Case of the Day – Wednesday, February 26, 2025

SHOWING UP

Denise Pevarnek’s agent chopped down her neighbors’ trees so she’d have a better view of the river. The neighbors complained (surprisingly enough), but Denise steadfastly ignored their remonstrances. The neighbors then sued, but Denise ignored the summons. She finally decided to start paying attention after a default was entered against her and the trial court intended to assess treble damages against her in the amount of $77,000.

YouSnoozeYouLoseDenise tried futilely to undo the consequences of her earlier indolence. Alas, a stitch in time saves nine. The Court ruled that she had had plenty of notice, but her decision to ignore the lawsuit was her problem, and undoing the default she so richly deserved would have turned her problem into her neighbors’ problem. And they were already smarting from the loss of their trees.

Of interest in the case — one argument Denise included in her scattershot but untimely defense — was her contention that the cost to replace the trees wasn’t the right measure of damages and that the trial court was wrong to rely on an affidavit of an arborist that didn’t explain in detail how he had arrived at the damage costs. The Court rejected this, saying that in the case of trespass, the measure of damages is either the reduction in the value of the property or — where the property can be repaired — the cost to fix things. The goal of the damage award, according to the Court, is to come as close as possible to compensating the owner for the damages, and trial courts have a lot of latitude to choose the method that seemed more reasonably calculated to do so.

The affidavit, the Court noted, laid out the expert’s education and experience, showed that he had inspected the damaged real estate, and proposed a reasonable strategy for repairing the harm. The arborist listed what had to be done and how much he’d charge to do it. It might not be perfect, but perfection is often the enemy of “good enough.” The affidavit, the Court ruled, was “good enough.”

Stitch2The Court reminded the defendant that if she really had found the damage showing to be flawed and superficial, she could have come to the hearing and contested it. Snooze and lose, indeed.

Bologna v. Pevarnek, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 2689, 2007 WL 4207801 (Mich.App., Nov. 29, 2007). Denise Pevarnek hired Chester Damiani to clean up her property. He was zealous to a fault, deciding to improve the view of the Detroit River from her adjacent lot by cutting down trees belonging to her neighbors, the Bolognas. Believing that Denise and Chester’s conduct was baloney, the Bolognas sued for trespass, alleging that the destruction reduced the value of their property and exposed a view to Pevarnek’s unsightly neighboring property and asking for $28,000, trebled by Michigan’s wrongful cutting statute to $84,000.

Denise Pevarnek was served with the lawsuit, but she didn’t answer. As is customary when that happens, the Bolognas got a default judgment. Thereafter, they presented the affidavit of a certified arborist who opined that the cost of landscape restoration was $24,050. At this point, Denise took notice, and began taking action to defend, seeking to have the default undone. The trial court refused, and it entered judgment against her for $77,730. Pevarnek appealed.

Held: The judgment was upheld. Much of the case revolves around whether Denise should be relieved from her default judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled, in essence, that she knew about the suit and did nothing. In other words, “you snooze, you lose.” But of interest in the area of tree law was Denise’s claim that the trial court was wrong in using the cost of replacing the trees as a measure of the damages the Bolognas suffered. The Court of Appeals said where the wrong consists of a trespass to property resulting in an injury to the land that is permanent and irreparable, the general measure of damages is the diminution in value of the property. If the injury is reparable or temporary, however, the measure of damages is the cost of restoration of the property to its original condition (if less than the value of the property before the injury).

perfectThe rule is, however, flexible in its application. The ultimate goal is compensation for the harm or damage done. Thus, a court may apply whatever method is most appropriate to compensate a plaintiff for his or her loss. Here, the Court said, given the fact that the Bolognas’ trees could be restored, it was proper for the trial court to use the cost-of-restoration method.

Pevarnek argued that the trial court erred by adopting without question the assertion of alleged damages without sufficient foundation. The plaintiff had filed an affidavit of arborist Steve McCollum, who swore that – in order to return the property to its pre-trespass condition, that is, with no view of Pevarnek’s property – 12 new trees had to be planted, some existing trees had to be replanted, the over-pruned trees had to be removed, and the lawn had to be repaired. He stated that the total cost of this work was $24,050. The trial court awarded plaintiffs damages of $77,730, equal to three times the sum of the cost of work proposed by McCollum and $1,860 for the cost of a privacy fence. Although McCollum’s affidavit didn’t explain how he calculated the damages, he stated his qualifications and education, he said he had personally inspected the Bologna property, assessed their needs, specifically listed the work to be done, and listed the cost for his business was to complete it. The Court said the expert affidavit put forth a reasonable basis for the damage computation, and that was enough.

– Tom Root
TNLBGray

Case of the Day – Thursday, February 20, 2025

INJUNCTION JUNCTION

Pipelines are tubes through which money flows. There are barrels of revenue and gallons of net income in building those capital-intensive projects.

Yesterday, we read how Buckeye Pipeline Co., got whupped by local tree owner Bob Pichulo. And that was no mean feat. Buckeye is not just a couple of guys in a rusty Reading work truck. Instead, it is a subsidiary of Buckeye Partners, L.P. a master limited partnership that in turn is owned by IFM Investors, a global fund manager owned by 27 Australian pension funds. The IFM bought Buckeye in 2019 in a deal valued at $10.3 billion. At the time, Buckeye had prior year revenue of $4 billion and about $400 million in net income. Buckeye’s assets included 6,000 miles of pipeline, with over 100 delivery locations and 115 liquid petroleum products terminals with aggregate tank capacity of over 118 million barrels, and a network of marine terminals located primarily in the East and Gulf Coast regions of the United States, as well as in the Caribbean.

So Bob was a problem, but not much of one. Or it would not have been if Buckeye had just gone ahead and cut down the 13 maple trees, and paid the $50,000 Bob’s expert said the trees were worth. Buckeye would have had the clear view and open space it wanted for the pipeline. Cut the check, Buckeye. It’s only money. And by your metric, not much money at that.

But Bob’s backwoods Wolverine lawyer had one final trick up his rumpled sleeve. Bob did not ask for money. Instead, he asked for and got a permanent injunction. So Buckeye no longer had the option of cutting the trees and tendering a check to Bob.

Injunctions are extraordinary remedies, generally reserved for cases where the harm is irreparable, that is, not compensable with dollars.

On appeal, Buckeye whined that the trial judge should not have granted an injunction, because Bob’s own expert said the trees were worth $50K. The very fact that Bob could assign a dollar value to his trees, Buckeye argued, meant that the harm was not irreparable.

Everyone knew what Buckeye meant. What it meant was that if it lost, it would trespass anyway, cut the trees it wanted removed, and then remedy its trespass with a checkbook. The trial court did not intend to let that happen.

Pichulo v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 261 (Ct.App. Michigan, Feb. 14, 2019). Bob Pichulo bought some property in Mount Morris Township back in 1992. Thirty-three years before the sale, the previous owners had granted Buckeye Pipeline an easement to construct and maintain an oil pipeline across the property.

Bob knew about the easement when he bought the place. Yet it hardly affected him for about 23 years. Then, in 2015, Buckeye sent him a letter informing him of Buckeye’s intent to remove 13 Norway maple trees that were on the easement. Buckeye asserted that the trees had to be removed because they obstructed aerial surveillance of and access to the pipeline in case of an emergency or for repairs. In response, Bob sued seeking a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction against cutting the trees.

After an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction motion, the trial court ordered that all underbrush be removed from the easement and the branches on the Norway maples be trimmed to provide a 10-foot clearance.

Buckeye later moved for summary disposition of Bob’s complaint, arguing that it was entitled to remove the trees as a matter of law. Bob responded that there was a real question whether the removal was reasonably necessary for Buckeye’s use of the easement. The trial court agreed with Bob.

Over the course of the four-day trial that followed, the trial court heard Bob’s testimony about the value of the trees to him; pilots’ testimony about the visibility of the pipeline easement after the clearing of underbrush and pruning of the trees; testimony from an expert who estimated that the trees were older than the pipeline, grew shallow roots, and had a monetary value of nearly $50,000; and testimony from experts in oil pipeline regulation, maintenance, and safety who disagreed about whether Buckeye’s proposed plan to remove the trees was reasonably necessary for its enjoyment of the easement.

The trial found Bob’s evidence to be more credible and convincing, ruling that the removal of the Norway maples was not reasonably necessary. Consequently, it permanently enjoined Buckeye from removing them.

Buckeye appealed.

Yesterday, we discussed how Bob’s experts, perhaps with the help of a judge inclined to find the home team a little more believable, steamrolled Buckeye. What we did not talk about was the permanent injunction.

Buckeye complained that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a permanent injunction against it cutting down Bob’s trees. It claimed the injunction was not a proper remedy because Bob had a legal remedy available, the loss of Bob’s trees was not irreparable, and a weighing of the harms between the parties and the risk to public safety should have favored Buckeye.

It is true, the Court said, that injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that “issues only when justice requires, there is no adequate remedy at law, and there exists a real and imminent danger of irreparable injury,” and that he grant of such injunctive relief is within the sound discretion of the trial court. The general rule is that a court will balance the benefit of an injunction to the plaintiff against the inconvenience and damage to the defendant, and grant an injunction or award damages “as seems most consistent with justice and equity under all the circumstances of the case.”

“While an injunction may lie when a tort is merely threatened,” the Court said, “a cause of action for damages will not.”

Buckeye argued that the trial court should not have granted injunctive relief in favor of Bob because the harm to him could be remedied by the payment of money damages. Bob’s expert did testify that the Norway maples had an established value based on their health and age. However, the Court said, just because an object has monetary value does not rule out a permanent injunction. Permanent injunctions are permitted not only “[w]hen an injury is irreparable,” but also when “the interference is of a permanent or continuous character, or the remedy at law will not afford adequate relief”

Thus, the Court ruled, proof that monetary damages would not be adequate or that there would be a permanent interference also could warrant an injunction. Here, the trial court credited testimony from the plaintiff that the trees had a sentimental value to him and that no amount of money would satisfy his loss. Further, the trial court noted that removal of the trees would have been permanent, because they reasonably could not be replaced, considering the arborist’s testimony that the trees were quite old and took over 70 years to grow.

Additionally, the Court noted that when a tort merely is threatened, the proper remedy is for an injunction, not for damages. “The trial court did not clearly err in determining that removal of the trees was not reasonably necessary to the defendant’s use of the easement,” the Court of Appeals ruled. Bob showed that Buckeye was threatening to commit a trespass or, in other words, a tort. Consequently, the Court said, injunctive relief was the proper remedy.

In a last gasp, Buckeye argued that the trial court did not weigh potential harm to the plaintiff, the defendant, and the public. Buckeye is correct that, typically, a trial court is required to “balance the benefit of an injunction to plaintiff against the inconvenience and damage to defendant,” and only issue an injunction if it would be “consistent with justice and equity under all the circumstances of the case.” However, such balancing is not required where a trespass could result from an intentional or willful act. Here, Buckeye made no secret of its intent to remove the 13 Norway maples. “Therefore,” the Court held, “defendant’s proposed action was intentional and willful.”

Even assuming that the trial court did not properly balance the harms, the error would have been inconsequential, because the trial court was not required to do so.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Wednesday, February 19, 2025

PRIDE GOETH BEFORE A FALL

Rural lawyers are quite familiar with the not-so-legal but all-too-real concept of being “homered,” a problem I mentioned a week or so ago.

Being “homered” is a phenomenon that occurs when an out-of-town client, especially one represented by big-city out-of-town lawyers, appears in a small rural county courthouse on the opposite side of a case against a local resident represented by a local lawyer.

As a matter of law, it means nothing that the judge plays golf with the local lawyer, or that the local litigant had been sitting in the next pew over from the judge’s family for two decades or more. The law does not countenance favoritism, and the judge has taken an oath.

That’s the law. But it is not real life. As a matter of fact, you can be sure that Vicki Lawrence was wrong when she warned you not to “trust your soul to no backwoods southern lawyer.” Indeed, if your case against a big pipeline company is being heard in the local courthouse, there’s no one to whom you would be better advised to trust your soul, or at least your case, than that shambling wreck of an attorney who needs a haircut and is wearing his lunch on his jacket lapel.

The other side might have good lawyers, indeed, very good lawyers from very good law firms from the big city. But that clownish local yokel with the battered briefcase is a great lawyer… because he knows the judge.

When you’re actively homering your opponent, luck is on your side. Of course, as my beloved 2nd-grade teacher Minta Newmeyer taught me a few years ago, “luck” is defined as the result of preparation meeting opportunity. So having a couple of good-old-boy experts won’t hurt, and neither will not accepting everything the smarty-pants experts from the pipeline company say at face value.

In today’s case, there is simply no way a longtime local landowner should have won against the big pipeline operator. When Buckeye Pipeline showed up at Bob Pichulo’s door after 25 years of silence wanting to clear-cut its easement, the company’s judgment that the trees should be removed should normally have been sufficient to carry the day. But Bob and his hometown legal talent found some experts of their own and – perhaps benefitting as well from the fair winds and following seas that result from homering the other side –  pretty much beat the brakes off the haughty pipeline people.

It hardly helped Buckeye’s cause that its case was largely one of ipse dixit. The pipeliner’s case could charitably be summarized as “we own the easement, and the trees need to be cut because we say so.” Even after being called on it, Buckeye continued to spin, saying the tree roots were dangerous to the pipeline because they said so, and the trees could make lightning strike the pipeline because they said so. It’s a bad idea to make outrageous claims that you cannot back up.

The moral: When you’re Goliath going up against David, try a little humility. And duck when he slings that stone.

Pichulo v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 261 (Ct.App. Michigan, Feb. 14, 2019). Bob Pichulo bought some property in Mount Morris Township back in 1992. Thirty-three years before the sale, the previous owners had granted Buckeye Pipeline an easement to construct and maintain an oil pipeline across the property.

Bob knew about the easement when he bought the place. Yet it hardly affected him for about 23 years. Then, in 2015, Buckeye sent him a letter informing him of Buckeye’s intent to remove 13 Norway maple trees that were on the easement. Buckeye asserted that the trees had to be removed because they obstructed aerial surveillance of and access to the pipeline in case of an emergency or for repairs. In response, Bob sued seeking a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction against cutting the trees.

After an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction motion, the trial court ordered that all underbrush be removed from the easement and the branches on the Norway maples be trimmed to provide a 10-foot clearance.

Buckeye later moved for summary disposition of Bob’s complaint, arguing that it was entitled to remove the trees as a matter of law. Bob responded that there was a real question whether the removal was reasonably necessary for Buckeye’s use of the easement. The trial court agreed with Bob.

Over the course of the four-day trial that followed, the trial court heard Bob’s testimony about the value of the trees to him; pilots’ testimony about the visibility of the pipeline easement after the clearing of underbrush and pruning of the trees; testimony from an expert who estimated that the trees were older than the pipeline, grew shallow roots and had a monetary value of nearly $50,000; and testimony from experts in oil pipeline regulation, maintenance, and safety who disagreed about whether Buckeye’s proposed plan to remove the trees was reasonably necessary for its enjoyment of the easement.

The trial found Bob’s evidence to be more credible and convincing and held that the removal of the Norway maples was not reasonably necessary. Consequently, it permanently enjoined Buckeye from removing them.

Buckeye appealed.

Held: Bob was entitled to his permanent injunction.

Buckeye argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Its argument, in essence, was that it had the easement for the purpose of maintaining its pipeline and cutting down the trees was maintenance. No one could question Buckeye’s judgment that the trees should go.

An easement is a right to use the land burdened by the easement rather than a right to occupy and possess the land, as does an estate owner. The use of an easement must be confined to the purposes for which it was granted, including any rights incident to or necessary for the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, which rights are to be exercised with as little burden as possible to the owner of the land.

When considering the scope of an easement, a court must discern the parties’ intent as shown by the plain language of the document granting the easement. “Where the language of an easement is plain and unambiguous,” the Court said, “it is to be enforced as written and no further inquiry is permitted… Under our well-established easement jurisprudence, the dominant estate may not make improvements to the servient estate if such improvements are unnecessary for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably burden the servient tenement.”

There was no question the easement gave Buckeye a “right of way” and “free ingress and egress,” for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, operating, altering, repairing or removing the pipeline. And “maintenance” in an easement generally includes the right to clear “the property [of trees] to ensure maintenance and inspection,” the term “maintenance including maintaining the property in the appropriate condition so that it is accessible in the event that repair of the pipeline is required.” What Buckeye proposed to do by removing the trees was undoubtedly encompassed by the right of maintenance.

Buckeye argued that this conclusion required the trial court to grant it summary disposition. But a trial court also is required to consider “(1) whether the tree removal is needed for Buckeye’s effective use of the easement and (2) whether the tree removal unreasonably burdens Bob’s servient estate.” Those questions, the Court wrote, are in regard to the extent and scope of the easement, and generally are questions of fact.

Bob and Buckeye presented competing testimonial and documentary evidence regarding whether aerial surveillance of or access to the pipeline was unreasonably obstructed by the trees. Thus, the Court concluded, there remained a question of fact as to the extent of the burden presented by the trees and their roots with respect to potential emergencies and repairs. In light of such questions of fact to be decided at a trial, Buckeye was properly denied summary judgment.

That was especially true because the trial court made reasonable findings of fact that undercut Buckeye’s claims. Buckeye said the trees had to go in order to give Buckeye access to the right-of-way and the pipeline, to respond to emergencies as they arise, and to remove the risks that the tree roots posed to the pipe. Buckeye’s expert, William Byrd, testified that the trees and their roots inhibited Buckeye’s access to the pipeline because excavation equipment could not reach the pipeline in an emergency. Byrd opined that the removal of the trees was reasonably necessary for future maintenance and that such actions were common in the oil pipeline industry. Bob contradicted that evidence with testimony from his own expert Richard Kuprewicz. Rich concluded that the removal of the trees was not reasonably necessary in anticipation of potential maintenance. He said federal regulations did not declare a set width for pipe excavation and opined that removal of the trees to access the pipeline when the time for such maintenance came would not significantly extend the time required to perform such excavation, should the need arise.

The trial court found Bob’s expert to be more credible when he said there was already adequate space to access the pipeline and that the potential requirement to remove the trees before performing any excavation, if needed, would not cause a significant delay. The appellate court gave deference to the trial court’s findings of fact.

Buckeye also argued that the trial court clearly erred by finding that it is not permitted to remove the trees in anticipation of a future emergency. Buckeye introduced testimony that the Norway maples would present a significant burden both in identifying an emergency and accessing the pipeline in case of an emergency. Buckeye’s patrol pilot testified and provided photographs showing that his aerial view of the pipeline and easement was obstructed by the trees. Buckeye’s agent also testified that the trees would significantly delay Buckeye’s ability to properly access the pipeline. He noted that federal regulations required Buckeye to prepare an emergency plan. Buckeye already has such a plan, but to carry it out, it argued, it must remove the trees in question.

Mark Twain says there are none of these …

Bob’s evidence contradicted Buckeye’s claims. He elicited testimony from another pilot that the easement around the pipeline plainly was visible when flying past the property at the proper angle. Bob also provided photographs showing an unobstructed view of the pipeline, which is identified in the photographs by the presence of yellow tape. His expert Rich, meanwhile, testified that in cases of emergency, it would be entirely improper and unsafe to rush to the scene of the leak with large machinery and to begin excavation. Instead, he testified, the s pipeline had internal sensors that allowed for the identification of leaks in general areas, which could then be isolated and the flow of oil through that area stopped. This effectively reduced the amount of environmental contamination without having to rush in with dangerous machinery.

While Rich agreed that federal regulations required an emergency plan, he pointed out that the regs did not require the removal of any trees.

The trial again found Bob’s expert to be more credible. With respect to locating an emergency via aerial surveillance, the trial court relied on the pilot’s photographs and testimony establishing that the pipeline was visible. Because the trial court’s decision on this issue relied on admissible and compelling evidence in the record, the Court of Appeals said, it was not clearly erroneous and thus carried the day.

The Court said, “Given our deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and [its] decision to believe [Rich] instead of Buckeye[‘s] expert and the trial court’s reliance on admitted evidence, the record presented does not provide any reason for us to be “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Thus, based on the facts as found by the trial court, Buckeye’s request to remove the Norway maple trees was not reasonably necessary for Buckeye to prepare for an emergency.

Finally, Buckeye argued that the trees had to be removed because their roots presented a danger to the pipeline. In support of that, its expert testified that tree roots acted as conduits for electricity, so they could cause lightning to strike the pipeline. In addition, Buckeye presented evidence that the roots potentially could grow toward and eventually chip away at the pipes, and its expert testified that the tree roots could entangle the pipeline, causing damage. On cross-examination, however, he acknowledged that he was aware lightning strikes could happen but did not know of any specific examples. Bob countered with expert testimony from an arborist who testified that the root system of a Norway maple stays in the top 10 inches of soil, which is above the pipeline. As to the tree roots and potential pipeline erosion, Bob’s expert explained that the pipeline’s cathodic protection would be able to provide a timely alert that a tree root was encroaching on the pipeline and, if that failed, other tools could be used to identify external corrosion of the pipeline.

The trial court again found Bob’s evidence more credible, weighing the fact that Buckeye’s expert could not identify any particular instance where a lightning strike on a pipeline had been conducted by a tree root. Considering that evidence in light of the arborist’s testimony that the tree roots did not go as deep as the pipeline and Rich’s testimony that Buckeye would be alerted to any encroaching root in a timely manner, the trial court found that removal of the trees was not reasonably necessary for Buckeye’s maintenance of the pipeline. The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge’s conclusion was not clearly wrong and thus had to be accepted.

In sum, the Court of Appeals said,

Buckeye asserted that the Norway maple trees had to be removed because they were a danger to the pipeline and an obstruction to surveillance and access. Buckeye’s contentions rely on a misapplication of the law in Michigan with regard to easements. Buckeye, under the terms of the easement at issue here, does not have the right to ensure freedom from any and all obstructions or dangers to the pipeline. That simply is not the standard for such inquiries. Instead, Buckeye’s rights under the easement are limited to freedom from unreasonable obstructions or dangers. The extent, or reasonableness, of the obstruction presented by the trees is a fact question for the trial court to decide and it did so here. The trial court, after considering all of the evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses, decided that removal of the Norway maple trees was not reasonably necessary for Buckeye’s maintenance, operation, or repair of the pipeline.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray140407

Case of the Day – Friday, December 13, 2024

DON’T SIT ON YOUR RIGHTS

burgerk150223Today’s case appears at first blush to be nothing more than a titanic conflict between a fast food purveyor and a strip mall, hardly the material that will get a tree or neighbor law fan’s blood pumping. But it illustrates a few worthwhile points.

A Burger King and a Long John Silver’s sat next to each other in Bay City, Michigan. The owners of the lots agreed to mutual easements so that patrons of each could use a common driveway while their arteries clanged shut from the cholesterol and trans fat. The easements were written without the benefit of a legal description of the land subject to the easement (perhaps to save the $300 or so a surveyor would have cost). Sometime after that, the Burger King was dethroned, and the restaurant was torn down. The buyer of the land, the strip mall next door, tore down the BK and expanded the mall. In so doing, the developer built over where one of the access drive easements lay (although the actual common driveway had never been constructed).

The Long John Silver’s crew observed the construction, but the company didn’t complain until the construction was completed. Then, the fish folks sought an injunction in federal court to get the offending building torn down. The Court agreed that the mall developer had violated the easement, but the facts that the remedy was so drastic (tearing down the building) and the fact that Long John Silver’s sat on its complaint during the construction and said nothing when the mall developer could have remedied the problem easily. That is called “laches,” and the law doesn’t think much of people who engage in it.

The case wasn’t resolved at that point, but Long John Silver’s was more likely to just win the difference in the value of the real estate (about $35,000, or 1,591 8-piece family meals). But the lesson is that if you sit on your rights and permit the other party to really damage you, you may be severely limited in your remedies.

The lesson of laches - don't sit on your rights.

The lesson of laches – don’t sit on your rights.

BR Associates, Inc. v. LaFramboise, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46036, 2007 WL 1840031 (E.D.Mich., June 26, 2007). BR operated a Long John Silver’s restaurant just west of a busy intersection in Bay City, Michigan. LR owned a commercial plaza east of the Long John Silver’s at the intersection itself. In 2004, a Burger King operated on the LR site, but it closed and was sold to LR. LR demolished the Burger King and added to its existing plaza, making space for five new tenants. BR’s fish fryers were aware of the construction, and they informed BR’s corporate offices of the activity.

BR never complained during the construction. But after LR was done, BR claimed that the plaza blocked an easement arising out of a written agreement entered into by BR and the old Burger King owner, in which BR and the prior owner gave a mutual “perpetual, non-exclusive easement” for the customers of each other to use two driveways (the “North Access Drive” and the “South Access Drive”) on the easement areas, which were the boundaries of the two properties. Under the easement, the parties had the right “to relocate from time to time and in each party’s own discretion, those driving aisles and ingress and egress points located on their own Parcels … provided that such relocation does not adversely effect [sic] the other party’s right to use the Easement Area … [and] upon the mutual written agreement of the parties hereto.”

Apparently, the contemplated South Access Drive was never constructed when the Burger King still operated. The easement agreement did not specify the width or the length of the access drives nor did it include a legal description of the areas. LR did not get BR’s permission to move the North Access Drive, nor did it have permission to completely block the South Access Drive, which it did as a result of the construction.

BR sued LR for trespass during the construction, but mostly for breach of the easement agreement, seeking an injunction to compel LR to honor the easement. BR contended that LR’s conduct violated the easement agreement and placed an increased burden on the easement. LR’s actions constituted a trespass, in BR’s view, and created additional wear and tear on BR’s parking lots. Finally, LR’s activities interfered with BR’s business. BR claimed that the easement agreement simply did not contemplate loading and unloading of vendor vehicles as well as parking or that LR would use BR’s property for uses beyond simple customer ingress and egress contemplated by the easement agreement.

LR argued that any recovery for breach of the easement agreement should be limited to $35,000 because BR’s appraiser valued its property with the easement at $650,000 and without the easement at $615,000. BR and LR both moved for summary judgment on all issues.

Imagine 1,591 of these monster meals - that's probably what the damages will buy.

Imagine 1,591 of these monster meals – that’s probably what the damages will buy.

Held: BR was entitled to summary judgment on some claims, and others would go to trial. The District Court noted that Michigan law defined an easement as the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose. In order to create an express easement, there must be language in the document manifesting a clear intent to create a servitude. Any ambiguities are resolved in favor of use of the land free of easements. The unambiguous language of an agreement controls the determination of whether a breach has occurred.

Here, the Court said, there could be no dispute the LR breached the express terms of the easement when it constructed the addition to the plaza. The easement agreement provided that an “access drive” could only be relocated upon the parties’ mutual written agreement. LR didn’t contend that it got BR’s consent. Instead, it claimed that the South Access Drive never came into existence at all. No curb cut was made, and the electrical installations otherwise blocking the south access drive and preventing its use were never removed. The parties’ course of performance, LR argued, demonstrated that there was never an intent to open the south access drive.

However, the Court found that the parties’ mutual intent was clearly expressed in the plain language of the easement agreement, which granted BR a “perpetual, non-exclusive easement.” The fact that one of the access drives hadn’t been built, the Court said, provided no basis to depart from the language of the agreement. However, the Court noted that requiring LR to remove the building blocking the south access drive was unjustified because BR waited until construction was complete to seek any type of relief. It couldn’t identify the specific dimensions of the South Access Drive. Neither party required that level of precision in the easement agreement. The Court said it would be difficult, if not impossible, to fashion such injunctive relief to the extent of the breach. Finally, destroying the structure would necessarily be economic waste.

The Court refused summary judgment on BR’s remaining issues, denied summary judgment on all of LR’s issues, and set trial dates.

– Tom Root

TNLBGray