Case of the Day – Monday, May 19, 2025

Posted on May 19, 2025 by TLRoot tagged.

NOT A HAPPY BUNCH AT ALL

This bunch is pretty happy … The Wongs? Not so much.

The Wong family, through their company Happy Bunch, LLC, was quite happy indeed with the nice piece of property the family occupied. The Wongs especially liked the 10 trees that lined one boundary. They had planted and nurtured them for 20 years or so, and the trees had gotten big enough that eight of them actually straddled the boundary line with their neighbor.

But what a hot dog the neighbor turned out to be! Grandview North was a developer and planned a Wienerschnitzel franchise on the lot next door. The City required that Grandview add about four feet of fill to the lot, and Grandview was afraid the Wongs’ boundary trees would get in the way. Grandview had a survey done, and the company knew the trees were on the boundary line, with most of the trunks on the Happy Bunch land (two were entirely on the Happy Bunch side of the boundary). So what? After finding itself unsuccessful at getting Mr. Wong to consent to the trees being cut down, Grandview made its view grander by taking out the trees itself. Mr. Wong was done wrong …

Happy Bunch sued. The trial court ruled that Grandview owed $32,000 or so for the trespass to timber, but it refused to impose statutory treble damages, finding them not applicable to boundary trees.

The Court of Appeals, in a case of first impression, disagreed. It ruled that boundary trees in Washington State are owned by both landowners as common property, and neither may cut them down without the consent of the other. The Court ruled that damages resulting from a boundary tree being cut down are the replacement value of the tree, apportioned by the percentage of the trunk on the injured landowner’s property, a method that strikes us as rather artificial and likely to undervalue the tree to the injured property owner. What, Happy Bunch gets half a tree back? There was a little bit of justice, however: the Court of Appeals ruled that the treble damage statute for trespass to timber applied to boundary trees as well as other trees.

Happy Bunch, LLC v. Grandview North, LLC, 173 P.3d 959 (Wash.App. Div. 1, 2007). The Wong family owned land through its limited liability company, Happy Bunch LLC. Grandview was a property development company that purchased a parcel of property next door to the Happy Bunch property to build a Wienerschnitzel drive-through restaurant. The City of Mount Vernon required that four feet of fill be placed on the Grandview property as part of the planned development.

Twelve mature trees stood either on or near the boundary line between the Happy Bunch and Grandview properties. Some portion of the trunks of 10 of the trees — all originally planted by the Wongs some years before — extended from the Happy Bunch property onto the Grandview property. Grandview believed it couldn’t meet the city’s fill requirement without putting a retaining wall on the Happy Bunch/Grandview property line. Because the roots and trunks of the trees extended onto Grandview’s property, Grandview believed that they would interfere with the construction of the retaining wall and decided to move them, even though Grandview knew a survey showed the trees’ true location on the property line.

The Happy Bunch was not happy, not agreeing with the plan and finding through its own survey that the trees were either on the boundary line or entirely on the Happy Bunch land. Despite Happy Bunch’s opposition, Grandview cut down all ten trees. Happy Bunch sued, claiming that it had acquired title to the land under and around the trees by adverse possession due to the Wongs’ maintenance of the trees and surrounding area. It also sought damages for both the value of the cut trees and the estimated $15,065 cost of digging up the trees’ root systems and repairing damage to the Wongs’ driveway likely to be sustained as a result. Happy Bunch also requested that the entire award be trebled under Washington law because of Section 64.12.030 of the Revised Code of Washington, the state’s timber trespass statute. Happy Bunch was thus happy to seek a total damage award of $168,294.

The trial court ruled that Grandview committed timber trespass by cutting the trees on the Wong/Grandview property line. The trial court took the damage figure to the trees of $40,033 and multiplied it by the percentage of the cut trees that had been growing on Happy Bunch’s property, resulting in damages of $32,519.22 to Happy Bunch on its timber trespass claim, as well as $2,500 for the cost of grinding out the remainder of the stumps. The court denied the damages of $15,065 for completely removing the trees’ root systems and repairing the resulting damage. Finally, the trial court ruled that Happy Bunch was not entitled to treble damages as provided by the timber trespass statute “[b]ecause the trees that were cut straddled the common property line.”

Happy Bunch appealed.

Held: Judgment was reversed on most counts. The Court of Appeals concluded that Happy Bunch was only entitled to recover damages for injury to those portions of the trees growing on its land. However, the Court found that RCW § 64.12.030’s treble damages provision did apply.

In most jurisdictions, a tree standing on a common property line is considered the property of both landowners as tenants in common. Although Happy Bunch admitted that courts commonly calculate damages based on the value of each cut tree, apportioned according to the percentage of the tree that was located on the injured landowner’s property, it contended that the proper approach here was the one applied in the Colorado case, Rhodig v. Keck. Rhodig held that absent a showing of an agreement to the contrary, a boundary line tree belongs entirely to the party on whose land the tree was originally planted, with damages calculated accordingly.

The Court of Appeals rejected Rhodig, holding that adoption of its rule would enable Washington landowners to effect boundary line adjustments with trees, creating “an entirely new theory of adverse possession without a basis in either the statutory or common law of this state.” The Court said the Rhodig holding would mean that Happy Bunch acquired title to the land under the trees simply because had once had planted the trees. Therefore, the Court held, a tree standing directly upon the line between adjoining owners so that the line passes through it is the common property of both parties, whether marked or not; and trespass will lie if one cuts and destroys it without the consent of the other. Grandview had an interest in the trees proportionate to the percentage of their trunks growing on Grandview’s property, and thus, the trial court correctly awarded Happy Bunch only that portion of the trees’ value reflecting Happy Bunch’s property interest in them.

Happy Bunch contended that an award of treble damages was mandatory pursuant to RCW § 64.12.030, unless Grandview proved one of the mitigating factors listed in the statute. The Court agreed, holding that the trespasser must allege and prove mitigation, and absent such a showing, treble damages will be imposed. The Court rejected Grandview’s argument that it believed it had a right to remove the trees, noting that Grandview possessed a survey that indicated that the majority of the trees were predominantly located on Happy Bunch’s property, and that at least two of the trees were not located on Grandview’s property at all.

The Court said that where a person has been given notice that another has an ownership interest in trees, and the person nonetheless cuts them down, the actor will be liable for treble damages under the statute. Both the punitive and compensatory policies underlying the statute are implicated with respect to boundary line trees, the Court reasoned, and for that reason, the statute must be applied.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Wednesday, April 23, 2025

Posted on April 23, 2025 by TLRoot tagged.

TESTING THE BOUNDARIES

Before I forget to do this, I’d like to report on a case of a conveniently forgetful property owner from the Land of 10,000 Lakes.

Mr. Meixner made an agreement with his neighbor, a sawmill, to replace some boundary fences. The first several fencelines were replaced according to the parties’ agreement, with Meixner and the sawmill sharing the costs. Everything seemed hunky-dory, as they like to say in Minnesota..

Out of nowhere, Mr. Meixner sued, claiming that the sawmill had cut down 73 trees on his land before replacing the second of the three fences.

The sawmill said, “Yup. Sure did.” These Minnesotans are people of few words, when they’re not saying things like “hunky-dory.” But the sawmill employee did say, “Had to cut down the trees to build the new fence. Meixner agreed.” Those words were plenty, and the jury found for the sawmill.

On appeal, the Court agreed with the level-headed jurors. It first adopted the general principle that trees on a boundary line are owned in common by the property owners, and neither may cut down a boundary tree without the consent of the other. But here, the Court said, it’s pretty clear that the sawmill employees had Mr. Meixner’s OK to axe the trees. After all, the Court observed, Mr. Meixner had given the sawmill permission to build the new fence, and he even shared the cost. If permission is given to enter onto the property to build a new fence, that permission implies authority to do all acts necessary to the completion of the task.

Don’t you believe it …

The sawmill employee said the trees had to go if the new fence was to be built. That evidence was good enough for the Court. Mr. Meixner wanted a fence, so he necessarily wanted the trees cut in order to build it.

Meixner v. Buecksler, 216 Minn. 586, 13 N.W.2d 754 (Sup.Ct. Minn. 1944). Meixner owned property next to a lumber company. He had an agreement with the company to replace old fences standing on the common boundary line.

Meixner and Buecksler, a tenant and employee of the company, built a new east-west fence in September 1938. Pursuant to the lumber company’s direction, Buecksler then cleared out the brush and cut down some trees in preparation for building a new fence to replace the old one that marked the boundary between Meixner’s south forty and the company’s north forty. A survey was made of this line, and thereafter Meixner and Buecksler constructed the replacement fence. A third fence was later completed, marking the east-west boundary.

Meixner contended that Buecksler and the company unlawfully cut 73 trees on his property prior to building the north-south fence, and that such acts were done without his knowledge or consent, and constituted trespass. The lumber company claimed Meixner had consented to clearing away the brush and cutting the trees, and that such acts were necessary in order to carry out the mutual plans to build the fence. The jury found for the defendants.

Meixner appealed.

Held: The appeals court upheld the verdict. It found that trees on the boundary line are the common property of the adjoining landowners, neither of whom may destroy without the consent of the other. However, trespass is not committed if there is permission or consent to do acts complained of, which consent may be implied from circumstances, and the jury was entitled to find that the Defendants had Meixner’s consent.

Generally, the Court said, permission to do a particular act carries with it authority and right, by implication, to do all that is necessary to effect principal objects and to avail the licensee of his rights under the license. Meixner’s agreement with Buecksler and the company for building a line fence between the adjoining properties carried with it by implication the right to do such things as were reasonably necessary in order properly to build the fence, including the cutting of trees on the boundary line.

Meixner had asked the court to award him treble damages under the Minnesota statute on wrongful cutting. The court declined, pointing out that there had to be damages in order to treble them, and Meixner simply had none.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Tuesday, April 8, 2025

Posted on April 8, 2025 by TLRoot tagged.

HEAD IN THE SAND

When Dominick Cristino and his brother got sued for cutting down a silver maple and a couple of elms on his neighbor’s land, Don’s bro hired a lawyer. But Dom wasn’t worried. His brother was a nervous Nellie. What did Dom need a high-priced lawyer for?

He soon found out. Acting as his own attorney, Dom had a fool for a client. He missed the deadline for pleading, and he couldn’t figure out that the judge was throwing him a life ring when he suggested Dom work something out with the plaintiff’s attorney. When Dom did not, the court entered a default against him. When the judge ruled that the tree damage was about $12,000, Dom thought that maybe having a mouthpiece wasn’t such a bad idea.

The new solicitor asked the court to set aside the judgment because Dom thought his brother’s lawyer was his lawyer, too. Horse-puckey, the Court said. Then Dom said he and his brother hadn’t cut the trees down willfully, meaning that treble damages could not be assessed under state law. The Court had to balance justice and judicial efficiency, fairness, and the public interest in finality. Dom had had his chance to argue that he hadn’t deliberately chopped down the trees. He sat on his rights.

The judge may have been no Solomon, but he did all right: he decided that justice demanded that Dominick not be hammered with treble damages — which, after all, are punitive in nature — without a chance to be heard. So the court told the plaintiff he could take the $12,000 and run, or the Court would decide the treble damage issue on the merits.

The judge was not Solomon, and he kept the swords out of the courtroom – but he brokered a balanced, efficient, and fair result.

Still, Dominick would have done a lot better if he had hired counsel at the outset.

Bontempo v. Cristino, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 407, 2007 WL 3014707 (Mass.Super., Sept. 6, 2007). Bontempo sued the Cristino brothers for the harm caused when Dominick Cristino cut down three trees located on the Bontempo property without permission.

One brother settled, but Dominick Cristino did not bother to defend the action. A default judgment was entered against him, despite the fact he was in court when it occurred. He declined the court’s invitation to talk to the plaintiffs to settle and offered no reason why a judgment should not enter against him.

At a damages hearing, Noel Bontempo and Dominick Cristino both testified. An expert estimated the replacement cost of the silver maple that had been cut down at $30,000 and two other elms at $7,000 each. The court determined that damages in the amount of $12,000 should be awarded against Dominick Cristino.

After the hearing, Dominick Cristino hired a lawyer and moved to set aside the default on the grounds that Dominick Cristino was misled into thinking that the law firm representing his brother also represented him. Also, Dominick and his brother Antonio filed affidavits that maintained they acted on the mistaken but good-faith belief, that the trees in question were located on their land.

Held: The default judgment would stand because Dominick Cristino had admitted that he cut down trees on Bontempo’s land without license in violation of Massachusetts G.L. Chapter 242, §7. What was in dispute, according to Dominick Cristino, was whether he acted willfully. If he did, the Court held, he would be liable to the owner for three times the amount of the damages assessed. The Court held that the interests of justice required that Bontempo should be given the opportunity to offer evidence in rebuttal to Dominick’s affidavit, and then the Court would decide the issue of willfulness on the merits, that is, whether the damages should be trebled or not.

If Bontempo was satisfied with the $12,000 award, the Court would uphold that and everyone could go home. To Cristino’s relief, Bontempo took the deal.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Friday, April 4, 2025

Posted on April 4, 2025 by TLRoot tagged.

VIRTUAL TRESPASS

More today from the annals of good neighboring. Out in Washington State, where some mighty big trees grow, the Herrings shared a boundary tree with their next-door neighbors, Jose and Blanca Pelayo.

What do we know about boundary trees, trees that grow with part of the base in each of two or more properties? First and most important, states generally hold that the trees are owned by all of the property owners as a tenancy in common. For the purpose of tree ownership, “tenancy in common” is a fancy way of saying that no one owner may do anything to the tree without the permission of all of the owners.

In 2011, the Herrings trimmed some of the branches from the boundary tree, branches that were overhanging their property. They did not ask permission of the Pelayos before they did so.

That, of course, was so wrong. But rather than suing the Herrings – the Pelayos may have considered their response restrained on this point – Jose and Blanca decided to go tit for tat. They called their own arborist to look at the tree. He told them the tree seemed unbalanced and dangerous with the branches on the Herring side removed. He suggested a few options, including cutting all of the remaining branches off. Amazingly, the Pelayos thought that sounded like a good idea.

Just as had the Herrings, the Pelayos did not discuss their plans with the neighbors. After the arborist left what was essentially a very dead telephone pole standing on the boundary line, the Herrings (with no sense of irony) sued the Pelayos for trespass to trees, asking for treble damages under state law for wrongful cutting. The trial court found the Pelayos liable, awarding $10,475 to the Herrings.

On appeal, the Pelayos argued that they could not have possibly trespassed in cutting the tree, because they had never stepped off their own property when they butchered the tree, and anyway, under the Massachusetts Rule, they had every right to trim branches that were overhanging the property. They also argued they could not be liable for treble damages, because the trial court had not made a finding that the cutting was willful.

The appeals court made short work of the Pelayos’ arguments. Yes, the court said, you can trespass on timber without necessarily trespassing on the underlying land (I guess that’s virtual trespassing). No, the Massachusetts Rule does not let you cut overhanging branches from a boundary tree in which you have an ownership interest. And no, the trial court does not have to make a willfulness finding unless you have argued that the cutting was casual and involuntary. No one contended the cutting had not been willful.

There is a certain irony that the Herrings had done exactly what the Pelayos had done, except for merely mauling the tree rather than killing it. But the Pelayos apparently figured they could get even simply by replicating the Herrings’ bad conduct. The law does not work that way.

Herring v. Pelayo, 198 Wn. App. 828, 397 P.3d 125 (Ct. App. Washington, May 2, 2017). The Herrings and Pelayos are neighbors who share a common property line. In early December 2011, the Herrings hired a tree trimmer to remove some branches from a tree located on the common property line. The Herrings did not discuss their plan to remove branches from the tree with the Pelayos. The Pelayos thought the trimming done by the Herrings unbalanced the tree, constituting a danger to their home. So four weeks later, the Pelayos’ own tree trimmer removed all of the remaining branches, without first discussing their plan with the Herrings. The tree obligingly died.

The Herrings sued the Pelayos, claiming timber trespass in violation of RCW 64.12.030 or RCW 4.24.630. At trial, Jose Pelayo admitted he knew the tree was on the common property line, he told his tree trimmer to remove all of the remaining branches from the tree, he did not discuss his plan with the Herrings, the tree was alive prior to the removal of the remaining branches, and he figured that removing the remaining branches would kill the tree.

The trial court found the Pelayos liable for timber trespass under RCW 64.12.030 and awarded treble damages.

The Pelayos appealed.

Held: The Pelayos committed timber trespass. Although the Pelayos argued the trial court never specifically found their conduct to be willful, the court noted that Jose’s testimony “was tantamount to a concession that his conduct in removing the branches was willful, and there was no other evidence presented at trial from which the trial court could infer that this conduct was casual or involuntary. Therefore, no specific finding as to willfulness was required to conclude that the Pelayos were liable under RCW 64.12.030.”

The Pelayos also argued they couldn’t be liable for trespass “because they were lawfully authorized to remove branches from the boundary tree that were overhanging their property.” The Court agreed a landowner has the authority to “engage in self-help and trim the branches and roots of a neighbor’s tree that encroach onto his or her property.” A landowner does not, however, have the right to cut down an encroaching tree.

The Court held that the right of self-help, derived from the Massachusetts Rule, does not apply where the landowner using self-help owns an interest in the tree because the portions of the tree overhanging his or her property cannot be said to be “encroaching.” You simply cannot encroach upon yourself.

What’s more, the Court said, as tenants in common, the Pelayos and Herrings were each entitled to use, maintain, and possess the boundary tree, but not in a manner that “interfered with the coequal rights of the other cotenants.” Unlike a landowner engaging in self-help to trim branches overhanging his or her property from a tree situated entirely on the property of another, a cotenant to a boundary tree has a duty not to destroy the common property and thereby interfere with the rights of the other cotenants.

The Court said, “We discern no meaningful distinction between cutting down a tree and trimming a tree in a manner intended to kill the tree.”

The Pelayos argued that because they cut the tree branches while standing on their property, they had probable cause to believe that they owned the land where such conduct took place. Their argument was based on the mistaken belief that the trebling provisions of RCW 64.12.030 don’t apply when the defendant’s conduct resulting in the destruction of a tree occurs while the defendant is on his or her own property. The Court held that even if the conduct resulting in the tree’s death occurred solely on the Pelayos’ own property, the trial court would not be required to conclude that mitigating circumstances applied to reduce the damages award. Instead, when determining whether mitigating circumstances applied, the relevant inquiry for the trial court was whether the Pelayos proved that their trespass on the common property tree was casual or involuntary.

At trial, the Pelayos did not claim, let alone prove, that the trespass upon the tree was casual or involuntary. Thus, they were liable for treble damages.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Friday, March 7, 2025

Posted on March 7, 2025 by TLRoot tagged.

THE TROUBLE WITH TREBLES

No .. our troubles are with “trebles.”

Most states have statutes on the books that increase the damages due for the wrongful cutting of trees when that cutting is intentional. As we have seen in Johnson v. Tyler, statutory treble damages are intended to be applied instead of punitive damages. The treble damages are meant to punish a wrongdoer and deter misconduct.

But rare is the case where Charlie Chainsaw runs amok in your backyard, cutting down trees just for the thrill of watching them fall on your house. Now that would be “willful.” Usually, things are not – forgive the pun – that clear-cut.

That’s the trouble with “treble.” The statute seems so limited in its coverage. Fortunately (that is, unless you’re the malefactor), courts have defined “willful” expansively. You might think that “willful” means “intentional.” But you would be wrong. While “willful” is certainly more than mere “inadvertence,” probably more than just “negligent,” it certainly encompasses “reckless.”

Whew! The whole concept’s kind of squishy. Listen to the Court of Appeals in today’s case: It said “willfulness” under Iowa’s treble damage statute is “under conditions that may be said to indicate something more than mere carelessness or recklessness. Of course, there was no personal malice against the owner. But there was a loose disregard for the rights of others… Certainly, there was something more than mere inadvertence.”

Got it? Good for you, because we don’t. More than “mere inadvertence” could be “gross negligence.” But what is “loose disregard for the rights of others?” Generally, the law follows a continuum from strict liability – that is, liability without any fault at all – through negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and intentional misconduct. “Loose disregard” is nowhere on the list.

We’re tempted to suspect that the Court of Appeals found Lionberger’s and Norton’s conduct sufficiently outrageous that it was unwilling to let them off for a mere $1,500.00. Perhaps it believed the legislature intended that even negligence in the identification of boundaries should give rise to punitive damages. Whatever the Court’s rationale, it provided guidance to the definition of “willful” that shows a “loose disregard” for precision.

Drew v. Lionberger, 508 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa App. 1993). Drew owned land that was surrounded by property owned by Lionberger. Codefendant Norton Lumber Company is in the logging business. In the fall of 1989, Lionberger hired Norton to log some trees on his land. Lionberger helped Norton in determining the boundaries of his land, but Lionberger never contacted Drew about the proper boundaries between the respective properties. As a result of improperly marked boundaries, Norton logged twenty-eight trees from Drew’s land. The trees were mature, some of them being as old as 150 years.

During trial, Drew testified that he and his family used the land for hunting and hiking. He also produced testimony from an arborist that the trees were worth $17,053. Lionberger said the trees were worth between $535 and $1,500. The defendant’s expert based these figures on the market value of the lumber cut from the trees.

The trial court determined that Lionberger and Norton were jointly and severally liable for the market value of the lumber produced from the trees in the amount of $1,473.

Drew appealed, claiming the trial court erred by using the market value of the lumber produced from the trees to measure damages, by not awarding treble damages for the willful cutting of the trees, and by failing to find that codefendant Norton Lumber Company trespassed on Drew’s land and wrongfully logged trees.

Held: The district court was correct that the current market value of the lumber produced from the trees is the correct measure of damages. However, the trial court was wrong to conclude that treble damages were not warranted.

The Court of Appeals, relying on Laube v. Thomas, held that because Drew’s trees had no special use, the measure of damages was the commercial market value of the trees at the time of taking. The Court of Appeals held that the district court’s finding that Drew was entitled to the market value of the trees – a princely sum of $1,473 – was right.

If you're dropping trees this close to the neighbor's house, you just may be in lines for paying some treble damages.

If you’re dropping trees this close to the neighbor’s house, you just may have a bill for treble damages in your future.

Drew also argued that Iowa Code § 658.4, which addresses treble damages, should have been applied. That statute provides that “[f]or willfully injuring any timber, tree, or shrub on the land of another, or in the street or highway in front of another’s cultivated ground, yard, or city lot, or on the public grounds of any city, or any land held by the state for any purpose whatever, the perpetrator shall pay treble damages at the suit of any person entitled to protect or enjoy the property.”

The Court of Appeals agreed. It found no substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that Lionberger’s and Norton’s actions were not willful. The Court held that the trees were cut and removed “under conditions that may be said to indicate something more than mere carelessness or recklessness. Of course, there was no personal malice against the owner. But there was a loose disregard for the rights of others … Certainly, there was something more than mere inadvertence.”

Lionberger and Norton, on their own, had measured and marked what they thought was the Drew property. Because no boundary markers existed at the time the measurements were taken, they knew a question existed as to the boundaries of Drew’s property. Despite knowing this, the defendants never contacted Drew to determine whether or not the boundaries they measured were acceptable to him. Furthermore, neither Lionberger nor Norton communicated any intention to cut trees from the area in question to Drew prior to logging the trees.

Their failure to contact Drew or to obtain his input as to the existing boundaries before logging the trees, the Court concluded, was “clearly intentional. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the defendants did their own measuring and then proceeded to cut the biggest and oldest trees from the area in question. Because we find the cutting of Drew’s trees to be willful in accordance with § 658.4, we conclude Drew is entitled to treble damages under the statute.”

Drew’s damage award thus went up from $1,473 to $4,418.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Wednesday, February 26, 2025

Posted on February 26, 2025 by TLRoot tagged.

SHOWING UP

Denise Pevarnek’s agent chopped down her neighbors’ trees so she’d have a better view of the river. The neighbors complained (surprisingly enough), but Denise steadfastly ignored their remonstrances. The neighbors then sued, but Denise ignored the summons. She finally decided to start paying attention after a default was entered against her and the trial court intended to assess treble damages against her in the amount of $77,000.

Denise tried futilely to undo the consequences of her earlier indolence. Alas, a stitch in time saves nine. The Court ruled that she had had plenty of notice, but her decision to ignore the lawsuit was her problem, and undoing the default she so richly deserved would have turned her problem into her neighbors’ problem. And they were already smarting from the loss of their trees.

Of interest in the case — one argument Denise included in her scattershot but untimely defense — was her contention that the cost to replace the trees wasn’t the right measure of damages and that the trial court was wrong to rely on an affidavit of an arborist that didn’t explain in detail how he had arrived at the damage costs. The Court rejected this, saying that in the case of trespass, the measure of damages is either the reduction in the value of the property or — where the property can be repaired — the cost to fix things. The goal of the damage award, according to the Court, is to come as close as possible to compensating the owner for the damages, and trial courts have a lot of latitude to choose the method that seemed more reasonably calculated to do so.

The affidavit, the Court noted, laid out the expert’s education and experience, showed that he had inspected the damaged real estate, and proposed a reasonable strategy for repairing the harm. The arborist listed what had to be done and how much he’d charge to do it. It might not be perfect, but perfection is often the enemy of “good enough.” The affidavit, the Court ruled, was “good enough.”

The Court reminded the defendant that if she really had found the damage showing to be flawed and superficial, she could have come to the hearing and contested it. Snooze and lose, indeed.

Bologna v. Pevarnek, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 2689, 2007 WL 4207801 (Mich.App., Nov. 29, 2007). Denise Pevarnek hired Chester Damiani to clean up her property. He was zealous to a fault, deciding to improve the view of the Detroit River from her adjacent lot by cutting down trees belonging to her neighbors, the Bolognas. Believing that Denise and Chester’s conduct was baloney, the Bolognas sued for trespass, alleging that the destruction reduced the value of their property and exposed a view to Pevarnek’s unsightly neighboring property and asking for $28,000, trebled by Michigan’s wrongful cutting statute to $84,000.

Denise Pevarnek was served with the lawsuit, but she didn’t answer. As is customary when that happens, the Bolognas got a default judgment. Thereafter, they presented the affidavit of a certified arborist who opined that the cost of landscape restoration was $24,050. At this point, Denise took notice, and began taking action to defend, seeking to have the default undone. The trial court refused, and it entered judgment against her for $77,730. Pevarnek appealed.

Held: The judgment was upheld. Much of the case revolves around whether Denise should be relieved from her default judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled, in essence, that she knew about the suit and did nothing. In other words, “you snooze, you lose.” But of interest in the area of tree law was Denise’s claim that the trial court was wrong in using the cost of replacing the trees as a measure of the damages the Bolognas suffered. The Court of Appeals said where the wrong consists of a trespass to property resulting in an injury to the land that is permanent and irreparable, the general measure of damages is the diminution in value of the property. If the injury is reparable or temporary, however, the measure of damages is the cost of restoration of the property to its original condition (if less than the value of the property before the injury).

The rule is, however, flexible in its application. The ultimate goal is compensation for the harm or damage done. Thus, a court may apply whatever method is most appropriate to compensate a plaintiff for his or her loss. Here, the Court said, given the fact that the Bolognas’ trees could be restored, it was proper for the trial court to use the cost-of-restoration method.

Pevarnek argued that the trial court erred by adopting without question the assertion of alleged damages without sufficient foundation. The plaintiff had filed an affidavit of arborist Steve McCollum, who swore that – in order to return the property to its pre-trespass condition, that is, with no view of Pevarnek’s property – 12 new trees had to be planted, some existing trees had to be replanted, the over-pruned trees had to be removed, and the lawn had to be repaired. He stated that the total cost of this work was $24,050. The trial court awarded plaintiffs damages of $77,730, equal to three times the sum of the cost of work proposed by McCollum and $1,860 for the cost of a privacy fence. Although McCollum’s affidavit didn’t explain how he calculated the damages, he stated his qualifications and education, he said he had personally inspected the Bologna property, assessed their needs, specifically listed the work to be done, and listed the cost for his business was to complete it. The Court said the expert affidavit put forth a reasonable basis for the damage computation, and that was enough.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Tuesday, February 25, 2025

Posted on February 25, 2025 by TLRoot tagged.

THIS ONE IS FOR MY WONDERFUL WIFE

Years ago, our neighbor Olwen – who, if she had not passed away (meaning, of course, that we cannot speak ill of her), we would have described as a battleaxe – surrounded two sides of her property with 2-3’ arborvitae. It didn’t really look that bad, but… well, they grew.

And grew, and grew and grew. Our neighbor never trimmed them before she departed this mortal coil. And the two families who lived there subsequently never trimmed the trees/shrubs/whatever-the-hell-they-are, either.

Consequently, the arborvitae are 25 feet tall and still growing. We finally had to move our vegetable garden about 20 yards to the west because of the shade they were throwing. Exercising our Massachusetts Rule rights last fall, we hacked about ten of them back to the property line in order to install a new shed. We then built a fence to try to keep the monsters in check.

My wife mutters about the arborvitae daily. I have no problem understanding Nancy – the protagonist in today’s case – who must have loved neighbor Pnita’s arborvitae as much as my wife loves Olwen’s. But while my wife just glowers at the arborvitae, Nancy – a woman of action – did something. She brought in a trimming crew and topped the neighbor’s trees.

She didn’t kill them, just sort of knee-capped them. Who knew that so much visceral pleasure could end up being so expensive?

So this post is for my wife, a cautionary tale lest she decides to take matters into her own hands on the next-door arborvitae. Take a deep breath, honey…

Joseph v. Nathanson, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1102, 23 N.E.3d 151, 2015 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 37 (Ct.App. Mass. Jan. 16, 2015). Pnina Joseph and Nancy Ellen Nathanson owned abutting properties and shared a property line. Pnina planted thirty-five arborvitae trees on her property close to the property line to serve as a privacy screen. In October 2012, Nancy directed her landscaper to go onto Pnina’s property and “prune” the trees. The landscaper “topped” the trees by cutting about five to six feet from the tops.

Pnina sued under Massachusett’s tree-cutting statute, G. L. c. 242, § 7, and a jury returned a verdict in Pnina’s favor, awarding her $35,000. The award was trebled under the statute. Nancy appealed, arguing that her actions did not violate the tree statute because the trees were not “cut down” or “destroyed” as required by the statute.

Held: “Topping” the trees so that they would no longer grow any higher justified application of the Massachusetts wrongful-cutting statute.

General Law c. 242, § 7 provides for liability on the part of anyone who “without license willfully cuts down, carries away, girdles or otherwise destroys trees.” Nancy asserts that under the tree statute, Pnina’s trees had to be completely destroyed or cut down in order for the plaintiff to recover. She argues that the evidence showed that the trees were alive, growing, and healthy after the topping of the trees and, therefore, could not possibly have been “destroyed.”

The Court said it would interpret a statute to give effect “to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.” The statute here requires that the trees be “cut down, carried away, girdled or otherwise destroyed.” G. L. c. 242, § 7. “The phrase “otherwise destroyed” includes,” the Court said, “but is not limited to, the preceding phrases including ‘cut down’.” In other words, “cut down, carried away,” and “girdled” are examples of how a tree may be destroyed; they are not exclusive.

The judge instructed the jury that the word “destroy” has a commonly understood meaning, which includes “to ruin completely, to ruin the structure, organic existence or condition of a thing, to demolish, to injure or mutilate beyond the possibility of use.” The Court held that this definition given to the jury correctly provided a broader meaning to the term destroy than the examples in the statute.

Pnina’s expert testified that the “topping” of the trees meant that they would never grow vertically again and were no longer functional as a privacy screen. The jury was entitled to credit that testimony, to agree with Pnina that the trees were “mutilated beyond the possibility of use” as a privacy screen, and therefore to find in Pnina’s favor.

– Tom Root