Case of the Day – Thursday, June 18, 2026

IT WAS A DARK AND STORMY NIGHT …

Snoopy made the opening line of Paul Clifford one of the most famous in the history of pedestrian writing.

Snoopy made the opening line of Paul Clifford one of the most famous in the history of pedestrian writing.

Or so begins Edward George Bulwer-Lytton’s 1830 novel, Paul Cliffordthe opening line now famous thanks to Snoopy in the comic strip Peanuts and the fiction contest that bears the author’s name. It’s a bit ironic:  we are enjoying as much light over the next few days as any time this year (the solstice arrives at 4:24 am EDT on Sunday).

Yet today, we’re going to look back on a really dark and stormy night when the aptly-named farmer Hay drove his truck through the Ohio countryside, past the golf course owned by a local lodge of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks.

On this particular dark and stormy summer night, an oak tree by the side of the road, weakened and decayed after a lightning strike several years before, fell on Farmer Hay, bringing to a sudden end his time on this mortal coil. Subsequently, his estate sued the Elks, claiming the Lodge had been negligent in failing to do anything about the hazardous tree, despite the fact that its decrepit state was well known to the duffers.

Relying on rather a thin precedent, the trial court threw out the Hay descendants’ claim, holding that a rural landowner had no duty to protect travelers on the highway from the natural condition of trees on his or her property. The matter reached the Ohio Supreme Court in 1951.

The Supreme Court began with the observation that the law permitted every landowner to make such use of the person’s property as he or she wishes, provided it is used in such a manner as not to invade the rights of others. It then added flesh to that general rule, holding that while a rural landowner has no duty to inspect trees adjacent to a highway, when he or she has knowledge – actual or constructive – of a patently defective condition of a tree which may injure a traveler, the landowner must exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to people lawfully using the highway.

While there was little precedent in other states for the duty to act defined by the Hay court, the decision hardly came as a surprise. The American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law of Torts had previously held that while “[n]either a possessor of land, nor a lessor, vendor or other transferor thereof, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to others outside the land by a natural condition of the land other than trees growing near a highway.” But it contained an important caveat. The Restatement – which is written with a goal of identifying trends in the law – noted that its drafters expressed “no opinion as to whether a possessor of land who permits trees not planted by himself or his predecessors to remain on a part of the land near a public highway is or is not under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent their condition becoming such as to involve a grave risk of causing serious bodily harm to those who use the highway and the burden of making them safe is not excessive as compared to the risk involved in their dangerous condition.”

The ALI presciently foresaw evolution of the duty defined in Hay and cases in other jurisdictions that followed it. The Hay rule has since become a standard of care imposed by virtually all states.

These things happen ... but the landowner may be liable, depending on what he or she knew and when he or she knew it.

These things happen … but the landowner may be liable, depending on what he knew and when he knew it.

Hay v. Norwalk Lodge No. 730, B.P.O.E, 92 Ohio App. 14, 109 N.E.2d 481 (Court of Appeals, 6th Dist., 1951). Farmer Hay was driving his truck on New State Road when a large limb or limbs fell from a tree located on land owned by the local chapter of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks. The limb struck the top of the cab, injuring Mr. Hay so that he lost control of the truck, crashed into a tree, and died as a result of his injuries.

Mr. Hay’s estate sued, alleging that the tree had been struck by lightning several years before, and was extensively damaged and weakened as a result. The complaint said the damage to the tree was visible and apparent for several years, and that after the tree was struck by lightning, apparent natural processes of decay set in and further weakened the tree and its branches, which extended over and above the traveled portion of the road. Finally, the complaint averred that the Elks knew that portions of the tree extended over the road, that it had been struck by lightning, and the tree was  weakened. The complaint concluded that the Elks had neglected to remove or brace the damaged portions or to do anything to make the tree secure, and failed and neglected to give notice to motorists of the danger.

The trial court held that the Elks had no duty to Mr. Hay to alert him as to the danger tree, or to remove or trim it. It threw out the complaint. The matter ended up before the Ohio Supreme Court:

Held: The Supreme Court reversed, and sent the case back for trial. It held that every person may make such use as he or she will of real property, provided he or she uses it in such a manner as not to invade the rights of others. But in the case of rural landowners, this means that although there is no duty imposed upon the owner of property abutting a rural highway to inspect trees or to ascertain defects that may result in injury to motorists, an owner having actual or constructive knowledge of a patently defective condition of a tree which may result in injury to motorists must exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to people lawfully using the highway.

The Court noted that the only Ohio holding even close to its conclusion in this case was one in which the owner of property upon which a tree was situated was held to have the duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of pedestrians using the sidewalk. However, the American Law Institute had noted in Restatement of the Law of Torts that its members were split, and thus had no opinion on “whether a possessor of land who permits trees not planted by himself or his predecessors to remain on a part of the land near a public highway is or is not under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent their condition becoming such as to involve a grave risk of causing serious bodily harm to those who use the highway and the burden of making them safe is not excessive as compared to the risk involved in their dangerous condition.”

Public policy opposes burdening rural landowners with the duty of inspecting their property for hazard trees ... but if the landowner knows there's a problem, he or she should attend to it.

      Public policy opposes burdening rural landowners with the duty of inspecting their property for hazard trees … but if the landowners know of a problem, they should attend to it.

The Ohio Supreme Court observed that the law imposes upon every member of society the duty to refrain from conduct of a character likely to injure a person with whom he comes in contact and to use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another. The justices reviewed cases from other states, which led the Court to the “conclusion that in the absence of knowledge of a defective condition of a branch of a tree which in the course of natural events is likely to fall and injure a person in the highway, no liability attaches to the owner of the tree. On the other hand, where the owner has knowledge of the dangerous condition of the tree or its branches, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the fall of the tree or its branches into the highway.” The Court agreed with a Minnesota case that held that it was unreasonable to require the owner of rural land to inspect his property with regard to naturally arising defects, because of the burden thereby imposed upon the owner of large and unsettled tracts of land. However, the Court rejected the Minnesota case’s conclusion that the owner was not liable even if he had actual knowledge.

The Ohio Supreme Court instead followed dictum from a Federal court decision that “an owner of property abutting a highway has an obligation to use reasonable care to keep his premises in such condition as not to endanger travelers in their lawful use of the highway. If he fails to do so and thereby renders the way unsafe for travel, he should be liable therefor. It is, therefore, concluded that, although there is no duty imposed upon the owner of property abutting a rural highway to inspect growing trees adjacent thereto to ascertain defects that may result in injury to a traveler on the highway, an owner having knowledge of a patently defective condition of a tree which may result in injury to a traveler on a highway must exercise reasonable care to prevent harm from the falling of such tree or its branches on a person lawfully using the highway. If the danger is apparent, which a person can see with his own eyes, and he fails to do so with the result that injury results to a traveler on the way, the owner is responsible because in the management of his property, he has not acted as a reasonably prudent landowner would act.”

Because the Hay Estate’s filing alleged the Elks had actual knowledge of the decayed tree, the complaint made out a claim that – if proven – would entitle the Estate to recover. The case was reinstated and sent back to the trial court.

– Tom Root

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And Now The News …

CNN, June 17, 2026: Ancient Sherwood Forest oak tree reputed to have sheltered Robin Hood has died

When knights of old went looking for Robin Hood, they knew where to find him. The legendary outlaw has been associated with England’s Sherwood Forest for centuries, and one tree in particular has traditionally been cited as his hideout: the Major Oak. Scientists now believe this 1,200-year-old oak tree has died after it failed to produce any new leaves this spring, British conservation body the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds said in a news release. With a canopy spread of 28 meters (92 feet) and a trunk circumference of 11 meters (36 feet), the Major Oak was one of the biggest trees in Britain. Supports for some of the branches were put in place in the early 20th century, and the tree was fenced off in the 1970s…

Ottawa, Ontario, CTV News, June 16, 2026: A tree in this Ottawa homeowner’s yard is destroying her home, but she can’t cut it down

By looking at the damage, it appears as if an earthquake hit Nicole Robert’s house. But the root cause of all the damage to her home in Ottawa’s Copeland Park neighbourhood is a maple tree in her front yard. Specifically, the tree’s roots. “The front of my house sank, and the brick became separated from my foundation. The house is cracked. There is enough force to crack through my brick, which I guess when that happens, it’s a substantial force,” Robert said. Robert noticed last summer that her house started shifting when doors wouldn’t stay closed and windows could not open. Upon further inspection, she found major cracking and separation along her foundation and brick siding. She brought in three different engineers to assess why it was happening. “They determined that the cause of the movement was trees. The tree roots sucking the moisture out of the ground,” said Robert. “[The roots] can’t go that way because of the street, there’s no water. So where are they getting pushed to? Well, they’re getting pushed back to my home…”

New York City, The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2026: Vultures Are Stinking Up This North Carolina Town. Locals Want Justice.

These days, you have to watch where you step in parts of this picturesque hamlet. Those white splashes on the sidewalk aren’t fresh paint. They’re vulture poop. Lots of it. Large groups of black vultures have taken up residence in town, covering the quaint historic district in feathers and foul-smelling excrement. Poop was so thick beneath one tree that people slipped on the sidewalk when it rained. When public-works crews went to hose down the area, they couldn’t complete the job. The smell was so overwhelming that workers started retching. Now, the malodorous mess has led to legal squawking between the town and two of its residents. In March, the Town of Hillsborough sued Kenneth and Linda Ostrand, demanding they stop feeding a large group of the black vultures roosting on their property…

Real Simple, June 16, 2026: 6 Trees You Should Never Plant in Your Yard, According to the Experts

Outfitting your yard with beautiful flowers, shrubs, and trees comes down to far more than aesthetics alone. Often, the best choices are low-maintenance plants that are native to the environment, thrive brilliantly on their own, and (as a nice bonus) show off with some pretty foliage. This is true of anything you add to your landscaping, but trees require an extra level of scrutiny to ensure they pass the backyard vibe check. Once established, they’re far more difficult to remove, and their larger canopies can lead to a lot more maintenance compared to, say, a knee-high shrub. We spoke with arborists and landscapers about which trees are bad choices for your yard so you can spare yourself the headache. Despite its name, the Tree of Heaven isn’t exactly a homeowner’s delight. Not only is it intrusive both by seed and sucker, but it can become unwieldy and very difficult to control, warns Tammy Sons, landscaping expert and founder of TN Nursery. But wait, it gets worse…

Honolulu, Hawaii, Spectrum News, June 15, 2026: Repellent offers new hope in battle against rapid ohia death

Forestry officials are pinning their hopes for containing the spread of rapid ohia death on a newly developed beetle repellent known as SPLAT Verb. ROD is a fungal disease that has killed upwards of a million ohia trees on Hawaii Island since it was first detected in Puna over 15 years ago. The disease has also appeared on Kauai, killing about 1,000 trees there. SPLAT Verb, developed over five years by forest entomologist Kylle Roy with the U.S. Forestry Service Health Protection Branch, works by repelling ambrosia beetles, which burrow into diseased trees and spread ROD through their frass (chewed, undigested wood and excrement). Specifically, the repellent emits a pheromone that discourages the beetles from burrowing into the trees, ultimately preventing the release of active fungal pathogens into the environment. Personnel from the Department of Land and Natural Resources’ Division of Forestry and Wildlife and the USFS have applied SPLAT Verb to ohia trees killed by ROD as well as healthy ohia in the Kokee State Park area over the last few months…

Boca Raton, Florida, Florida Atlantic University, June 15, 2026: Researchers find trees can shield homes from storms

Florida International University researchers found that some of the most common trees in Florida can significantly shield homes from extreme wind, decreasing suction forces applied to critical regions of the roof by as much as 50%. The findings were recently published in the Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics. The urbanized part of Miami-Dade County is home to an estimated 36 million trees, and city planners want even more in the years to come. About 20% of Miami-Dade County is covered by the branches and leaves of trees, known collectively as the urban tree canopy. For homeowners, the canopy can provide shade and protection, but during hurricanes trees can also become hazards. So, what exactly are all these trees doing during storms? Which trees are more likely to become hazards, and which help shield homes from wind? To answer these questions, Amal Elawady, an associate professor in the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department, Haitham Ibrahim, a postdoctoral associate, and Fouad Elazaka, a Ph.D. candidate, gathered data on more than 40,000 trees across Florida. They then tested how a set of the most common trees in Florida interact with extreme wind and nearby homes at FIU’s Wall of Wind, a world-leading facility capable of simulating a Category 5 hurricane and conducting full-scale testing…

London, UK, The Guardian, June 13, 2026: Trees may store less planet-heating carbon than hoped, study suggests

Trees may not be able to store as much planet-heating carbon as hoped, a study suggests, with researchers finding photosynthesis does not always lead to wood growth. Scientists studied 137 sites across the US and found trees stopped growing months before the point in the year at which photosynthesis stopped. Forests are a vital defence against climate breakdown but their power depends in part on how much carbon dioxide they can convert into wood, which keeps the planet-heating molecule out of the atmosphere for decades and centuries. Other uses of carbon are typically shorter lasting…

New York City, The New York Times, June 13, 2026: ‘Witness’ Tree Outside Abraham Lincoln’s Former Home Irreparably Damaged

Severe storms on Thursday irreparably damaged what is believed to be the last remaining “witness” tree at a home in Springfield, Ill., dating back to the time that Abraham Lincoln lived there. According to a National Park Service employee, the tree, an American linden, was damaged by winds, which gusted to at least 60 miles per hour. Pictures posted to social media show the tree with its upper half toppled over. Lincoln bought the home in January 1844 and lived there for 17 years. During that time, he set up his own law practice, welcomed and buried his second child, was elected to the House of Representatives and eventually to the White House in 1860. He left the home for the White House early in 1861…

Yahoo Life, June 11, 2026: Would you go to war over an 80-foot elm? The backyard battles tearing neighbors apart — and delighting the internet.

An intriguing question: What do Chris Pine, William H. Macy and a suburban librarian have in common? Answer: They’ve all been entangled in messy, costly disputes over … trees. Each of these three people have been involved in lawsuits over, you guessed it, the finer points of foliage — to the tune of tens of thousands to tens of millions of dollars. It turns out that the leafy corner of the yard is often the most contentious spot in the neighborhood, with people passionately sparring over property lines, esoteric regulations and who’s blocking the view. There are plenty of spectators too, with strong opinions — the subreddit r/treelaw has more than 175,000 weekly visitors who come to ask their questions, make tree puns and, virtually, chant “TREE! LAW! TREE! LAW!…”

Albuquerque, New Mexico, New Mexico Political Report, June 14, 2026: Tree deaths in New Mexico tripled in 2025 as warming summers increases insects, stress on forests

Tree deaths tripled in New Mexico during the second warmest year on record, according to new analysis of the state’s forest health from the U.S. Forest Service and New Mexico Forestry Division. 2025 saw a rapid expansion of bark beetle-caused deaths with 209,000 acres of conifers now dead — up from 67,000 acres in 2024 — mostly on national forest land managed by the USFS. “Fall and winter temperatures remained warmer and drier, allowing bark beetles to remain active late in the season,” the report concluded. “Large areas of ponderosa and piñon forests saw significant mortality from bark beetles, especially in the southern part of the state. Areas near burn scars from large wildfires continue to experience bark beetle attack on residual trees. If there is good news in the report, it is that a virus infecting some of the most common insects causing defoliation greatly reduced the number of acres showing a loss of leaf or needle coverings. Insect infestations of the western spruce budworm, Douglas-fir tussock moth, western tent caterpillar, needleminers and scale insects was down 51% from 327,000 acres in 2024 to 160,000 acres in 2025…”

Pasadena, California, Local News Pasadena, June 14, 2026: PUSD Tree Removal Plan Sparks Outcry Over Transparency and Environmental Impact

Pasadena holds a long-standing designation as a Tree City. Administered by the Department of Public Works, the city actively manages a diverse urban forest comprising more than 60,000 public trees spanning dozens of species. The city uses a Master Street Tree Plan to carefully select which tree types are planted on specific parkways and tracks and to closely monitor tree care. For generations, Pasadena has been a community defined not only by its historic architecture and beautiful neighborhoods, but by the towering canopy of mature trees that line its streets, parks, and school campuses. That is why many residents were stunned last Wednesday to find construction crews preparing to remove what appeared to be healthy, mature trees from the campus at San Rafael Elementary School. The Pasadena Unified School District (PUSD) has instituted a plan to remove approximately 193 trees across 11 school campuses as part of a soil remediation project tied to post-Eaton Fire environmental cleanup efforts…

Space Daily, June 14, 2026: Beneath Oregon’s Blue Mountains, a single honey fungus has been spreading through the roots of the forest for thousands of years, now covering nearly 10 square kilometres.

Beneath the Blue Mountains of eastern Oregon, in the Malheur National Forest, a single honey fungus has been spreading through the roots of the forest for thousands of years. It now covers nearly ten square kilometres. Most of it is invisible. What you see at the surface is indirect: clusters of trees dying in the same way, and, for a few weeks in autumn, honey-coloured mushrooms pushing up through the soil. The organism itself is the network underneath. It is one of the strongest contenders for the largest living thing on Earth. That phrasing is deliberate, and we will come back to it, because the title is more contested than the headlines suggest. The fungus is Armillaria ostoyae, a honey fungus and a root pathogen, the kind of organism a forester first meets as a disease rather than a wonder. It was spotted in the Malheur in 1988 by a Forest Service worker, Greg Whipple, who put its extent at about 400 acres. That turned out to be a large underestimate…

TNLBGray

Case of the Day – Wednesday, June 17, 2026

THE STIG

The Stig

Jim and Cindy Muncie found oil on their land.

Sadly, this was not a cause for champagne. The oil was #2 heating oil, a thousand gallons of it that had come spilling down the hill to flood their house. It was a mess.

The estate of the deceased woman whose oil tank had ruptured settled a federal court suit for $60,000, the restoration amount the Muncies figured it would take to clean up the slick. But as soon as they got the $60,000, the Muncies – deciding that cleanup compensation just wasn’t enough – sued the estate in state court for “stigma damages.”

Stigma damages, which I caution fans of the long-departed Top Gear have nothing to do with The Stig (who is even longer departed but not forgotten), are pretty much what they sound like. Remember how you felt when you learned that your childhood hero, Captain Kangaroo, did not fight beside Lee Marvin in the Battle of Iwo Jima? And that he was not really a captain and had never been a kangaroo? After that, there was a stigma attached to ol’ Cap that even Dancing Bear could not erase.  

Properties can be like that. Considering buying Yellowstone Park from a federal government that’s a little strapped for cash to pay Medicare and Social Security for us baby boomers? How much you’re willing to shell out for a national treasure might be affected by knowing that you’re standing in the caldera of one of the biggest volcanoes on Earth. On a smaller scale, a buyer might hesitate to write a check knowing that his or her prospective home had been steeped in hydrocarbons, even if there was no tangible evidence that the mishap had ever occurred.

We recently focused on restoration costs being awarded when those costs exceeded the reduction in value suffered due to a trespass and subsequent damage. Today’s case is the obverse of that coin, where the restoration costs may not be quite enough to fully pay for the loss suffered, a loss due to the “stigma” attached to the property because of the damage.

Muncie v. Wiesemann, 548 S.W.3d 877 (Supreme Court, Kentucky, 2018). One cold December day, a faulty underground home heating oil tank on an unoccupied property cracked open, spilling 1,000 gallons of fuel oil. The oil flowed downhill, flooding Cindy and Jim Muncie’s at the bottom of the hill.

Although Patricia Wiesemann, who was handling the affairs of the estate that owned the unoccupied property, hired contractors to remove the heating oil and prevent further contamination, the leaking continued to damage Jim and Cindy’s place. The contamination caused the Kentucky Environmental Response Branch to declare an environmental emergency, implementing emergency procedures to “limit any human health or environmental impacts” at the Muncie residence.

Litigation ensued. In September 2013, the parties entered into a partial settlement. The settlement allocated $60,000 to the Muncies for restoration costs, intended to remedy actual damages to their property. In return, the Muncies agreed to dismiss all claims against Wiesemann and the Estate, except for a few reserved claims. Prominently, the partial settlement reserved “claims by the Muncies asserting the diminution of the value of their real estate due to the stigma resulting from the contamination…”

Stigma damages, as the name implies, are damages suffered from diminished value to property caused by a negative perception of a site and call for compensation for the “stigma” to satisfy the fundamental concept that an injured party must be made whole. A perception of harm may be all that is needed to support an award of stigma damages. Such damages are intended to compensate for loss to the property’s market value resulting from the long-term negative perception of the property in excess of any recovery obtained for the temporary injury itself. Were this residual loss due to stigma not compensated, a plaintiff’s property would be permanently deprived of significant value without compensation.

A month after signing the settlement, the Muncies sued Pat in state court for negligence, trespass, and permanent nuisance. Pat filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the partial settlement barred the state action because the Muncies were fully paid for the actual damages the contamination caused to their property. She claimed that, as a matter of law, stigma damages can only be recovered when paired with an actual damages award.

The trial court said that while stigma damages can be considered as part of restoration damages – the cost to repair the property – stigma damages cannot be awarded separately from restoration damages. Because the Muncies settled their restoration claim in the partial settlement agreement, the trial court held that no further claim existed. The Muncies’ claim for stigma damages was dismissed.

The Muncies appealed.

Held: Stigma damages can be awarded in Kentucky, and that award can be separate from restoration damages.

Pat complained that because the $60,000 restoration payment was accepted by the Muncies in the partial settlement agreement, they could not now separately seek stigma damages for the diminution in value of their property. To do otherwise would result in a “double recovery” for the Muncies.

The Supreme Court disagreed. In order to recover stigma damages, it held, plaintiffs must have suffered actual property damage. If injured parties receive repair costs that make them whole, then they cannot recover stigma damages that would compensate them above the diminution in their property’s value. But if restoration damages for repair costs are insufficient to make the injured party whole, then a recovery for stigma damages up to the monetary value of the diminution may be proper.

In other words, the Court said, damages recoverable for an actual injury to real property are equal to the sum of the costs of repair and the difference in fair market value of the property before the injury and after it has been repaired. If there is a difference in fair market value after the physical injury has been repaired, then that is the appropriate measure of stigma damages.

Stigma damages measure the amount by which a real property’s value is diminished in excess of repair costs. Here, once the oil was removed from the Muncies’ property and the environmental response team departed, stigma was what remained, and it – by its nature – it cannot be repaired.

“Unquestionably,” the Court presciently ruled, “the devil is in the details for these types of cases. We can only provide broad principles of law. The method for computing damages is straightforward but can be difficult to understand. They can also be difficult to prove.” However, when property is damaged by trespass, the degree of the damage is determined at the moment such injury is completed. The recovery shall be the difference in value of the property before the injury occurred and the value immediately after it is completed. The after-value shall take into account any stigma damages. Damages will also include the cost of any repair or remediation.”

Because there was no evidence taken on the stigma damage, if any, suffered by the Muncies, the Supreme Court of Kentucky sent the case back for a factual determination as to whether they were fully compensated for the diminution in fair market value of their property by the $60,000 partial settlement for repair.

– Tom Root

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Case of the Day – Tuesday, June 16, 2026

ASSUMPTION OF RISK

blamagame170112Today we have yet another cautionary tale from the annals of “I got hurt, so I need someone to sue.”

Dan was a healthy 26-year-old recreational-football-league kind of guy. He was playing flag football with some buddies in the Dome Football League, using an indoor facility owned by the Town of Tonawanda. Of course, you need to mark the boundaries of the football field, and — necessity being the mother of invention — someone used a softball glove as a marker.

Dan stepped on the glove during a moment of football derring-do, and he was injured. So of course, he threw a yellow hankie at the Football League and the Town. The Town and League threw their own red flags, asking the booth, that is to say, the trial court, to review and throw out the case.

The trial court refused.

The appellate court, however, penalized Dan 15 yards and loss of down. When someone engages in an injury-prone event, like flag football, he or she (usually “he” in the case of football, but there are exceptions), consents to the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the activity. There are always sideline markers, the Court observed, and Dan didn’t show that using a softball mitt had created a danger any greater than using the usual cones or plastic flags employed by the League.

So what does this have to do with trees? When people engage in outdoor activities in which they come in contact with trees, roots, stumps and holes in the ground, it’s always a fair question whether they assumed the risk when they elected to ski, mountain bike, run a 5k or whatever they were doing at the time.

If you’re a Dan (or a Danielle), be prepared to prove that the hazard you confronted was something over and above what you could reasonably expect to encounter in the activity. If you’re playing football, expect to be hurt. You’ll rarely be disappointed.

tfootball141126Gardner v. Town Of Tonawanda, 850 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept., 2008). Dan Gardner, a 26-year-old flag football enthusiast, slipped and fell on a baseball glove that he and his buddies were using as a sideline marker during a recreational indoor flag football game organized by the Dome Football League and played in a facility owned by the Town of Tonawanda. Dan was experienced in playing recreational flag football on the indoor artificial turf field, and he knew the sidelines were marked with orange plastic cones and that the referee had discretion to use other markers as well. Dan said he was unaware that a baseball glove was being used as a sideline marker, but he didn’t have any evidence supporting his contention that the risk of slipping on the baseball glove was greater than the risk of slipping or tripping on the cones or plastic flags usually used as sideline markers. But that didn’t stop him from suing the Football League and the Town. The defendants moved for summary judgment, but the trial court denied it.

crayon170112

Maybe so, but the big crayon assumed the risk.

Held: Summary judgment was granted to the Town, and the case was dismissed. The Court concluded that Dan assumed the risk of the injuries that he sustained because the use of the baseball glove as a sideline marker didn’t create a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in recreational flag football.

The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk generally constitutes a complete defense to an action to recover damages for personal injuries and applies to voluntary participation in sporting activities. As a general rule, the Court said, participants properly may be held to have consented by their participation to those injury-causing events which are known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequences of their participation. Such injury-causing events include risks inherent in and arising out of the nature of the sport generally and flowing from such participation.

– Tom Root

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Case of the Day – Monday, June 15, 2026

TRESPASS, GEORGIA STYLE

fromgvt170111When the Upper Oconee Water Authority began building a new reservoir, its consulting engineer needed to use the Walls’ property to provide its subcontractor access to a drainage pipe. “Just a little easement, ma’am,” the engineering firm told Mrs. Walls. “And we promise not to cut down any trees.”

Of course, you promise not to. And we believe you. Right?

You guessed it — the contractor promptly started cutting down the Walls’ trees. Then – adding insult to injury – after the contractor was done with the drainage pipe, the Walls’ property flooded. After repeated complaints to the engineer got no satisfaction, the Walls sued.

The trial court threw the case out without a trial. But on appeal, the Walls won back their trees (or at least their right to fight for them at trial).

Initially, it didn’t sound like a win. The appellate court began by ruling that the Walls failed to prove that the engineer and its contractors caused the pooling water. Instead, the Walls only proved the water appeared after the contractors’ work, not that the contractors’ work caused the standing water. The Walls had engaged in the classic logic fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Just because the water followed the contractors doesn’t mean the water was caused by the contractors.

Classic "post hoc ergo propter hoc" reasoning ... but then, he's a dog. What can you expect?

Classic “post hoc ergo propter hoc” reasoning … but then, he’s a dog. What can you expect?

But as for the trees, the Court said, the Walls had a right under Georgia law to be secure in their property. The engineers were responsible for supervising their contractors, as the engineering firm’s representative had told Mrs. Walls he would stop the tree-cutting. A jury could have found that the engineering firm was liable for the damages arising from the trespass. Therefore, the Court sent the case back for trial.

Walls v. Moreland Altobelli Associates, Inc., 290 Ga.App. 199 (Ga.App. 2008). The Walls live on a large piece of land along Highway 330 in Jackson County. In 1999, the Upper Oconee Basin Water Authority bought the land across the highway from the Walls’ residence to build a water reservoir. The Water Authority hired Moreland, a civil engineering firm, to manage the reservoir construction.

Hank Collins, a construction manager with Moreland, began overseeing several construction projects to be completed by Maxey Brothers Construction. One of those involved replacing a drainage pipe under Highway 330 and regrading the area to allow proper drainage from the Walls’ property to the reservoir side of the road. Before the project began, a Moreland representative asked the Walls to grant the Water Authority a temporary easement along the front of their property to permit workers to complete the drainage work. The representative assured Mrs. Walls that the construction would not disturb any trees on the property and would only minimally affect the land. Based on these assurances, Mrs. Walls signed the easement.

Imagine the Walls' surprise ...

Imagine the Walls’ surprise … could it be that the contractor was somehow a little less than candid?

But when Maxey Brothers began work on the Walls’ property, the contractor promptly started cutting down trees. Mrs. Walls immediately called Collins, who apologized, stating that the trees should not have been cut and that “he would stop it immediately.” Collins also promised that Moreland would replace or pay for the cut trees. Although Mrs. Walls discussed the trees with Collins several times over the next year, Moreland did not pay for the tree loss. In the meantime, the Walls noticed that during heavy rains, standing water would accumulate on their property near the opening to the new drainpipe. The Walls had never experienced standing water before the construction. Mrs. Walls wrote to Moreland about both the water and tree removal, but Moreland did not remedy her concerns. Instead, it referred her complaints to the Water Authority, which investigated the situation. The Water Authority offered to repair the drainage area that ran next to the Walls’ property and pay $100 to settle the tree claim.

The Walls sued Moreland for trespass and nuisance, alleging that a work crew supervised by Moreland cut trees on their property without permission, improperly installed the drainpipe, and created a standing water nuisance. The Walls sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees. The trial court tossed the case out. The Walls appealed.

Held: The Court of Appeals split the case, upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the nuisance claim but reversing the damage-to-trees claim. As for the standing water claim, the Walls offered no evidence that the work overseen by Moreland caused the water problem. To be sure, the Walls said they hadn’t had the problem before the construction, but the mere fact that one event chronologically follows another is alone insufficient to establish a causal relation between them.

Moreland also produced evidence that following the project’s completion, a utility company laid underground cable in the area and Jackson County installed a water line along the road, both of which altered the grade. Also, Collins testified that Mrs. Walls first complained about the water problem after the utility company worked in the area. Because the Walls failed to link the work performed by Maxey Brothers and Moreland to the drainage problem, they did not establish causation.

AidAbet140415However, the trial court shouldn’t have booted the Walls’ claim for trespass based on the tree cutting. Georgia statutes provide that because the right of enjoyment of private property is an absolute right of every citizen, every act of another that unlawfully interferes with such enjoyment is a tort for which an action shall lie. Cutting trees on property owned by another, the Court ruled, may result in a trespass under OGCA § 51-9-1. The evidence showed that the Walls objected to any tree cutting, and a Moreland representative assured Mrs. Walls that the work would not affect any trees. Mrs. Walls also testified that when she confronted Collins about the tree cutting, he stated that the trees should not have been cut. Under these circumstances, a jury could find that the tree-cutting exceeded the permitted entry onto the Walls’ property.

While Maxey Brothers actually felled the trees and committed the trespass, Moreland was responsible for overseeing Maxey Brothers’ work and ensuring compliance with the project plans, which, according to at least some evidence, did not involve tree-cutting. Moreover, Collins knew that Maxey Brothers planned to cut trees on the Walls’ property, but did nothing to stop the work.

Based on this evidence, the Court said, a jury could find Moreland liable for trespass. One who aids, abets, incites, encourages or directs, by conduct or words, in the perpetration of trespass is liable as much as are the actual trespassers themselves.

This is an important expansion of liability for trespass. Often the trespasser is a mere functionary. The party who put the wheels in motion to cause the trespass – and, incidentally, who may have the deep pockets – is the aider or abettor. Being able to reach such a defendant is crucial.

– Tom Root

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Case of the Day – Friday, June 12, 2026

I WANT MY TREES BACK…

A long, long time ago, before I was trained to think like a lawyer, I was a neophyte law student and still thinking like a layman, that is to say, “normally.” New law students are first exposed to contract law, as anyone old enough to recall “Paper Chase” well knows. Digging into Basic Contract Lawthat boring-looking brown tome that was chock-a-block with fascinating cases, I very quickly ran into Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co. (on the second day of class, I recall).

Farmer Peevyhouse signed a deal with Garland Coal Co. to strip mine his land. The land was hilly, and Farmer P thought that strip mining was the ideal way to fix that. So he got Garland Coal to agree to level the land when the company was done strip mining.

Garland Coal left a lot of hills behind…

When the coal was gone, so was Garland Coal, leaving the farm just as hilly as it was before the mining. Farmer Peevyhouse sued for breach of contract. He won, of course, but when it came to figuring damages, the court noted that the diminution in value of the farm because it was still hilly (as opposed to flat) was only about $5,000. But if Garland Coal were required to return to keep its promise to level the place, it would have to spend $25,000 to do so. The higher award would constitute economic waste, the court held, and the court was not about to be wasteful with the coal company’s money.

Back then, as a tyro-at-law, I couldn’t understand the decision. Who cared if the damages were wasteful, or if the market value of the farm was only slightly less? To me, Farmer Peevyhouse made a deal, Garland Coal agreed to the deal, and – inasmuch as Garland got all the coal it bargained for – Farmer P should get what he bargained for as well, economics be damned. The economics did not matter to me nearly as much as the parties’ reasonable expectations.

Now, with many years of practice under my belt, I tend to think like a lawyer. But Peevyhouse still makes no sense to me. The farmer would not have let Garland Coal strip his land without the promise to level the hills. So the promise was material to the farmer. Why reward Garland Coal simply because Mr. Peevyhouse’s legitimate desires might not make great economic sense?

In The Princess Bride, Inigo Montoya ends his years-long quest to avenge his father’s untimely death in a fight to the death with the six-fingered man. At last, Montoya has the tip of his sword at Count Rugan’s throat:

Inigo Montoya:   Offer me money.
Count Rugen:      Yes!
Inigo Montoya:   Power, too, promise me that.
Count Rugen:      All that I have and more. Please…
Inigo Montoya:   Offer me anything I ask for.
Count Rugen:      Anything you want…
[Rugen knocks Inigo’s sword aside and lunges. But Inigo traps his arm and aims his sword at Rugen’s stomach]
Inigo Montoya:   I want my father back, you son of a bitch!

That, on a less dramatic level, was Paul Harder’s complaint. As we read in yesterday’s installment on this case, while Paul was absent from Alaska, Joel and Darlene Wiersum clear-cut his land without permission in order to improve their view. In seeking money to restore his property – a sum that came to something like four times the fair market value of his land before the clear-cutting – Paul told the jury he “didn’t want money,” but rather he only wanted his trees back. Paul, therefore, asked for damages to restore the property by replanting the forested area.

Count Rugen could give Inigo money and power and land. But he could not give Inigo what he wanted the most, a desire that was heartfelt if utterly infeasible (and rather uneconomical). In that regard, Inigo Montoya and Farmer Peevyhouse had something in common. The question is whether they both had something in common with Paul Harder. We’ll find that out now…

Wiersum v. Harder, 316 P.3d 557 (Alaska, 2013). Paul Harder owned a pretty nice piece of Alaskan wilderness near Kodiak. He built a cabin on it and lived happily for quite a stretch. But when wanderlust set in, he subdivided the land, sold the plot with the cabin on it to his sister Lisa, and kept one for himself, and left for a 15-year sojourn in warmer climes.

Paul lived in Hawaii but returned to visit his plot of land occasionally and enjoy the hunting, fishing and recreation opportunities it afforded.

About nine years after Paul went south, Joel and Darlene Wiersum bought some land at the top of a hill, adjacent to the Harder tracts. Looking down the hill, they could see Lisa’s cabin several hundred yards below, and incorrectly assumed she owned it all. One day, Darlene called Lisa at work and asked whether they could cut down some trees on Lisa’s property that Darlene thought might “come down with the wind” and hit their home. Lisa gave them permission because she thought the removal of some trees would “let a little more light in” to the woods.

Darlene and Joel did not just thin out a few hazard trees. Instead, they clear-cut the entire hill, out to almost 400 feet beyond their property line. When Lisa returned home to find that bare naked hillside, she told the Wiersums not to cut any more trees.

When Paul returned a couple of years later, he discovered the clear-cut hillside (which really was on his plot, not that of his sister), and promptly sued the Wiersums for timber trespass. A jury him $161,000 in compensatory restoration damages, which was trebled under Alaska statute AS 09.45.730.

The Wiersums appealed.

Held: The jury’s restoration damage award was reversed and sent back for retrial.

A party who is injured by an invasion of his or her property that does not totally destroy its value may choose as damages either the loss in property value or “reasonable restoration costs.” To determine whether an award of restoration costs is appropriate, Alaska follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929. The Restatement says if a plaintiff is entitled to damages for harm to land resulting from a trespass that does not amount to a total destruction of value, the damages include either (1) the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the value after the harm, or—if the plaintiff so chooses—the cost of restoration that may be reasonably incurred. Damages are measured by the difference between the value of the land before and after the harm only if the cost of restoring the land to its original condition is disproportionate to the loss in the value of the land caused by the trespass “unless there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original condition.”

That’s the law for you. A layman untrained in legal niceties would say “a personal reason,” but the legal phrase is a “reason personal.” The distinction is intended to convince you that the law must be complex, and thus you ought to pay that “bill inflated” your lawyer hands you without a whimper.

A “reason personal,” the Court said, is a reason peculiar or special to the owner, where “the owner holds property primarily for use rather than for sale and where the owner is likely to make repairs with the restoration costs award rather than to pocket the funds and enjoy a windfall.” For example, the Court in the past had found a “reason personal” where the damaged property was used by the plaintiff as “a showplace in connection with his nursery business” and, in another case, where the property enjoyed “unique views… abundant trees, and the unusual juxtaposition of the trees, the cabin, and the views,” and its owners, who planned to retire on the property, had testified that “other properties in the area were not comparable.”

To find that a plaintiff had a “reason personal” for restoration, where those costs were much higher than the loss of value to the land, a court should look for evidence showing “a reasonable likelihood that the trees would be restored.”

Paul showed at trial that he held on to the Monashka property for 34 years and that he intended to build a house and live on it once his son graduated from college because “it’s a very beautiful piece of property.” A real estate agent testified that he approached Paul about selling the land, but Paul had refused. Paul testified he “didn’t want money,” but rather he only “wanted his trees back” and was asking for damages to restore the property by replanting the forested area. He said he enjoyed spending time with his children on the property, but that after the trees were cut down, the property “looked totally different,” full of salmonberry bushes… whereas it was just like thick moss before,” and he reported that he had not heard any ravens there since the trees were cut.

The Wiersums argued the award of restoration damages was objectively unreasonable because the total market value of Paul’s property before the timber trespass was only $40,000. A damage award of $161,000, they contended, was disproportionate to the property’s diminution. Besides, peripatetic Paul’s “minimal use of and contribution to the land’s special value would at most justify a marginal award of restoration costs.”

The Court noted it had found in the nursery case that restoration damages were not “grossly disproportionate” where the owner had paid $4,000 per acre for the property, but the jury awarded $12,550 for restoring a quarter-acre of land. Because the principal value of the property stemmed from the creek running through it, and the owner intended to use the property to create “a showplace in connection with his nursery business,” the cost of restoration, although disproportionate to value, was reasonable. Nevertheless, the Court had previously cautioned that “restoration costs exceeding diminished market value may be awarded only to the extent such added costs are objectively reasonable in light of the ‘reason personal’ and in light of the diminution in value.”

The “reason personal” may be a non-commercial one based on the property’s uniqueness, but the restoration award must be limited to the cost that has been or may be reasonably incurred.  The reason for this rule, the Court said, is “to reduce the economic waste that occurs when a party incurs repair costs in excess of the diminished value of the property.” The application of this principle “must ensure that an award of restoration damages does not confer a windfall upon a landowner.” Where proposed replacement costs are excessive in relation to the damage caused by the trespass, “the achievement of a reasonable approximation of the land’s former condition may involve something less than substantially identical restoration… It may be more appropriate to award costs for the planting of saplings, or a few mature trees, or underbrush to prevent erosion and achieve a lesser but, over time, reasonable aesthetic restoration.”

Applying these principles to Paul’s denuded hillside, the Court held that the award of $161,000 in restoration costs was objectively unreasonable in light of the $40,000 pre-trespass total value of the property. Paul’s “reason personal” for restoration, and the absence of any proof of the extent of the decrease in the value of his property, made it more appropriate to award costs “for the planting of saplings or a few mature trees or underbrush to prevent erosion and achieve a lesser but, over time, reasonable aesthetic restoration.” The Court’s conclusion was based on its determination that the “property could be reasonably restored by replacing at least some of the mature Sitka spruce with saplings or smaller trees and that because the property’s large trees were growing in a forested environment where the root zones were intertwined” it was not possible to “replace that exact tree in that environment.”

The jury must base its award on a finding that the restoration costs were objectively reasonable in light of the value of Paul’s land, the loss of value due to the Wiersums’ trespass, and his “reason personal.” Here, the Court said, no reasonable juror would award restoration costs totaling more than four times the full fair market value of the property before the trespass. Thus, the Court sent the case back for a new trial on damages.

And what’s my take on this case, based upon my decades of thinking like a lawyer? I’m with Inigo Montoya and Paul Harder: “I want my trees back, you son of a bitch,” and economics be damned.

This is a bad decision.

– Tom Root

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Case of the Day – Thursday, June 11, 2026

THE DEVIL MADE ME DO IT

You know the guy I’m talking about. Nothing is ever his fault. The blame always lies with someone else. Think of John Belushi in The Blues Brothers, groveling at the feet of an assault rifle-toting Carrie Fisher, explaining all the reasons he had left her standing at the altar and ending with the plaintive wail, “It’s not my fault!”

Today’s defendants have something in common with the pathetic Jake Blue. For reasons unexplained (but I suspect, given this occurred on breathtaking Kodiak Island, Alaska, that it was intended to enhance their view), Joel and Darlene wanted to remove some trees on the downslope of the hill they lived on, out to about 400 feet. Most of the trees – beautiful 100-foot-plus Sitka spruces – were not on their property. A minor detail.

Darlene called her neighbor, Lisa, and asked whether she and her husband could cut down a few trees on Lisa’s land, you know, just trees that might pose a hazard if they were to fall in a windstorm across the property line and strike Joel and Darlene’s cabin. Lisa was at work when Darlene called her, and she didn’t really have a well-formed idea of what her neighbors had in mind. This was understandable, given that Darlene misled Lisa into believing they were talking about a few sickly boundary trees. Lisa, thinking that thinning the woods there would probably let more light in and spur growth, said that she did not mind at all.

When Lisa got home that evening, she discovered a denuded hill, with trees clear-cut from the boundary line toward her cabin for almost 400 feet. Hyperion itself couldn’t have fallen from that point and hit Joel and Darlene’s. Lisa was furious and called Darlene (who had the good sense not to answer the phone). Lisa told Darlene’s voicemail that there would be no more tree cutting.

Now for the fly in the ointment: Lisa had always thought that her land extended all the way from her cabin to Joel and Darlene’s property line. But it did not. Her brother, Paul, who had subdivided a larger parcel years before and sold Lisa one of the plots – the one with his old cabin on it – had reserved for himself a plot between Lisa’s and Joel and Darlene’s place. After selling in 1992, Paul had left for an extended sojourn (well over a decade) in Washington state and Hawaii. When he finally came home from wandering the Lower 48, some two years after the tree-cutting incident, he was not pleased. Paul demanded Lisa tell him who had cut all of his trees. That was when Lisa found out that much of the property between her cabin and the land up to Joel and Darlene’s property line belonged to Paul.

Naturally, Paul went after Joel and Darlene. Who wouldn’t? But they sniveled, “It’s not our fault! Lisa told us we could cut your trees!” Well, they did not exactly snivel, not audibly, but they promptly brought Lisa into the lawsuit as a third-party defendant. They maintained that because Lisa gave them permission to cut some trees without telling them that some of the intermediate land between their property and her cabin was Paul’s (and that they could not cut his trees), she was negligent. Joel and Darlene whined that if Paul had been damaged, Lisa owed Paul some of those damages. They argued Lisa had breached her duty to inform them, that she had made misrepresentations to them, and that she had breached her duty to Paul as well as a general duty she had to her neighbors.

The Alaska Supreme Court cut through Joel and Darlene’s arguments like a hot knife through butter. Lisa got nothing out of the tree-cutting episode, and she thus owed nobody nuthin’. Joel and Darlene had no right to rely on Lisa’s permission without checking the boundaries themselves. The Court’s finding might have been a blessing for the defendants, too, because it avoided the sticky question of whether – given Darlene’s obvious fraudulent misrepresentation to Lisa as to their tree-cutting – Lisa could possibly be liable at all. After all, if Darlene asked Lisa, “Hey, mind if we clear-cut 400 feet in the direction of your shanty so that we can improve our magnificent view?”, we suspect Lisa would not have been so forthcoming with permission.

Clearing up the issue of Lisa’s liability allowed the Alaska Supreme Court to get to the meat of the case, which was the amount of damages owed to Paul. We’ll take up that part of the holding tomorrow.

Wiersum v. Harder, 316 P.3d 557 (Supreme Court of Alaska, 2013). Paul Harder owned a pretty nice piece of Alaskan wilderness near Kodiak. He built a cabin on it and lived happily for quite a stretch. But when wanderlust set in back in 1992, he subdivided the land, sold the plot with the cabin on it to his sister Lisa and kept one for himself, and set off for parts unknown.

Not completely unknown, however. Paul spent the next 15 years living in Washington state and Hawaii, but he returned every so often to visit his plot of land and enjoy the hunting, fishing and recreation opportunities it afforded. It was, after all, overlooking Monashka Bay on Kodiak Island – it would be hard to stay away from home when it was as beautiful and wild as that.

About nine years after Paul went south, Joel and Darlene Wiersum bought some land at the top of a hill adjacent to the Harder tracts. Looking down the hill, they could see Lisa’s cabin several hundred yards below, and they assumed she owned everything between their home and hers. One day, Darlene called Lisa at work, and asked whether they could cut down some trees on Lisa’s property that Darlene thought might “come down with the wind” and fall on their land, damaging their home. Lisa readily gave them permission, because she thought the removal of some trees might “let a little more light in.”

Darlene was not being exactly straight with Lisa. She and Joel never intended to thin out some hazard trees. Instead, they intended to clear-cut the entire hill, out to more than 300 feet beyond their property line. When Lisa returned home from work later that day, the deed had been done; she discovered that bare naked hillside. Upset by the number of trees that had been cut, Lisa immediately called the Wiersums and left a message instructing them not to cut any more trees.

Paul did not return to the Last Frontier for about two years. When he did, he discovered the clear-cut hillside. Paul asked Lisa who had cut the trees, and then explained to her that the trees had been on his plot, not hers. After that, he promptly sued the Wiersums for timber trespass.

The Wiersums, apparently a couple not lacking chutzpah (just look at the clear-cutting escapade), filed a third-party complaint blaming Lisa for the trespass. They sought to apportion fault to Lisa, claiming she had negligently misrepresented that she owned the property where the trees were cut when she gave them permission to remove the trees from her property. The trial court granted Lisa’s summary judgment motion and dismissed the claim against her. The Wiersums and Paul went to trial, and a jury awarded Paul $161,000 in compensatory restoration damages along with statutory treble damages.

Held: Lisa was not liable for the Wiersums’ trespass, but the case had to be sent back to the trial court because the damages were excessive. Today, we’ll talk about Lisa’s “duty” to the Wiersums and her own brother.

The Wiersums contended that fault must be apportioned to Lisa because she was negligent in failing to disclose to Darlene that she did not know exactly where her property lines were and that Harder also owned property in the area. In essence, their negligence claim was based on the theory that Lisa had negligently misrepresented or failed to disclose information to the Wiersums, and her negligence thus caused them to trespass on Paul’s property and remove his trees.

However, the Court held, negligent misrepresentation requires a showing that a party made a misrepresentation in the course of her business, profession, or employment, or in any other transaction in which she has a pecuniary interest.” Likewise, a person is liable for failure to disclose information when there is an affirmative duty to do when someone “fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction.” Lisa had no financial interest in what the Wiersums did with their land and thus owed them no duty under a theory of negligent misrepresentation or failure to disclose information when she had an affirmative duty to do so.

But did Lisa owe a duty to Paul? The Wiersums argued that Lisa owed a broad duty of care to her neighbors – both themselves and Harder – and was liable for any unreasonable risk of harm to them that stemmed from her own conduct. They supported this assertion with references to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 and § 165, and they cited decisions from other states in support of the rule that a “landowner who intends to have timber cut on his land owes a duty to an adjoining landowner to ascertain the boundary line of the adjoining land with diligence and care.”

None of these arguments carried the day. The Court held that sections 158 and 165 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts were inapplicable because they applied only where the person intentionally causes a third person to enter the property, that is, “commands or requests” a third person to enter the land of another. Lisa never commanded the Wiersums to do anything. Section 165 similarly provided no support for the Wiersums’ position but rather imposes liability where someone recklessly or negligently enters land in possession of another or causes “a thing or third person so to enter,” and thereby harms the land. Comment (a) to this section indicated that the rule applies where “the conduct of the actor either… involve[s] an unreasonable risk of invading the possessor’s interest in his exclusive possession of the land, or… [is] caused by an abnormally dangerous activity carried on by the actor.” Lisa’s act of giving the Wiersums permission to cut trees on her own land did not present an unreasonable risk that the Wiersums would enter Paul’s land and cut his trees.

The Wiersums also argued that a Texas case held that landowners who intended to cut timber on their own land owed a duty to adjoining landowners to ascertain the boundary lines of the adjoining land. But Lisa did not seek out the Wiersums to remove trees from her land, nor did she affirmatively offer inaccurate information about her property boundaries. The Wiersums did not ask her for this information and because this was not a business transaction, she was under no legal obligation to provide it. Thus, the Court said, she did not assume a duty to give accurate information to the Wiersums when they asked permission to remove her trees.

Finally, the Wiersums relied on Prosser and Keeton’s treatise on tort law for the rule that a landowner owes a broad duty “to cause no unreasonable risks of harm to others in the vicinity.” The Court was unimpressed. “Our prior decisions recognize that landowners have a duty to use due care to guard against unreasonable risks created by dangerous conditions existing on their property. We have also held that a landowner must act as a reasonable person in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances. But we have never previously gone so far as to hold that a landowner has a broad duty to prevent the unreasonable risk of harm to her neighbors caused by third parties.”

Foreseeability of harm is the most important factor in whether Lisa had a duty to Paul, the Court said, and “there can be no duty where the harm is unforeseeable, but foreseeability alone is insufficient to establish a duty if the burden of taking care or the effect on society is too harsh.”

The foreseeability of harm to Paul resulting from Lisa’s conduct was low. Lisa made no active representation to the Wiersums implying that the trees on the hillside near their property were hers rather than Paul’s. She merely gave the Wiersums permission to cut trees on her own land. It was thus foreseeable that the Wiersums would cut trees on Lisa’s property, but it was not foreseeable that they would remove 70 large trees from Paul’s hillside – some of which were located between 300 and 400 feet from their own land – “without conducting proper due diligence to identify the true property owner and then seeking that person’s permission. No person,” the Court said, “can be expected to guard against harm from events which are not reasonably to be anticipated at all, or are so unlikely to occur that the risk, although recognizable, would commonly be disregarded.”

– Tom Root

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