Author: TLRoot

Case of the Day – Friday, September 19, 2025

Posted on by tagged.

FINDERS KEEPERS

superball140801I ran into this hulking young electrician the other day who greeted warmly by name (called me “Mr. Root,” something I’ve never gotten used to). I confessed that I had no idea who he was.

He reminded me that he had been my across-the-street neighbor 15 years ago. He was a great kid. I fixed his bike countless times, played catch with him, and often had to explain to him the nature of whatever arcane project I was engrossed with in my garage.  I was very sorry when his family moved.

Seeing Christian made me recall one day when Chris had found a Superball (remember those?) in the leaf-covered grass near his house. He was busy tormenting his sister, 4-year-old Lexi, with it – something at which 8-year-old boys are especially adept – when he wondered whether he could keep his find or he’d have to “give it back.”

I asked, “Give it back to whom?”

He shrugged, having no idea who the owner had once been. His situation reminded me of a sad story from a few years ago about a contractor who discovered a wad of money in the walls of a house he was renovating for a new owner. The contractor and the owner and — finally — the descendants of a prior owner, all became embroiled in litigation, and in the end, the lawyers got virtually all of it. Shades of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce!

fklw2Lucky for Chris, I knew what Ohio law had to say about “treasure troves,” those little bundles of cash, jewelry, art, or old Hostess products that people occasionally stumble over. It turns out that the answer depends on whether the property is lost, abandoned, stolen, or mislaid. If it’s lost or abandoned, it turns out, Chris’s young sister was right in the advice she gave him: finders keepers.

In today’s case, a very fortunate cop found thousands of gold and silver coins scattered on a city street at 4 a.m. He picked them up and then, being a dutiful cop, turned them in. The owner never stepped forward — and you can bet there’s a story in that — so after about a year, the police officer sued for ownership.

The City opposed him, arguing that the coins were located on its street and the policeman was on the City’s time clock when he found them. None of that mattered, the Court said. All that counted was that the lost or abandoned property was found by Officer Baker, who thus had ownership rights superior to anyone other than the rightful owner.

Our advice to Chris, then, was that the Superball was probably lost property, because who’d willingly abandon such a cool ball? It was his to enjoy unless the true owner stepped forward.

Sadly, our legal efforts were for naught. Shortly after our sage advice to him, Chris lost the Superball on an especially high bounce into a nearby soybean field. Losers weepers.

Baker v. City of West Carrollton, Case No. 9904 (Ct.App. Montgomery Co., August 7, 1986) (unpublished), 1986 WL 8615. Police officer Charles Baker found a large number of gold and silver coins scattered on a West Carrollton public street. After reporting the find, he and city employees picked up 6,871 gold and silver coins and placed them in the police property room. When no one stepped forward to claim them, Baker sued to establish his right to the money. The City counterclaimed, arguing that the money was found on its street, and Baker was its employee, so the money belonged to it. The trial court agreed and awarded the money to the City. Baker appealed.

chestHeld: The money belonged to Baker, not the City. The money was considered to be “lost” or “abandoned” property. Under Ohio common law, a finder who takes possession of “abandoned property” acquires absolute title. A finder of a lost article, although he does not by such finding acquire an absolute property or ownership, has a prior claim thereto as against everyone except the actual owner. The rule is practically absolute and is not affected by special circumstances of the character of the thing found, the place of finding, or the relation of the finder to the third person, even where the finder is the employee of the owner of the premises.

money2At common law, a finder who takes possession of lost property has a duty to protect the property; to seek the true owner, and to return the property to the true owner on demand. The state had no right to “found property” as against the finder. Although Ohio law governs the disposition of lost or abandoned property by police departments, the law requires the property to be turned over to persons with a right of possession, and Ohio courts have held that a finder of lost property that is unclaimed by the true owner is a person “entitled to possession of property” under that law. Officer Baker was such a person.

West Carrollton argued that because Baker is a police officer, he should not receive a reward for performing his duty. The Court agreed that rewards for police officers’ performance of their duties aren’t appropriate, but it said that the City’s award analogy was strained. It held that Baker’s primary duty was to the true owner of the coins, and he got no reward for that.

The Ohio Supreme Court later upheld the decision. Now, if those Justices can just help Chris search the soybean field.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Thursday, September 18, 2025

Posted on by tagged.

INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS

The man on the right is a corporal ... and a combat vet with a Purple Heart. The man on the right, a major general, is not a corporal. The guy in the middle is just a politician. But none of them is an incorporeal hereditament.

The man on the left is a corporal. The man on the right is a major general, not a corporal, but he may have once been one. The guy in the middle is just a politician and probably was never a corporal. But none of them is now or ever has been an incorporeal.

Today, we’re considering incorporeal hereditaments. Lawyers like cool terms like these, because they can charge more when their clients can’t understand what they’re saying. Here at treeandneighborlaw.com, we demystify the law for you. That’s us – the homeowner’s friend.

Before we pull a muscle patting ourselves on the back, let’s get to today’s topic. A hereditament is nothing more than a right that can inherited. A corporeal one is that may be seen and handled, like a piece of real estate. Back in the day, conveyance of land was done by livery of seisin, wherein the propert seller would actually hand the buyer a twig or clump of dirt, a ritual conveyance of the real estate being sold. An incorporeal hereditament, on the other hand, is something that couldn’t be symbolically passed off, something intangible like an easement.

Sound boring? Some North Carolinians found out that boring or not, it’s important. A couple of landowners had, over the past 11 years or so, planted trees, built fences and otherwise taken actions inside a 30-foot driveway easement that encroached on the use of the passage by its owners. The easement owner, stymied in his use of the drive, sued. The defendants argued “too little, too late:” the plaintiffs were way beyond the 6-year statute of limitations for suing on incorporeal hereditaments. The plaintiffs said, “Poppycock!” (a term that may be mildly vulgar in the UK but in the legal world means “fiddlesticks!”). The statute didn’t start running until the invasion of the easement had passed the 20-year period for adverse possession of land or prescriptive easements. In other words, the plaintiff argued, he was allowed 26 years from the time the trees were planted and fences were built to bring a lawsuit.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, siding with the defendants. This wasn’t a case of someone trespassing, taking land by adverse possession or a right by prescriptive easement. This was someone trying to undo an express easement. The lawsuit simply related to an incorporeal hereditament, and it was subject to the 6-year statute.

The incorporeal hereditament not taken ... as Robert Frost might have said.

The incorporeal hereditament not taken … as Robert Frost might have said.

The result is curious. It means that an owner of an easement, a right that is often as valuable as the property itself, can lose that right by interference by the servient estate owner in a relatively brief period of time. To use a legal term, “you snooze, you lose.”

Pottle v. Link, 654 S.E.2d 64 (N.C.App., 2007). The Pottles owned Tract 6 on Cedar Island, and Snug Harbor South, LLC, owned Tract 4. Both of these owners held 30-foot wide easements allowing ingress to and egress from the public road to Tracts 6 and 4 and other lots. Mr. Link owned Tract 3 and Mr. Willets owned Tract 5, adjacent lots that were the servient estates over which the easements ran. About 11 years before the lawsuit was filed, Link planted several oak, cypress, holly, and cedar trees on Tract 3, joined several years later by two more oak trees to replace two that had been destroyed by hurricanes.

He maintained the trees by installing an irrigation drip line and planting other vegetation on the tract In the summer of 2004, Willets installed a post and rope fence on Tract 5, and in 2005, Link built a fence. The Pottles and the LLC sued, arguing that Link’s trees impeded traffic on the easement and that Willets’ post and rope fence encroached on the easement as well. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Link and Willets had refused to clear the easements to provide access to property that had no other routes of access. Link and Willets moved for summary judgment, too, arguing that the 6-year statute of limitations for injuries to incorporeal hereditaments had expired and that the plaintiffs’ actions constituted an abandonment of the easement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed.

Here's a legal expression anyone can understand ...

Here’s a legal expression anyone can understand …

Held: Summary judgment for the plaintiffs was reversed, and the defendants won on many of the issues. The Court of Appeals noted that the parties agreed that all encroachments, except the fences installed in 2004 and 2005, were planted or installed approximately nine to eleven years before the lawsuit. The only question, the Court said, was which statute of limitations applied. An affirmative easement is a right to make some use of land owned by another without taking a part thereof, while a negative easement prohibits the owner of a servient estate from doing something otherwise lawful upon his estate because it will affect the dominant estate. Easements are incorporeal hereditaments, defined as “[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.” N.C. Gen.Stat. §1-50(3) requires that an action for injury to any incorporeal hereditament be brought within six years. The plaintiffs argued that the injury in this case was similar to an adverse possession, having a limitation period of twenty years, but the Court disagreed, holding that the cases relied on by the plaintiffs related to a defendant’s continuous trespass onto the plaintiffs’ property, not on plaintiffs’ incorporeal hereditament.

Because an injury to an incorporeal hereditament was at issue in this case, rather than a continuous trespass or a prescriptive easement to property held in fee, the Court held that N.C. Gen.Stat. §1-50(3) applied, and the plaintiffs’ case thus was barred because the six-year statute of limitations had been exceeded. All but two encroachments onto the plaintiffs’ easement began 9 to 11 years before the lawsuit. The defendants were therefore entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law. The fences had not been in place for more than six years, but because the defendants argued that the fences did not encroach on the easement, an issue of fact existed, and summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs had to be reversed.

The case was sent back for trial on the question of whether the fences encroached on the easement.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Wednesday, September 17, 2025

Posted on by tagged.

WHO YOU GONNA CALL?

So who you gonna call?

    So who you gonna call?

It’s not easy to defeat a utility company holding an easement for transmission lines, despite the fact that the power outage that spawned the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and turbocharged the North American Electric Reliability Corporation happened two decades years ago. The great Blackout of August 2003, after all, started primarily when power lines sagged into trees in the Cleveland, Ohio, area.

Yeah, it’s tough to beat the power company and its chainsaw-wielding minions … but the Corrigans did it for a while. They had granted an easement to a Cleveland electric utility for a transmission line. In the wake of the blackout, the utility told the Corrigans (and thousands of others) that it would vigorously pursue cleaning up vegetation in the easements. This means, among other things, no trees within 25 feet of the lines.

The Corrigans had a big silver maple that was about 22-1/2 feet from the lines. They loved that tree, so they hired an arborist at considerable expense to trim it away from the lines and to inject the tree with a hormone to slow growth. Tough luck, the utility said, it’s coming down anyway.

So who do you call when the power company shows up with chainsaws and a gleam in its institutional eye? The Corrigans raced to the local common pleas court and asked for an injunction. The trial judge agreed, and the Court of Appeals concurred. Both of those courts sided with the Corrigans that the utility could only cut trees that were “a possible threat to the transmission lines.”

It seemed important to the Court of Appeals that the community had not experienced any service interruptions since the Corrigans had pruned the tree, although that reasoning’s pretty thin. The tree has to only fall once, cascading one failed transmission line into a continental disaster. But the Court seems to have been favorably impressed by the amount of money the Corrigans had spent getting the tree professionally trimmed.

utilitytrim140515The utility saw an issue here that was bigger than just the Corrigans and their lone silver maple tree. It framed the question as being one of who was really in charge here, the 88-odd common pleas courts spread throughout Ohio or the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that this was indeed the issue, and ruled that the inclusiveness of the state statute and regulations delegating power to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio gave PUCO the sole authority to decide questions of vegetation management. (Ohioans spell out the acronym “P-U-C-O”: please don’t try to pronounce it as though it were a word).

I have to admit that the appellate decision left me with the uneasy feeling that the Court of Appeals’ attempt to do some rump justice here may have made it much more difficult for a utility to exercise its easement rights. To be sure, a utility being sued in a case like this would have to be prepared with an expensive and eye-popping case that graphically depicts the dangers that a tree in the transmission path — even a well-cared-for tree — can pose.

The Ohio Supreme Court’s holding provides electric utilities a much friendlier forum in which they must litigate issues of vegetation management, although that may not be a bad thing. Utilities have to walk a fine line, incurring ire if property owners think trees were pruned too aggressively, and facing universal fury (not to mention catastrophe) when service is interrupted by vegetation coming into contact with transmission and distribution lines.

Corrigan v. Illuminating Co., 122 Ohio St.3d 265 (Sup.Ct. Ohio 2009). The Corrigans granted a quitclaim deed to The Illuminating Company, the local electric utility, for a transmission line to run through their yard. The easement gave the Illuminating Company the right to “enter upon the right-of-way occupied by said transmission lines … with full authority to cut and remove any trees, shrubs, or other obstructions upon the above-described property which may interfere or threaten to interfere with the construction, operation and maintenance of said transmission lines.” The Corrigans had a large silver maple tree located about 22.5 feet from the centerline of the transmission lines. At considerable expense, they had their own arborist trim the tree and inject slow-growth hormone to keep the tree from posing a risk to the transmission line. Nevertheless, the Illuminating Company decided to remove the tree, and the Corrigans sued for an injunction.

The trial court granted an injunction barring the Illuminating Company from removing the tree, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The electric utility – seeing the issue as one that transcended the issue of one tree but rather affected the company’s ability to manage vegetation in its rights-of-way throughout the state – appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.

Held: The Corrigans argued that the issue was purely a contract matter, but the Supreme Court disagreed. Noting that “[t]here is no question that the company has a valid easement and that the tree is within the easement” and the easement’s language was unambiguous that the utility had the right to remove trees that might interfere with its transmission lines, the Court said the issue was the correctness of “the company’s decision to remove the tree instead of pruning it.” That was “really an attack on the company’s vegetation-management plan [and] that type of complaint is a service-related issue[] which is within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction.”

The statute creating PUCO to administer and enforce these provisions provides that the commission hears complaints filed against public utilities alleging that “any regulation, measurement, or practice affecting or relating to any service furnished by the public utility, or in connection with such service, is, or will be, in any respect unreasonable, unjust, insufficient, unjustly discriminatory, or unjustly preferential.” This jurisdiction is “so complete, comprehensive and adequate as to warrant the conclusion that it is likewise exclusive.”

The Court used a two-part test to reach its determination. First, it asked whether the commission’s administrative expertise was required to resolve the issue in dispute, and, second, whether the act complained of constituted a practice normally authorized by the utility.

rules140515The Ohio Administrative Code chapter on electric service and safety standards requires utility companies to establish a right-of-way vegetation-control program to maintain safe and reliable service. The Code requires that each electric utility inspect its electric transmission facilities (circuits and equipment) at least once every year, in accordance with written programs, and takes a number of factors into consideration, such as arcing, sagging, and line voltage, as well as regulatory requirements from OSHA, FAA, and the Army Corps of Engineers. In addition, electric utilities are required to comply with the American National Standards Institute’s National Electrical Safety Code. The utilities are required to submit their programs to the Commission, which will resolve any disputes as to the efficacy of the plan.

The Court concluded that the Ohio Administrative Code made it clear that PUCO’s administrative expertise is required to resolve the issue of whether the removal of a tree is reasonable.

The second part of the test determined whether the act complained of constitutes a practice normally authorized by the utility. Again, the Court said, the Administrative Code clearly held that vegetation management is necessary to maintain safe and reliable electrical service. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled, the second part of the test was satisfied, and the Corrigans’ complaint fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of PUCO.

That meant that the Illuminating Company’s decision that the silver maple interfered or threatened to interfere with its transmission line was a service-related question and one that the Corrigans could only dispute in front of PUCO. The Court of Appeals judgment was thrown out.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Tuesday, September 16, 2025

Posted on by tagged.

YOU HAD ONE JOB

The municipal position of tree warden in this country is unique to a few New England states. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, for example, state law requires that each town appoint one. A tree warden is a person in charge of shade trees on public town lands. The word “warden” was a common title for natural resource officials in the late 1800s. Being a warden signified a unique legal responsibility: to guard public resources against destructive forces that might include persons, insects, or diseases.

A tree warden may be either or appointed. In either case, the responsibility is the same – to oversee the care, maintenance, or removal of all public shade trees. As both manager and advocate, the tree warden must protect the trees and, where necessary, protect the public from the trees.

Massachusetts describes the tree warden’s functions as being “broad and includ[ing] responsibility for all community trees – on streets and town commons as well as in parks, schoolyards, and town forests. The position of tree warden requires qualified training in arboriculture, the science of tree care. A tree warden should also have good communication skills for dealing with the public, municipal department heads, and local politicians.”

Connecticut says that “Tree wardens are appointed public officials responsible for trees alongside public roads and in public spaces, other than those on state property or under the jurisdiction of a park commission. Each municipality is required to have a tree warden. The tree warden’s responsibilities include approving the planting, pruning or removal of trees under his or her authority. Public safety is among the chief concerns of the tree warden.”

Fans of the many “you had one job” posts online (and even on ESPN, back in the day) can appreciate the “fail” in today’s case. A Connecticut town tree warden ignores his duty to check on a tree that a concerned resident reports on several occasions as dangerous and decayed. The woman even had her own arborist inspect it, but since the tree was on town property, it was the town’s responsibility to care for it. And that meant it was up to the tree warden.

He ignored it for nearly a year. Sure enough, it fell… right across the road and onto a passing car. When the motorist and his wife sued the town and the tree warden, the defendants claimed immunity. It turns out there is plenty of immunity for a government official acting according to his or her discretion. But immunity for failing to drive out to check on a reported danger tree?

C’mon, man. You had one job…

Wisniewski v. Town of Darien, 135 Conn. App. 364, 42 A.3d 436 (Ct.App. Conn. 2012). Mieczyslaw (let’s call him “Bud”) and Jolanta Wisniewski were injured when a tree within the street right-of-way toppled onto his car in front of 35 Rings End Road, inside the Darien, Connecticut, city limits. This should not have surprised the Town, which had been notified several times by property owner Kristen Doble that her arborist had determined that five trees located near the roadway “need attention.”

On one occasion, Kris told the Town that limbs had fallen from trees near the roadway. On another occasion, she asked that the Town send someone to examine a “hollow” tree located near her front gate, next to the roadway, that had lost a leader (which is “a primary or terminal shoot of a plant (as a main branch of an apple tree or the terminal shoot of a spruce tree… the upper portion of the primary axis of a tree especially when extending beyond the rest of the head and forming the apex…” leader.

At the time Kristen complained and later, when the tree fell on Bud and Jolanta’s car, Mike Cotta was the Town’s tree warden. Pursuant to General Statutes § 23-59, he was responsible for the care and maintenance of trees located along certain rights-of-way within Darian’s geographic limits. There were no other express town charter provisions, rules or ordinances directing Mike’s duties as tree warden.

Bud and Jolanta sued the Town and Mike Cotta, claiming negligence against Mike and seeking indemnification against the Town pursuant to General Statutes §§ 7-465 and 7-101a. In addition, the complaint contained claims for liability pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-557n and 13a-149 against the town.

The Town and Mike argued that Bud and Jolanta’s lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. That motion failed. The Town and Mike moved for summary judgment, arguing, in part, that governmental immunity barred the Wisniewskis’ claims. The court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

The jury found for Bud and Jolanta, holding that he had established Mike’s and the Town’s negligence under § 52-557n. Although the defendants established that their duty to maintain the subject tree was public in nature, they failed to establish that their duty to inspect, maintain and remove the tree was discretionary. Jolanta Wisniewski got $200,000, and Bud Wisniewski was awarded $1.5 million.

Mike and the Town appealed.

Held: Mike and the Town of Darian were liable for negligence.

As a general rule, a municipality is immune from liability for negligence unless the legislature has enacted a statute abrogating that immunity. In this case, Gen. Stat. § 52-557n abandons the common-law principle of municipal sovereign immunity and lists circumstances in which a municipality may be liable for damages. One is a negligent act or omission of a municipal officer acting within the scope of official duties. Section § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) explicitly shields a municipality from liability for damages to person or property caused by the negligent acts or omissions that require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law. Municipal officers are not immune from liability, however, for negligence arising out of ministerial acts. Ministerial acts are defined as acts to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion.

The language of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 23-59 provides that many, but not all, of the duties of a tree warden involve the exercise of discretion, and thus are immune.

The determination of whether official acts or omissions are ministerial or discretionary for liability purposes is normally a question of fact for the fact finder. Generally, evidence of a ministerial duty is provided by an explicit statutory provision, town charter, rule, ordinance or some other written directive. Testimony of a municipal official, however, may provide an evidentiary basis from which a jury could find the existence of a specific duty or administrative directive.

A municipal employee, and, by extension, the municipality, may be liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but are entitled to immunity in the performance of governmental acts, including acts that are discretionary in nature.

Although Darian maintains no written policies directing the conduct of its tree warden, the town’s assistant director of public works, Darren Oustafine, testified at trial that the general direction provided to Mike Cotta upon receipt of a complaint “is always the same, look at the tree, make a determination. Is it a safety concern? Is it a priority?” Moreover, Cotta himself testified that upon receipt of a complaint regarding a potentially hazardous tree, he has a nondiscretionary duty to perform an inspection. “In light of the evidence adduced,” the Court said, “including Cotta’s own statements, which were couched in mandatory language, it was appropriate for the court to decline to direct or to set aside the verdicts on the basis that the defendants’ actions as a whole were discretionary as a matter of law.”

The evidence in the record was enough to let the jury reasonably find that some of Mike’s duties, including the duty to inspect upon receipt of a complaint concerning a potentially hazardous tree, were ministerial. This was especially so given that Mike testified that upon receipt of a complaint regarding a potentially hazardous tree, he had a nondiscretionary duty to perform an inspection. The evidence showed a total absence of any documentation in the town’s work order records concerning Mike having inspected the trees. Although Mike testified at trial that he had performed a quick visual inspection, he admitted that performing a quick visual inspection is “not the same thing as saying you inspected it at all…” In addition, in a pretrial deposition, Mike admitted that he had not inspected the trees for decay or, for that matter, “for any reason.”

Furthermore, while Mike testified at trial that he had gone to the property and pruned the hazard tree in 2004, Bud and Jolanta introduced a deposition transcript in which Mike testified that he had not returned to the property between March 14, 2003, and July 11, 2006. Thus, the Court said, “numerous issues were raised concerning Cotta’s credibility, and the jury was free to decide that Cotta was not credible and to resolve the claim in favor of the plaintiffs that he failed to respond to any of the complaints by going to the property to inspect the trees.” Bud and Jolanta’s expert “opined that the subject tree would have exhibited signs of decay in 2002 and 2003, when Doble lodged her with the town. Accordingly, the jury could infer that a reasonable tree warden, had he performed an inspection, would have determined that the subject tree was a hazard.”

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Monday, September 15, 2025

Posted on by tagged.

FOLLOWING DIOGENES (AND OTHER ANCIENT LIGHTS)

I found myself reading a revealing scientific (well, a “social scientific”) paper once about pseudo-profound bullshit.

No bullshit. I am not making this up. The study asked people to rate the profundity of randomly-generated sentences of touchy-feely crap (such as “wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). The authors concluded, among other things, that “a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.”

I was impressed because up to the time I read the study, I firmly believed that wholeness really does quiet infinite phenomena. Guess not, huh?

Unsurprisingly, when I considered today’s case – which illuminates the old doctrine of “ancient lights” – I looked for the type of bogus profundity that Professor Pennycook and his colleagues were writing about. As you can see to the left, finding something that was suitably bullshit was not hard.

“Ancient lights” was decidedly not bullshit. The name refers to, of all things, windows that have been around for awhile but eventually the name was loaned to an English doctrine of “presumptive title to light and air, received over land of another person, arising from the uninterrupted enjoyment of it for twenty years and upward, through the window of a dwelling house” (as described in Clawson v. Primrose). But America, being a land of opportunity and progress, was unwilling to tie the hands of property owners by implying easements of light and air in favor of countless neighbors.

Still, some found need for the “ancient lights” doctrine, and – because the doctrine was unavailable to them – tried the “side door.” The “side door” did not work for Rick Singer and the parents who bribed their kids’ way into college. And it didn’t work too well for the plaintiffs in today’s case.

Mohr v. Midas Realty Corporation, 431 N.W.2d 380 (Supreme Court, Iowa, 1988). Erick Mohr owned an office building situated on a commercial “strip” along Highway 20 in Fort Dodge, Iowa, with parking in front for use by tenants and customers. In 1983, Mohr’s neighbors to the west, Midas Realty Corporation and the Stan and Lynn Building Partnership, built a muffler shop on the front of their property with parking in the rear.

The muffler shop complied with zoning restrictions and setback lines, but it blocked the view of the Mohrs’ building to traffic approaching from the west.

Erick sued Midas for “unreasonable interference with Plaintiff’s lawful use and enjoyment of his private property.” He claimed damages and sought abatement of the alleged nuisance, that is, removal of the muffler shop.

Midas moved for summary judgment, arguing that Erick could not win under existing law. The trial court agreed, holding that Iowa nuisance law did not allow a suit for interference with view.

Erick appealed.

Held: Iowa law does not recognize a right to a view, and therefore, interference with a neighbor’s view does not a private nuisance make.

A private nuisance is generally defined at common law as “a substantial and unreasonable interference with the interest of a private person in the use and enjoyment of his land,” Not every interference with a person’s use and enjoyment of land is actionable, however. Here the trial court focused on a preliminary determination of whether Midas’ construction of the building, whether reasonable or unreasonable, interfered with a legally protected interest belonging to Erick Mohr.

Although the petition alleges interference with light, air, and view, Erick admitted at oral argument that the heart of his claim was that the Midas Muffler shop blocked the motoring public’s view of Erick’s building, thereby diminishing its value as a commercial property. Thus, he argued, Midas had enhanced its property at Erick’s expense, giving rise to a private nuisance action, where the parties’ competing interests in the use and enjoyment of land are weighed according to a reasonableness standard.

Midas argued that while Erick tried to pigeonhole his claim into a nuisance action, it was really a claim under the old English common law doctrine of “ancient lights.” Under that doctrine, a landowner acquired a negative prescriptive easement for sunlight across an adjoining landowner’s property and could prevent the adjoining landowner from obstructing the light once the easement was established by the passage of time.

The only problem with the “ancient lights” doctrine, Midas argued, was that every state considering the doctrine, including Iowa, repudiated its premise as inconsistent with the needs of a developing country. In fact, Iowa’s legislature passed a law in 1873 prohibiting the implied acquisition by adjoining landowners of “any easement of light or air, so as to prevent the erection of any building on such land.” Iowa Code § 564.2.

Mohr vigorously argued that his claim of nuisance had nothing to do with any claim of prescriptive easement for light and air, but the Court was unpersuaded: “We recognize,” the Court ruled, “that while disavowing any cause of action for interference with light, air, and view unless granted by express contract, our prior cases have left unanswered the question whether such claim might be sustained under the doctrine of nuisance. Squarely confronted with the question, however, we are convinced that giving vitality to such a cause of action in nuisance would be the same thing as granting a prescriptive easement.”

In other words, recognizing Erick’s right to enforce a nuisance claim for intentional interference with light, air, or view as something other than enforcement of the doctrine of “ancient lights” would be a distinction without a difference. “For a variety of reasons,” the Court said, “we think such an expansion of the law of nuisance would be unwise, at least in regard to the interference with view claimed here.”

Extending the law of nuisance to encompass obstruction of view due to lawful construction of a neighboring building would unduly restrict a property owner’s right to the free use of his or her property, interfere with established zoning ordinances, and result in an endless flood of litigation. Every new construction project is bound to block someone’s view of something, opening every landowner up to a claim of nuisance. The practical implication of such a right would be the need of every servient owner to obtain a waiver of the view easement from the “dominant” landowner. This would reduce development decisions to being made by a committee of all owners with sightlines to the project.

The Court found “no compelling reason to recognize an enforceable right of view over private property. Accordingly, we hold there can be no cause of action grounded in nuisance for blocking that view.”

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Friday, September 12, 2025

Posted on by tagged.

SPITE FENCE TAFFY PULL

Trust an angry plaintiff and a clever lawyer to stretch a useful concept like “spite fence” – which we have been talking about the last few days – like a salt water taffy pull.

We have established that a spite fence requires unreasonable height and a malicious motive. We have also figured out that a spite fence can be something other than a fence, such as the Maine widow woman’s “spite trees.”

It was probably inevitable that someone would go after a neighbor for planting plants that may someday be too tall. Add a complaint that the neighbor refused to knuckle under when the plaintiff tried to boss him and her around regarding their landscaping, and, voilà, you have malice.

Just as the cops in Minority Report arrested people who would someday commit a crime (surely a useful idea), this theory holds people liable because their plantings might someday be a natural spite fence.

Fortunately, the Mississippi courts that heard this one all made short work of it.

Blackwell v. Lucas, 271 So. 3d 638 (Ct. App. Mississippi, Nov. 20, 2018): The Lucases planted some plants and shrubs in the front yard of their Ocean Springs, Mississippi, home. The Blackwells believed that if allowed to grow, the plants and shrubs would at some indeterminate time in the future block their view of the ocean, the sunsets and the beautiful areas normally and typically available to property owners in the Oak Bluff Subdivision.

Thus, the Blackwells asked the Lucases to remove the plants and shrubs or to retard their growth so that their view of the ocean and surrounding area would not be impaired. The Lucases, being your average, reasonable American homeowners, declined courteously.

Actually, it may not have been “courteously.” The Blackwells argued that the Lucases were being mean: “The shrubs and plants installed by Mr. & Mrs. Lucas have no beneficial use and were installed and maintained by them for the purpose of annoying the Blackwells and preventing them from enjoying their property.”

The Blackwells, also being your all-too-common American homeowners, sued the Lucases for planting shrubs that “will unreasonably block the view of the Blackwells.” The term “unreasonably,” in this case, apparently meant anything that might alter the status quo in any manner the Blackwells found objectionable: “The actions of Mr. & Mrs. Lucas,” the Blackwell’s complaint alleged, “amounts [sic] to and/or equates [sic] to an invasion of the Blackwells’ interest in the use and enjoyment of their land and the invasion is intentional and unreasonable or negligent.”

Strong words, indeed! But the trial court was unimpressed and tossed the suit out on its ear. Not taking the hint, the Blackwells appealed.

Held: The trial court’s dismissal was upheld.

The Blackwells had no common law or statutory right to an unobstructed view across the Lucases’ property, nor did they have a right to dictate the type or placement of the Lucases’ plants and shrubs. The Blackwell complaint failed to state a cause of action for a nuisance or to allege any present injury or an imminent threat of irreparable harm for which there was no adequate remedy at law.

The Court of Appeals observed that a cause of action arises out of a pre-existing primary legal right with which the law invests a person. The right to maintain an action depends upon the existence of a cause of action which involves a combination of a right on the part of the plaintiff and the violation of such right by the defendant. Thus, the existence of a legal right is an essential element of a cause of action, inasmuch as a plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own case instead of on the weakness of the defendant’s case. It is the plaintiff’s right, not the defendant’s wrongdoing, that is the basis of recovery.

That right or duty must be a legal right or duty, and not a mere moral obligation that is enforceable neither in law nor in equity.

Applying the general notion to this case, the Court of Appeals observed that property owners have a legal right to cut and remove any part of a plant or shrub that grows on or overhangs their property. They have a legal right to sue to abate a nuisance. But property owners have no legally cognizable right to a view across their neighbors’ property. Nor do they have a right to dictate the type or placement of the neighbors’ shrubs.

The shrubs were not a nuisance. The Lucases would be subject to liability for a private nuisance only if their conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of the Blackwells’ interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. Again, without a legal right to a view across the property, there simply is no such interest to be invaded.

But the Blackwells tried to bootstrap their claim into a “spite fence” argument. They argued that the plants and shrubs would someday obstruct their view, and this fact gave them a viable cause of action for a “spite fence” nuisance.

The Court of Appeals held that the Blackwells’ “spite fence” claim had no basis in Mississippi law. Because the one Mississippi case on “spite fences” was decided by an evenly divided Court, “there is still no precedent for such a claim under Mississippi law. Moreover, we decline to recognize a new cause of action for a “spite fence” in a case that does not even involve a fence,” but instead only “some unspecified ‘plants and shrubs’ that, “[i]f allowed to grow,” allegedly may obstruct the Blackwells’ view.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Thursday, September 11, 2025

Posted on by tagged.

HAWAII SINGS HAWAII

Regular readers know that I often write about the Hawaii Rule, easily the second most cited rule in arboriculture law. But for all of that, the great State of Hawaii has not expounded on the seminal holding in Whitesell v. Houlton, the decision that most famously rejected the second prong of the Massachusetts Rule by holding that when a landowner’s tree became a nuisance to his or her neighbor, the neighbor could compel the landowner to abate the nuisance – that’s legalese for remove the tree or at least the part of the tree that was bedeviling the adjoining property owner – at the landowner’s expense.

Whitesell, which adopted a rule from an old Virginia case, Smith v. Holt, held that a tree was a nuisance if it was “noxious” or if there was an imminent danger of it causing “sensible harm” to property (besides plant life) other than by “casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit.” “Sensible harm” is a standard not causing much confusion: tree roots heaving basement walls, danger trees about to fall on nearby cars and structures – it has always been reasonably obvious what “sensible harm” might be. But what might Whitesell’s reference to “noxious” trees be all about?

About 35 years after Whitesell, a Hawaii court has finally tackled the question, interpreting Whitesell and providing a rare glimpse at a court admitting that its own precedent, if not wrong, at least was a bit too frisky. Not that I am surprised, it turns out that Whitesell’s reference to noxious trees” was meaningless surplusage, language borrowed without much consideration from a since-discredited Virginia decision.

No one ever expected a litigant to latch on to the “noxious” half of Whitesell’s disjunctive definition in order to make his case. When the plaintiff in today’s case did just that, the appellate court was compelled to admit that Whitesell’s inclusion of ‘noxious’ was “superfluous.” Translation: Whitesell said ‘noxious’, but it did not mean it.

The appellate court in today’s case did the only thing it could: it decided to “modify [the] holding in Whitesell for when a plant can be considered a nuisance. Plants whose overhanging branches cast shade or drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or whose roots interfere only with other plant life, are not nuisances. Overhanging branches or protruding roots constitute a nuisance when they actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, material harm to a person or to property other than plant life.”

Good idea, even if it’s 35 years late. Get rid of the ‘noxious’ language. If the tree is noxious, it probably already poses an imminent danger to people or property. And that is exactly what a non-noxious tree does when it has become a nuisance.

For heaven’s sake, simply define the tree by the imminent threat it represents, not with some squishy term like ‘noxious’.

Spittler v. Charbonneau, 145 Haw. 204, 449 P.3d 1202 (Ct. App. 2019). Scott Spittler sued his neighbors, Paul and Janice Charbonneau, raising all sorts of trespass, nuisance and related claims. The claims relevant here is his claim that the Charbonneaus’ ironwood trees, planted in 1983 as windbreaks under a U.S. Dept. of Agriculture program, were dropping leaves and branches on his property, and had “an extensive root system, have created a poor growing environment, and continue to present danger to person, real property, and agricultural products of [Spittler].” For good measure, he also claimed that the trees were ‘noxious,’ based upon a “high risk” rating of “12” set out on the Hawaii Pacific Weed Risk Assessment website. He demanded that the Charbonneaus remove the trees at their expense.

The trial court held for the Charbonneaus, finding that “the intrusion by way of overhanging branches, leaves and roots into Scott’s property that results in damage to plant life is not a nuisance and not compensable.”

Scott appealed.

Held: The trees were neither noxious nor nuisances. What’s more, Whitesell’s reference to noxious trees being nuisances is surplusage that should be stricken from the decision.

The Court observed with some surprise that “in a state known for its lush foliage, there appears to be only one reported appellate decision, Whitesell v. Houlton, addressing when a plant that naturally encroaches upon a neighboring property can constitute a nuisance. Whitesell adopted a modified version of the Virginia rule set forth in Smith v. Holt, which was later overruled in part by Fancher v. Fagella. Borrowing from Smith v. Holt, Whitesell held that “non-noxious plants ordinarily are not nuisances… Overhanging branches or protruding roots constitute a nuisance only when they actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, sensible harm to property other than plant life, in ways other than by casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit. When overhanging branches or protruding roots actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, sensible harm to property other than plant life, in ways other than by casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may require the owner of the tree to pay for the damages and to cut back the endangering branches or roots and, if such is not done within a reasonable time, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may cause the cutback to be done at the tree owner’s expense.”

Thus, according to Whitesell, the Charbonneaus’ trees could be considered a nuisance if: (1) they were “noxious”; or (2) they caused, or there was an imminent danger of them causing, “sensible harm” to property other than plant life other than by “casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit.”

“In Whitesell,” the Court said, “we did not define the word ‘noxious’ or formulate a test to determine when a plant could be considered ‘noxious.’ The difficulty inherent in characterizing a plant as ‘noxious’ is illustrated by this case. Scott argues that ironwood trees are “noxious” based upon a “high risk” rating of “12” on the Hawaii Pacific Weed Risk Assessment website. That website does not use the word “noxious” and states only that the “small-cone ironwood” is “[u]sed in [Hawai’i] for windbreaks at higher elevations. Wood used for fuel.” It does not indicate that the ironwood is “physically harmful or destructive to living beings,” which is the definition of “noxious” contained in the Merriam-Webster dictionary.” The Court noted that some Hawaii cases had characterized some other flora as being noxious, but ironwood trees weren’t on anyone’s list except for Scott’s.

The Court sheepishly admitted that “[o]ur use of the word “non-noxious” in Whitesell was superfluous. A noxious plant — i.e., one that is “physically harmful or destructive to living beings” — is one that actually causes, or that could pose an imminent danger of causing, material harm to persons or to property other than plant life; conversely, a plant that actually causes, or that poses an imminent danger of causing, material harm to persons or property other than plant life may be considered noxious. We note that certain plants, such as coconut palms, are capable of causing material injury to persons or to property other than plant life just by dropping fronds or nuts. We also note that tree roots can, under some circumstances, pose imminent trip[ping] hazards without damaging property other than plant life. We therefore modify our holding in Whitesell for when a plant can be considered a nuisance. Plants whose overhanging branches cast shade or drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or whose roots interfere only with other plant life, are not nuisances. Overhanging branches or protruding roots constitute a nuisance when they actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, material harm to a person or to property other than plant life. When overhanging branches or protruding roots actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, harm to a person or to property other than plant life, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may require the tree’s owner to pay for the damage and cut back the endangering branches or roots and, if that is not done within a reasonable time, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may cause the cutback to be done at the tree owner’s expense.”

The only dispute before the court alleged the ironwoods dropped “overhanging branches which merely cast shade or drop leaves, flowers, or fruit,” and “roots which interfere only with other plant life.” Under those facts, the Charbonneaus’ trees were not a nuisance…

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407