Case of the Day – Friday, November 28, 2025

WRITE ME UP A VERBAL CONTRACT

putt150827OK, what’s a little New York case about a miniature golf course construction contract doing on a tree law blog? It’s here as a cautionary tale …

A miniature golf operation called Oasis Park hired Bill Oberholtzer – who was both a miniature golf course owner and a mini-golf course builder – to jazz up Oasis Park before the mini-golf season started up in the Troy, New York, area. Disregarding the universally accepted good practice in construction of starting with a nice, neat signed agreement setting out the scope of the work, payment terms, time to completion, and other such details, the Oasis Park people and Bill pretty much sketched out their agreement on the back of a cocktail napkin. And that was a mistake.

Later, Oasis Park needed a more formal document in order to convince its bank to release financing. Bill, of course, accommodated Oasis Park by signing one. You can guess what happened. When the parties’ working relationship soured, Oasis claimed that the accommodation document – and not the “cocktail napkin” – was the real deal between the parties covering the scope of the work. Bill countered that he had already been working for weeks, and the plans had changed.

You probably need a little more contract detail than you can fit on a napkin.

You probably need a little more contract detail than you can fit on a napkin.

Nevertheless, within six weeks after some fateful April 29 “thing” occurred — and even the Court couldn’t tell what the “thing” was — Oasis fired Bill amid claims that he hadn’t adhered to some nonexistent schedule, hadn’t provided workers, and hadn’t provided materials. For good measure, Oasis claimed that Bill’s work was substandard.

Bill naturally argued just the opposite, asserting that he couldn’t buy supplies because Oasis Park wouldn’t pay him. The whole mess ended up in federal court, where the judge threw up his hands and said no one was getting summary judgment. The entire kerfuffle would have to be sorted out at trial.

So now, let’s all grab our calculators and figure out how Bill saved by not wasting his money on a lawyer preparing a contract with Oasis Park upfront. Not much, we guess. And you arborists, tree trimmers, loggers, and owners – let’s remember this: No contract, no winners.

sign150827Paone, Inc. v. Oberholtzer, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75092, 2007 WL 2455074 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 23, 2007). Oberholtzer agreed to provide all labor and materials necessary to remodel Paone’s miniature golf course. Beyond that fact, the parties could agree on nothing.

Paone said that under a contract dated April 29, 2004, Oberholtzer was to build a bumper boat pond, including walls, docks, light fixtures, a cave, a filter system, a perimeter walkway, and a staging area deck. As well, Paone said, the contract required Oberholtzer to renovate the course’s clubhouse entrance, the third hole, and the practice green. Paone said that under the contract, Oberholtzer began the project in May 2004, but its laborers did not show up for work, causing the project to fall behind schedule. To rectify the situation, Paone claims that it hired temporary workers.

Even with these outside laborers, the project did not move forward because Oberholtzer failed to provide supervision and direction. Paone said it had to supply all materials to the site and hire various construction professionals to inspect the work. Paone contended that these professionals found that Oberholtzer’s work violated building code requirements and fell below industry standards. After the project had gone on for about a month, Paone notified Oberholtzer that it was in default of the contract.

Oberholtzer, on the other hand, claimed that he reached an agreement to perform work for Paone well prior to April 29, 2004. Oberholtzer said he began preparatory work in March. The April 29th document, Oberholtzer contended, was merely an estimate prepared at Paone’s request, intended by both parties to help Paone get a bank loan released. The April 29th agreement was conformed to an earlier budget from the winter of 2003-2004, which Paone had submitted to the bank to support its initial loan application.

golf150827Consequently, Oberholtzer argued, the estimate did not reflect intervening changes of which both parties were aware, including a different location for the bumper boat pond, changes in site elevations for the clubhouse and parking lot, which required alteration of a ramp and deck, and additional concrete walkways on the course.

Oberholtzer said he had already made significant progress before April 29, 2004, including filling in traps, reconfiguring the practice green, removing an existing sidewalk near the old practice green, building a deck between the seventh and eighth holes, and removing fixtures and equipment from the old clubhouse. What’s more, Oberholtzer asserted, he had also cleared and trimmed trees for a new picnic area, built retaining walls for a walkout basement, constructed a deck attached to the clubhouse, erected bumper boat pond walls and skimmer baskets, and backfilled the pond.

As for the schedule, Oberholtzer argued that the April 29th document did not include such a timeline or any other time-related requirements. Oberholtzer said that Paone knew Oberholtzer would be opening and operating his own miniature golf course in Georgia at the end of May. Therefore, Oberholtzer claimed, Paone knew that Oberholtzer would not be available to work on the project on a regular basis. Furthermore, Oberholtzer argued that several weeks of delay resulted from the actions of an unrelated contractor who placed heavy equipment in the area of the future bumper boat pond. Also, he said, Paone failed to make timely payments, preventing Oberholtzer from buying materials and advancing the project. Finally, Oberholtzer complained that Paone had approved all building plans and that town building inspectors routinely inspected the progress and noted no building code violations.

Paone sued for breach of the contract and for negligence, and then moved for summary judgment.

obfus150827Held: Summary judgment was denied in this fact-laden morass. The Court observed that Paone’s causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing both required first that there be an enforceable contract with sufficiently definite terms. Here, the parties could not even agree whether the document was a contract, let alone what its terms were. Paone contended the document represents the parties’ complete agreement, but Oberholtzer asserted that the document was an estimate used solely for the purpose of obtaining funding. While Paone said the performance period commenced in May 2004, Oberholtzer alleged that it had already completed substantial portions of the project prior to that time.

What’s more, the Court found that reference to the April 29th document wasn’t helpful because it contained no details about the parties’ responsibilities or the construction schedule. The document was labeled “Spring 2004 Construction” and merely set forth the various projects and the price for each. In light of these disputes, the Court held, it could not determine whether an enforceable contract existed between the parties without evaluating the parties’ conflicting factual accounts. On the basis of the April 29, 2004 document alone, the Court held, it could not determine the construction schedule or the parties’ respective contractual responsibilities.

A trial would be necessary to straighten out the whole mess.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Wednesday, November 26, 2025

ME AND MY SHADOW

Removing covenants can be like herding cats ... which explains why Robby Ricciardello looked for a shortcut.

Removing covenants can be like herding cats … which explains why Robby Ricciardello looked for a shortcut.

I had occasion about ten years ago to round up a majority of 55 subdivision owners in order to revoke some (then) 25-year-old restrictive covenants. The rules were pretty harsh – no work vehicles with signage in front of the house, no sheds, no yard signs…

It helped that almost everyone in the subdivision was already violating one or more of the covenants. I explained – over a several-month education program – that all it would take is one jerk moving into the neighborhood who wanted to stick it to his neighbor, and we’d all face trial court Armageddon.

I got a majority to sign on, but it was like herding cats, an exhausting effort. I made our filing deadline by a nose. The whole experience gave me a heightened appreciation for the long-suffering neighbor in today’s case.

The case concerns poor Robby Ricciardello. Well, maybe not poor in the fixed-asset sense. Robby owned five lots in a subdivision, and he had big plans — plans like building a barn, storing bulldozers, hunting, growing mangoes — you know, the kinds of things we all like to do with our lots in the middle of subdivisions.

A man oughta be able to do what he wants with his own property ... right?

A man oughta be able to do what he wants with his own property … right?

But he had a problem. His deed contained one of those pesky restrictive covenants that restricted the use of the lots to the construction of one-family homes only. Fortunately for Rob, the restrictive covenants provided that they could be amended or terminated by a vote of the owners of six of the subdivision lots.

Robbie decided to build a barn anyway, and he hatched a plan to pull it off. He told his neighbor Jim Carroll what he was going to do. Jim panicked, because he knew Rob had five lots and only needed the concurrence of one more owner. So Jim hatched a plan of his own, launching a drive to amend the covenants to make them harder to circumvent. Finally, Rob announced he wouldn’t build a barn after all, so Jim abandoned his efforts.

Any sense of relief Jim felt was short-lived because Rob did an end run on the subdivision owners. He formed his own limited liability company, which he then used to buy an additional lot. Rob essentially had a meeting with himself as an owner of five lots and Connecticut Outfielder LLC – of which he himself was the president – being the sixth lot owner. Rob took a nose count, and — mirable dictu — the owners of the minimum six lots were present! The vote was unanimous, unsurprisingly, as Rob agreed with himself to terminate the covenants.

My shadow is duly incorporated ...

My shadow is duly incorporated …

Pretty slick, Rob. But Jim didn’t think so, and he sued. Connecticut Outfielder protested that it had done nothing wrong. It just agreed to terminate the covenants, something it as an owner had a right to do. Rob and his alter ego LLC moved for summary judgment, pointing out that the restrictive covenants had been terminated. The court disagreed, finding that issues of fact existed, not the least of which being whether Rob had misled James to induce him to abandon trying to amend the covenants, and whether one guy – by controlling six lots himself or through corporate devices – could validly terminate the covenants.

James B. Carroll 2003 Revocable Trustee v. Ricciardello, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1681, 2007 WL 2080583 (Conn.Super.Ct., Apr. 4, 2007). It seems that Robert Ricciardello and James Carroll were adjacent landowners in the Ferrando Subdivision of Glastonbury, Connecticut. The Subdivision lots were subject to a “Declaration of Covenant and Restrictions” that provided, in part, that “[e]ach lot shall be used and maintained solely and exclusively for one-family residential purposes … No trailer, tent, shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding erected on any Lot shall at any time be used as a residence temporarily or permanently … [The] covenants and restrictions are to run with the land and shall be binding on the Declarant, purchasers or owners of any Lot … for a period of twenty (20) years from the date of recording … During the twenty-year period that this Declaration is in effect, any or all of the covenants, conditions and restrictions contained herein may be amended or terminated by an instrument signed by the then owners of at least six (6) of the Lots described on Schedule A hereto, which instrument shall be recorded on the Glastonbury land records.”

In June 2004, Ricciardello told Carroll he intended to build a barn on one of the six lots he owned. Carroll started talking to the other owners about amending the covenants to, among other things, raise the number of lot owners needed to amend or terminate the covenants. Then Ricciardello told Carroll he had decided not to build the barn, and Carroll abandoned his efforts to stiffen the covenants.

But Ricciardello, ever the crafty one, formed a Connecticut limited liability company named “Connecticut Outfielder LLC.” The same day it was formed, the entity bought lot two of the subdivision. Three weeks later, Ricciardello and Connecticut Outfielder — who together owned six lots in the subdivision — executed a “Release of Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions,” that was recorded in the Glastonbury town clerk’s office, which wiped out all of the covenants and restrictions on the books.

covenant150826Ricciardello proceeded to do as he liked with his lots, planting an orchard, hunting for small game and storing construction equipment. Carroll sued, claiming that the release of the covenants was improper, and asked for an injunction. Ricciardello and Connecticut Outfielder answered, counter-claimed and filed for summary judgment. Connecticut Outfielder contended there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Connecticut Outfielder is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the breach-of-restrictive-covenants count and the counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the release of covenants is valid. Connecticut Outfielder’s grounds for the motion were that Carroll testified that Connecticut Outfielder did not breach the covenants, and the plaintiff did not allege any wrongdoing by Connecticut Outfielder in the operative complaint. Carroll objected that there were genuine material issues of fact.

Held: Summary judgment was denied. Summary judgment, of course, is appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Here, the Court said, genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether Ricciardello and Connecticut Outfielder breached the covenants and whether the covenants were properly released. Also, there was an issue as to whether Carroll relied on Ricciardello’s false assurances that he wouldn’t build a barn in deciding to abandon his quest to amend the covenants to block Ricciardello’s plans.

As long as those issues remain, the case must go to trial.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Tuesday, November 25, 2025

LOOKING FOR SOMEONE TO BLAME

No matter how rational and discerning television juries might be, in real life, the decisions that the finders-of-fact make can be a crap shoot, especially with a roomful of parties.

I recall an old, wise lawyer telling me years ago that cases with multiple defendants were a headache for defense counsel, because jurors naturally assumed with so many people accused of damaging the poor plaintiff, someone must be at fault. “So they listen to the poor plaintiff’s sob story,” the wizened old barrister said, “and they start looking around the courtroom for someone to blame.”

A cautionary note to plaintiffs: Sometimes that backfires, because when so many parties with differing, interlocking relationships cram the defendant’s dock, convincing the jury that one or more of the defendants owes a duty to your poor, injured plaintiff can be like trying to catch a greased pig. Such as in today’s case.

The tree was rotten. It had been rotten for a long time. It collapsed onto a passing cyclist, out enjoying a country ride on a dedicated bike path. An electric utility owned by a mega-power holding company (imagine a corporation with buckets full of cash) held an easement over the bike path and adjacent land to trim the trees away from its lines, and that utility had a thundering herd of contractors signed up to do the hazard tree analysis and trimming for it.

Shouldn’t be too hard to get the money flowing to the plaintiff, right? Well, let’s see…

Rossetti v. American Electric Power Co., 2004-Ohio-118, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 109 (Ct.App. Licking County, Ohio, Jan. 12, 2004). Rosemarie Rossetti and her husband, Michael Leder, were riding bicycles on the T.J. Evans Bike Trail in Licking County when a Linden tree collapsed and fell onto an Ohio Power line and across the bike path. The tree then hit Rosemarie, seriously injuring her.

The Linden tree that fell was located about 51 feet off of the bike trail on land adjacent to the bike trail owned by Karen Matz and John Skowronski. The tree, which was about 80 years old and 101 feet tall, leaned over the power lines. According to the Rossetti’s expert, Dr. Sydnor, there was a huge cavity in the base of the tree, and the “tree was hollow for… three, four feet up.” The tree had been hollowed out at the base for over 20 years, and there was decay around the base that had existed for almost the entire life of the tree. Both the decay and the hollowed-out part of the base faced away from the bike path. According to Dr. Sydnor, the tree was rooted in the stump and the “root had actually grown through the stump and was growing up the hill. The root is – the failure of that root was what caused the failure of the tree. That was the only thing that was actually holding the tree up.”

Ohio Power had an easement over Karen & John’s property and the bike trail for trimming or removing trees along the trail that interfered with its power lines. The Linden tree was not located within Ohio Power’s easement but instead was about 51 feet from the trail and 25 feet from a wire fence marking the edge of the trail property.

Ohio Power trims and removes the trees in and around its easement on a three-to-five year trimming cycle. Under this cycle, the trees next to the bike trail were inspected and maintained in 1988-1989, between 1990 and 1992 and in 1995. As part of its tree trimming program, Ohio Power contracted with both ACRT and Nelson Tree. ACRT, under its contract with Ohio Power, hired work planners who, as part of the trimming/removing cycle patrolled the electric lines and identified easement trees needing trimming or removal. Nelson Tree Service would then perform the actual trimming or removal for the 1995 cycle.

Sticking a defendant with a duty to the plaintiff was a greased pig of a task…

Rosemarie and Michael sued everyone, including Ohio Power, ACRT, Nelson Tree, and Karen and John. Everyone responded with motions for summary judgment.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding that “it was not foreseeable that the Linden tree would fall onto the bicycle path and cause a person physical harm” and that “given the lack of evidence beyond mere inference indicating the Linden tree was trimmed by the utility Defendants under the tree-trimming program, Plaintiffs cannot establish proximate cause.”

Rosemarie and John appealed.

Held:  The defendants’ motions for summary judgment were properly granted.

In a negligence case, the Court said, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered harm; and (4) the harm was proximately caused by defendant’s breach of duty. The existence of a duty depends on the foreseeability of the injury. The test for foreseeability is whether a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result from the performance or nonperformance of an act.

Here, the Court said, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the tree would fall onto the bicycle path and cause a person physical harm. John, who owned the private property on which the tree was located, testified there was no reason to notice the tree before it fell because “it looked healthy. I mean, there was no reason to notice it. It wasn’t as if the crown was brown or the bark was peeling.” Dr. Sydnor, Rosemarie’s and Michael’s ‘ own expert, agreed that “earlier on in the growth of this tree it would have been more readily identified as a hazard tree than later on.” While he testified that the tree would have been identified as a hazard in the 1980s, Dr. Sydnor admitted that it was not reasonably foreseeable in 1980 that the linden tree was going to fall within the next 18 years.

“Looks fine to me…”

What’s more, Dr. Sydnor testified that the Linden tree was leaning for its entire life and that the tree had been hollowed out at its base for over 20 years, and that the decay around the tree’s base had been there “well in excess of 20 years, probably 40… maybe 80” years. Using the formula generally accepted in his field, Dr. Sydnor said the linden tree had a live crown ratio of 66%, which was “good.” According to Dr. Sydnor, the tree was either the dominant or co-dominant tree in the canopy, which indicates that it, at some point, had to have been fairly healthy. Thus, Dr. Sydnor said, even if Ohio Power, ACRT, and Nelson Tree Service actually examined and trimmed this specific linden tree in 1995, and observed the decay, hollowed cavity, and poor root structure, it was still not reasonably foreseeable the tree would fall in the next four years, which would have brought Ohio Power and its contractors to the next trimming cycle. Dr. Sydnor did testify that the tree would fall someday, but, the Court of Appeals said, “such testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact since most trees will eventually fall.”

Others, including a Right-of-Way Program Developer with Davey Resource Group formerly employed by ACRT as a supervisor to the Utility Forestry Pre-Planner, and a Licking County Park District Ranger who saw the tree shortly after it fell, both agreed that the “crown, the top of the tree, was full of leaves…it looked like a healthy tree.”

Furthermore, the Court said, Nelson Tree – as part of its contract with Ohio Power – had no duty to inspect the trees on and adjacent to Ohio Power’s easement. Instead, its job was merely to trim or remove trees that were marked by ACRT. Nelson had no discretion with respect to which trees were to be trimmed or removed.

Based on all of that, the Court held, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the tree would fall, according to Rosemarie’s and Michael’s own expert evidence, and thus, “no duty arose on behalf of Defendants to take any action with regard to the Linden tree.”

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Monday, November 24, 2025

T.H.E. CAT

Robert Loggia as Thomas Hewitt Edward Cat, accomplished second-story man turned bodyguard in this 1960s action series ...

Robert Loggia as Thomas Hewitt Edward Cat, accomplished second-story man turned bodyguard in this short-lived 1960s action series …

Remember T. Hewitt Edward Cat? If you do, I should mention that this is Medicare open enrollment season, because you’re old enough to care about that…

Anyway, Mr. Cat… His hangout was at the jazz joint Casa del Gato. And Lalo Schrifin wrote the cool theme music.

That’s OK if you don’t recall the show, because the cat we’re talking about today is anything but the black-clad suave Robert Loggia. More Garfield than cool cat, the Dinuccis’ tabby kept wandering into Mr. Lis’s yard. The Dinuccis — who, face it, didn’t have a great rapport with their neighbor to begin with — didn’t give a hairball about Lis’s complaints.

Finally tired of it all, Mr. Lis trapped the feckless feline and turned it over to the City. The City charged the Dinuccis with an “animal at large” minor misdemeanor. About this time, old softie Mr. Lis contracted a case of the “guilts.” He could hardly live with himself if the Dinuccis found themselves doing 30-to-life in some hard-labor gulag. So he relented and asked the city law director to dismiss the charges.

Big mistake. Proving someone’s old adage that no good deed goes unpunished, the Dinuccis promptly sued Lis for malicious prosecution.

deed150825After the long-suffering neighbor paid a metric ton of legal fees, the trial court threw the case out, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The Dinuccis’ case suffered from a simple problem: they never denied that their cat was free-range (how could they?), and that was all the ordinance required. Because there was probable cause to believe that the peripatetic pussycat had gone feral, there was probable cause to believe the ordinance had been violated. That being the case, there could not be malicious prosecution.

Nevertheless, if he ever sees the stray cat strut across his lawn again, we’d bet Mr. Lis’ll demand the City Prosecutor throw the book at ‘em — and probably overdose their sweet little kitty with industrial-strength catnip. Ingratitude isn’t only unbecoming… often, it’s self-defeating, too.

stray150825Dinucci v. Lis, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3702, 2007 WL 2269740 (Ct.App. Ohio, Aug. 9, 2007). This dispute between neighbors started over the capture and eventual safe release of a house cat. The parties were before this court in an earlier dispute, which involved trespass, property damage, and continuing nuisance claims by the Dinuccis against their next-door neighbor, Matthew Lis. Then the Dinuccis had claimed Lis was liable for 1) delays in the construction of their house due to his objections, 2) damage to their lawn caused by trespassing, 3) willow tree branches hanging over their property, and 4) creating a nuisance by having the Lis yard look like a construction site for over two years. Out of all of that, the Dinuccis won a princely $150 for damage to their lawn, the rest of their claims having been thrown out. The Dinuccis appealed to no avail.

At the same time, it appears that Lis had been complaining since 2004 about Dinuccis’ cat wandering around the Lis homestead. Lis contacted the North Royalton, Ohio, animal control department. The City’s animal control officer told the Dinuccis that the City had received complaints from neighbors about the cat and warned them that they would be cited if the problem wasn’t resolved.

It wasn’t, and a few months later, Lis captured the feline on his property and turned it over to the City. The Dinuccis were charged with a violation of North Royalton Ordinance 618.01, the “Animal At Large” provision. The North Royalton prosecutor met with the parties, at which time Lis agreed with the recommendation to dismiss the criminal charge against the Dinuccis. But after the charges were dismissed, the Dinuccis filed a civil lawsuit against Mr. Lis, alleging malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted Lis’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Dinuccis appealed.

garfield150825Held:  The case was correctly thrown out. The Court observed that, after all, North Royalton Ordinance 618.01 clearly stated that ‘[n]o person who is the owner or keeper of horses, mules, cattle, sheep, goats, swine, dogs, cats, geese or other fowl or animals shall permit them to run at large upon any public way or upon unenclosed land” and that “[t]he running at large of any such animal in or upon any of the places mentioned in this section is prima facie evidence that it is running at large in violation of this section.” In order to establish the tort of malicious prosecution, the Dinuccis had to prove malice in instituting or continuing the prosecution, a lack of probable cause, and termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused. And here, the Dinuccis couldn’t show a lack of probable cause.

Probable cause does not depend on whether the claimant was guilty of the crime charged, but instead, only on whether Lis had probable cause to believe that the Dinuccis were guilty. Lis wasn’t bound to have evidence sufficient to ensure a conviction, but instead was required only to have evidence sufficient to justify an honest belief of the guilt of the accused. Here, the Court said, the evidence showed that both the city and Lis had a reasonable belief that Dinuccis violated North Royalton Ordinance 618.01.

Indeed, the Dinuccis didn’t deny violating the ordinance either at the trial court level or in their brief. Their cat was captured on Lis’s property. As a result of Lis’s reasonable belief that the violation occurred, probable cause to investigate existed. The evidence was sufficient to justify an honest belief in the guilt of the accused.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Friday, November 21, 2025

YOU HAVE ONLY YOURSELF TO BLAME

I just got back from a week in London. The primary reason for the trip was so we could see our granddaughters. They live in London these days (with our son and daughter-in-law, but once the grandkids arrive, your children become an afterthought).

While there, I rented a car and tried English driving for the first time. That is my segue into today’s topic, the very English common-law tort of negligence.

Negligence is a tort law concept borrowed from the English and a living, breathing description of my adventures in a four-door, manual-shift Skoda. To prove negligence, one either needs a photo of me in the driver’s seat navigating a roundabout, or one must prove three essential elements The negligent party must owe a duty to the injured party, the negligent party must have breached its duty, and as a direct result of that breach, the injured party must have been actually damaged. Surprisingly, most of the litigation on tree-related negligence results from questions of the extent of the duty owed to the injured party.

The bulk of negligence actions related to trees result from trees or branches falling on people and property. The states are nearly uniform in holding that a property owner who has actual or constructive notice of a defect in his or her trees has a duty to the owners of adjoining property and the public who may be passing by to ensure that the tree does not injure persons or property.

Actual notice is fairly self-explanatory. A landowner who has been told that a tree is defective has actual notice. However, constructive notice is much more nuanced. Visual evidence of decay, a history of falling branches, advice of an arborist or tree professional that a tree poses a hazard – all of these may be enough for a court to find that a property owner was on constructive notice of a defect. Some cases have suggested that if a tree professional installs cabling or bracing to support a tree, that fact alone is constructive notice to the landowner of a serious defect in a tree.

Even if evidence of decay or distress is not clear from the ground, some courts have held that landowners have a general duty to regularly inspect trees on their property that may cause damage or injury if they fall. Most states recognize two levels of landowner duty. A rural property owner, because the size of the land holdings is generally larger than in urban areas and because there is a lesser concentration of people and property to be injured, has a duty to inspect that is significantly lesser in scope than the duty of a urban landowner. An urban landowner usually has fewer trees, and those have a greater likelihood of causing injury or damage if they fall. Thus, what is an adequate inspection program for a rural landowner may not be enough for an urban property holder.

Generally, before negligence can be determined, the extent of the defendant’s duty to the injured has to be defined. The great illustration can be taken from today’s case:

Sellens v. Christman, 418 S.W.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. Missouri, 1967). Elvin Christman had invited Jim Sellens to go out with him to try out his new chainsaw. They tacked some trees in the woods, and promptly dropped the first one into a notch on a second one. Jim concluded the lodged tree was safe, and was cutting a second tree near it when the whole thing gave way. The lodged tree collapsed on Jim, causing the loss of a leg. Elvin was nowhere nearby at the time.

Nevertheless, Jim sued Elvin.

The trial court held that Jim had not established that Elvin was at fault for the accident. In fact, there was no evidence that anyone other than Jim was at fault for the accident. But Jim tried to get a leg up by appealing. The case found its way to the Missouri Supreme Court.

Held: Jim didn’t have a leg to stand on.

The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal but focused more on the duty that Elvin owed to Jim. It held that Jim was an invitee, meaning that Elvin had a duty to take ordinary care to prevent injury to Jim, more care than if Jim were a mere trespasser.

Although Jim’s status was an invitee, the Court said there was no breach of any duty by Elvin to make the premises safe for Jim or to warn him of the danger. “The duty to keep premises safe for invitees applies only to defects or conditions which are in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like,” the Court reasoned, “in that they are not known to the invitee, and would not be observed by him in the exercise of ordinary care. The invitee assumes all normal, obvious, or ordinary risks attendant on the use of the premises, and the owner or occupant is under no duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to obviate known and obvious dangers.”

You have only yourself to blame, Jim.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Thursday, November 20, 2025

SIR, YOU ARE NO GEORGE WASHINGTON

solong161006Today, we conclude our consideration of the trespass problems faced by our New Hampshire landowners Larry and Laura Littoral. If you have followed along to this point (and can remember what transpired even after the news broke that Kim Kardashian did so well in the California bar exam that she has been invited to take the second half next year), you know that the Littorals’ pastoral cottage getaway –  situated on a classic New England pond – has been disrupted by neighbor Wally Angler.

Compared to Wally, Donald Trump would prefer Nancy Pelosi as a neighbor. Wally –  a NINO (neighbor-in-name-only) – is an angler, and asked the Littorals to chop down some dead trees on their property to create a trout habitat in the pond for the primary (and sole) purpose of adding to Wally’s piscatorial pleasure.  You can hear him now: “Thanks for all the fish!”

The Littorals preferred that their dead timber remain standing. When Wally asked them to cut down the trees, they said, “So long,” refusing to dump their tree into the pond. Apparently reasoning that it’s easier to ask forgiveness than permission – especially where permission has already been denied – Wally then took advantage of the Littorals’ weekend absence by bringing in a tree service to cut the trees down for him. According to the Littorals, Wally affirmatively misled the tree cutters that the dead trees were on his property, and the tree service cut down the timber with alacrity.

gw161006For the record, Wally denies having anything to do with the felling of the dead trees. He seemingly maintains that he turned around one day, and mirabile dictu, the trees were on the ground. If George Washington had tried a similar woof story on his father about a downed cherry tree, we’d probably all be speaking English and enduring a manchild national leader whose conduct is concerning for dementia. As every schoolchild knows, however, Little George ‘fessed up, telling his father, “I cannot tell a lie.” Channeling Lloyd Bentsen, our observation is this: Wally, we served with George Washington, George Washington was a friend of ours. Wally, you’re no George Washington.

Our analysis this week has assumed that unless Wally can produce the elves responsible for the tree cutting (and their saws), the Littorals will easily meet their burden of proof.

So far this week, we have concluded that the Littorals may bring a double-barreled complaint, alleging a statutory violation of New Hampshire’s trespass-to-tree statute, R.S.A. § 227-J:8, and a common-law trespass count. The § 227-J:8 count carries some rather serious penalties, from three to 10 times the market value of the trees. The catch is that the penalties must be based on a multiple of market value. Market value may be the stumpage value of the wood – what it is worth on location to a lumber buyer – or on the cost to replace the tree, minus transportation and planting costs.

We’re assuming for the sake of this column that a few dead trees probably are not going to have much stumpage value. The Littorals could find an expert to establish how much replacement of the trees would cost, but replacement value has traditionally been used because everyone assumes that the destroyed trees would have continued to flourish but for the actions of the defendant. Here, the defendant’s expert would have a good argument that those trees were going to fall in the next strong wind anyway, and awarding the Littorals new live trees to replace their old dead ones would give the plaintiffs a “windfall” for what was only windfall to begin with.

Wally suspects elves.

Wally suspects elves.

Given Wally’s underhanded approach to getting what he wanted (and what the Littorals did not want), we don’t have much trouble with the Littorals receiving a windfall. The law in New Hampshire and elsewhere does, however, hold instead that damages should be limited to compensating for the actual injuries suffered. For that reason, the Littorals can take the confluent approach that under the common law of trespass, their real property has suffered a decrease in value because of Wally’s conduct, both because of where the dead trees are no longer standing and because of where they are currently laying.

Even then, the Littorals might have a problem because the usual assumption underlying damages for loss of trees is that standing timber will continue to stand for the indeterminate future. That assumption may be challenged where the standing timber is already dead. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that dead trees standing have value. As we noted the other day, dead trees provide shelter or sustenance to over 40 percent of all birds, to amphibians, and to lichens and moss. Dead trees create “snow fences” that slow wind-driven snow. The snow that is trapped melts in place and saturates the ground, providing additional moisture to live trees. Dead trees create hiding cover and thermal cover for big game as well.

Even more counterintuitive, dead trees – after dropping their needles and bark – may reduce fire hazard. Their flammability is greatly reduced compared to green trees containing flammable resins.

stumps161006In the Connecticut decision we’re examining today, the plaintiff relied on standing dead timber to help maintain privacy from his neighbor. The court appeared to recognize that the elimination of the standing dead trees contributed to a substantial diminution of her property value, even while acknowledging that the trees themselves had no value. It’s not a New Hampshire case, but then there is a dearth of cases nationwide where the wrongfully cut trees were ornamental in nature and yet very dead even before tasting the ax. We were glad enough to find this one. The decision suggests that an action alleging loss of privacy may be the strongest case of all.

Caciopoli v. Lebowitz131 Conn.App. 306 (Court of Appeals, Connecticut, 2011). Dominic Caciopoli was a man who liked his privacy. He bought his place because it was isolated and private, surrounded by forest on all sides except for one area of the lot through which his driveway passed. A short while later, Jeffrey Lebowitz bought the place next door. His house was about 100 yards from Dom’s, and the area between the residences was wooded, affording each privacy from the other.

A few months after moving in, Jeff hired a tree service to clear standing dead trees from the wooded area between the two homes. Jeff believed the dead trees were on his land, but he didn’t check that carefully. The tree service removed all the dead timber, both standing and on the ground, some small saplings, and a few larger trees to provide more sunlight and enlarge the areas surrounding his house. Of course, it turns out that virtually all of what was cut really belonged to Dom.

When Dom came home to find that his natural privacy barrier had been clear-cut, he was not happy. He went to Jeff’s front door and expressed his displeasure, pointing out the actual property line in the process. Nevertheless, the next day, the tree service returned and finished the job. The removal of the trees and brush left Jeff with an unobstructed view of Dom’s house.

Jeff tried to make amends. He sent Dom a letter admitting his error and planted some trees on Dom’s property to replace what had been taken. Dom was not happy with the results and undertook his own extensive landscaping project in a failed attempt to restore his lost privacy.

Give a man a fish, and feed him for a day. Give a man a chainsaw, and watch trouble ensue.

Give a man a fish, and feed him for a day. Give a man a chainsaw, and watch trouble ensue.

Dom sued Jeff for common-law trespass and for treble damages pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-560 (the Connecticut adjunct to R.S.A. § 227-J:8). The trial court found that Dom had proven the elements of an intentional trespass action and awarded him $150,000. for the diminution in the value of his property caused by the trespass. Notably, the trial court declined to award any damages for the value of timber that had been removed.

Jeffrey Lebowitz appealed, alleging a lot of infirmities with the trial judgment. Of interest to the Littorals is Jeff’s appeal of the damage award.

Held: The trial court’s award of $150,000 was proper. The trial court found that after the cutting, Dom’s place was worth $675,000, according to an appraisal performed by a certified general real estate appraiser. The appraiser opined that prior to the cutting, Dom’s market value was $825,000. The Court of Appeals noted that Jeff could have presented his own expert testimony on the diminution of value, but he did not. Applying the ancient legal doctrine, et dormiat, ne perdatis (“you snooze, you lose”), the court said Dom’s expert was found to be credible and competent, and absent Jeff making an expert showing at all, that was good enough.

But, Jeff complained, Dom’s expert was not qualified to give an opinion as to the effect of the removal of certain trees from Dom’s property on its market value. He argued the expert had no relevant experience and was considered an expert only because she had a real estate appraiser’s license. However, the Court of Appeals said, the trial court relied on the fact she had conducted 1,500 appraisals before, and when the trial judge asked her whether she was able to testify as to the value of the property before and after the removal of the trees, she said she could. (This is rather like finding that she was an expert because she asserted she was, a rather bizarre ipse dixitbut the Court of Appeals was loathe to disturb a verdict and thus give Jeff a second bite of the apple on remand).

Jeff also argued that the court made no finding whether there was an adequate factual foundation for a “retrospective appraisal” – an appraisal after the fact of the value of the property before the cutting – and that Dom did not ask the court to find there was an adequate foundation for allowing the opinion evidence. The Court of Appeals pointed out that it was Jeff’s burden to object to the testimony on those grounds at the time of trial. Again, et dormiat, ne perdatisThe expert testified she visited the property in January and February 2009 and had determined the lot enjoyed a high degree of privacy prior to the incident. She also had studied photographs of the lot prior to the trespass and after the trespass, and noted that the pictures depicted more clearing of trees than she had imagined, thus strengthening her opinion as to diminution in value.

No one contests that trees in the water are a good habitat for fish... but Wally should have used his own trees.

No one contests that trees in the water are a good habitat for fish… but Wally should have used his own trees.

The Court observed that Jeff pointed to no authority to suggest that the expert’s personal observation of the property, her reliance on the plaintiff’s descriptions of the prior conditions of the property, and her review of photographs of the property in its prior conditions, was insufficient to form an inadequate factual foundation. The Court said the expert’s personal observation of the property “complemented by the plaintiff’s descriptions of the property in its prior conditions, is not impermissibly speculative…” After all, the Court said, Dom – as the owner – was undoubtedly familiar with his property (if perhaps lacking disinterest in the outcome), and no one was more competent than he to describe to the expert what it had looked like before the cutting.

The Court held that the fact that the expert “could not give a logical explanation for how she arrived at her opinion and did not articulate or apply methodology suitable to determining any diminution in value caused by the clearing of trees” was not fatal to her testimony. She testified that she examined real estate in the area, found comparable properties, estimated degrees of privacy and made adjustments, positive or negative, for the differences in the properties in order to “equal everything out.” She also noted that an appraisal is not based on science, but it is just an opinion as to value, and the Court accepted that.

Jeff had to pay the $150,000. That’s a lot of money for some dead trees that had no stumpage value.

– Tom RootTNLBGray140407