Cases from July 2015

Case of the Day – Wednesday, July 1, 2015

STRAINED RESULT IN GEORGIA

Every morning, we look to the left and right as we pull onto the main street, only to stare into an ill-placed car wash sign. The First Armored Division could be rolling into town, and we couldn’t see it the M1A1s coming before they flattened our Yugo.

So every morning we wonder whether the sightline obstruction might not make someone liable to our next of kin when the inevitable happens. As it did one rainy night in Georgia.

A car had a chance encounter with a dump truck at a Georgia intersection. The pickup driver perished. Investigators suspected that untrimmed shrubs on vacant property at one corner of the crossroads, as well as a “curvature” in the road, made the intersection dangerous. The intersection had experienced several other accidents due to visibility.

In the aftermath of the tragic auto accident, the victim’s survivors sued the Georgia Department of Transportation, claiming it had a duty to keep trees and shrubs from a vacant lot trimmed back to protect the sight lines at the intersection in question. The trial court disagreed.

On appeal, the Court agreed that as a matter of law, DOT had no duty to maintain the intersection. But it did have a duty to inspect. It seemed that an issue of fact existed as to whether the vegetation had encroached on the highway right-of-way. But the Court discounted the plaintiff’s expert opinion that encroachment had occurred, because DOT contended it didn’t know where the right-of-way began, so who knew?

The result seems to turn summary judgment on its head, letting DOT off the hook without a trial when a real fact issue ­– the location of the highway right of way – remained. We were left as confused about liability afterwards as we were beforehand. And we still can’t see down the street.

Welch v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 642 S.E.2d 913 (Ct.App. Ga., 2007). Addie D. Welch was killed when her vehicle hit a dump truck at an intersection. A policeman said the overgrown bushes on the northwest corner of the intersection contributed to the accident. A sheriff’s department investigator said overgrown shrubs on the vacant property and a “curvature” in the road combined to make the intersection dangerous. Several other accidents due to visibility had occurred previously at the intersection.

Welch’s expert witness said that a driver’s line of sight was obstructed by overgrown shrubs and trees on the northwest corner of the intersection. The expert said that the overgrowth extended two feet into the Georgia DOT right-of-way, and that DOT was responsible for maintaining the line of sight. The expert also said American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials’ (AASHTO) guidelines for that intersection require a line of sight of 430 feet. Because of the overgrown vegetation, Welch’s line of sight was between 143 and 277 feet.

After the accident, DOT employees helped remove the overgrowth. Claiming that trees and shrubs on the property adjacent to the intersection were negligently maintained and obstructed her line of sight, Welch’s estate and surviving children and grandchildren sued the Georgia DOT. DOT moved for summary judgment, arguing that state law precluded plaintiffs’ claim, or in the alternative, that plaintiffs presented no evidence that Welch’s line of sight was obstructed. The trial court granted DOT’s motion, and Welch appealed.

Held: DOT was not liable. The Court ruled that DOT was immune under OCGA § 32-2-2. That statute gives DOT has the general responsibility to design, manage and improve the state highway system. But, where state highways are within city limits, the DOT is required to provide only substantial maintenance and operation, such as reconstruction and resurfacing, reconstruction of bridges, erection and maintenance of official department signs, painting of striping and pavement delineators and other major maintenance activities.

Although the road Welch was on was a state highway, the intersection lay within the corporate limits of Quitman. Accordingly, DOT was required only to provide substantial maintenance activities and operations. Those activities, the Court said, did not include the maintenance of shrubbery and vegetation. Thus, the statute did not impose a duty on DOT to maintain the shrubbery. But Welch also argued that another statute, OCGA §50-21-24(8), made DOT liable for failing to inspect its right-of-way. In order to prevail on this claim, the Court said, Welch had to show that the vegetation extended into DOT’s right-of-way. DOT argues that the overgrowth was on private property.

Although Welch’s expert believed the vegetation encroached on the DOT right-of-way, the Court agreed with DOT’s view that the extent of the right-of-way couldn’t be ascertained without using courthouse records and surveyors. Because Welch’s expert had not relied on DOT testimony to opine that vegetation extended into the right-of-way, and the Court found that the evidence was uncertain as to the location of the right-of-way, Welch’s expert’s opinion that vegetation extended into the right-of-way was disregarded, and plaintiff was found not to have established DOT’s liability.

Case of the Day – Thursday, July 2, 2015

FUN WITH TREE LAWNS

 

Confusion reigns over who owns and controls the tree lawn, that strip between your front sidewalk and the street. With July 4th coming up, we’ll hear the same question we hear every year: can I, Harry or Harriet Homeowner, keep parade watchers off my beautiful tree lawn (or, in the alternative, can I reserve the best seats for my family and friends)?

We can’t answer that, but we can again remind you that generally speaking, it’s your tree lawn (subject to the rights of the city to maintain its right-of-way). That’s what the Miller-Lagro family established in today’s case. It seems that they arrived home one day to find that the electric utility and its tree trimming subcontractor had butchered the trees on their tree lawn. This being America and all, they sued, citing a Minnesota statute giving them the right to treble damages for wrongful cutting on their property.

The trial court sided with the utility, holding that because the tree lawn was land dedicated to the road right-of-way, the Miller-Lagros could not recover.

The Court of Appeals reversed.

The Minnesota Supreme Court sided with the Miller-Lagros. It held that they had standing under common law and the statute. Sure, the Court said, their interest in the trees was subordinate to the right of the city, as exercised by the electrical utility in its utility line maintenance function. But the utility’s rights to trim, derived from the city’s right-of-way maintenance rights, existed only to the extent that the trimming was reasonable and necessary.

The Miller-Lagros had the right to their day in court to prove that the trimming was unreasonable.

Normally, a landowner owns property to the center of the roadway passing the land, including the tree lawn. Obviously, the public has the right to occupy the roadway and sidewalks for their intended purpose, to transit across the land. However, there is no similar public purpose that would let people occupy the tree lawn. It seems to us that a landowner has the exclusive right of possession to the tree lawn, subject only to utility easements and rights-of-way (if the city wants to widen the street, you’re probably out of luck). As for the sofa, beer refrigerator, umbrella and roped-off area that some people from the other side of town have erected on your tree lawn (with the parade still a day away): they’re trespassers.

That’s the legal end of it … of course, there are social and political consider-ations in evicting them as well, especially if the patriarch of the parade squatters is 6’5”, 290 lbs. and goes by “Bubba.”

You’re on your own. Happy 4^th of July.

Miller-Lagro v. Northern States Power Co., 582 N.W.2d 550 (Sup.Ct. Minn. 1998). When Heidi Miller-Lagro and Kent Lagro returned to their home in Medicine Lake on the afternoon on October 21, 1992, they were shocked to discover that Northern States Power Company and Asplundh Tree Company had cut down several trees that were located on the city right-of-way between their lot and the paved roadway. The Lagros sued NSP and Asplundh, who promptly submitted surveys showing the trees were on land that was dedicated as public roadway in 1887 and property of the City of Medicine Lake, not property of the Lagros.

The trial court granted NSP’s and Asplundh’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Lagros lacked standing and could not recover because the trees were not located on their property. They appealed, citing Minn.Stat. §561.04, that stated “[w]hoever without lawful authority cuts down or carries off any … tree .. on the land of another person, or in the street or highway in front of any person’s house, … is liable ….” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute did apply, remanding the case for further proceedings on the issue of whether NSP had lawful authority to cut down the trees.

Held: The Miller-Lagros control the tree lawn. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that homeowners had standing under both common law and wrongful tree removal statute to bring a claim for removal of trees located on the tree lawn in front of their residence by a utility company’s contractor.

The homeowner’s interest in the trees is subordinate to the right of the city, as exercised by the electrical utility in its utility line maintenance function, to trim or cut trees in performance of its public works, the broad grant of authority provided by the statute governing utility’s maintenance of its lines, and the corresponding city ordinance. However, the statutes do not divest the property owner of ownership or control of the tree lawn, but rather only give] utility companies the lawful right to trim or remove trees to the extent that the trimming is reasonable and necessary for purpose of constructing, using, operating, and maintaining lines.

Case of the Day – Friday, July 3, 2015

A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR JULY 4TH

 

As millions of dollars worth of largely illegal fireworks are deflagrated in honor of America’s birthday, it’s a pretty good idea to consider the precautions people need to take in order to remain safe.

Today’s case reminds us of potential legal ramifications. The incident happened on New Year’s Day, not July 4th, but the risks are similar. A young kid in the neighbors’ yard with their permission … a bottle rocket set off by an adult guest of the neighbor … an eye lost.

The adult who lit the bottle rocket was liable, but inasmuch as she let a default judgment be entered against her, she probably had nothing. So the injured boy’s mother began prowling for a deep pocket. She claimed the homeowner was liable for several reasons, the most interesting of which was the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

Attractive nuisance balances two competing societal interests, that of protecting children (recognizing that most children will trespass on occasion and sometimes are injured when they do so) and landowners’ interest in not being unreasonably burdened to ensure that their property is safe for those children who trespass. Under the doctrine, a landowner who maintains dangerous instrumentalities on the premises easily accessible to children and likely to attract them in play, or permits dangerous conditions knowing that children are in the habit of using such things for play and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing with them, is liable for injuries to the children.

What is a “dangerous instrumentality?” Check out the top ten …

In today’s case, the landowner escaped liability because he had exercised ordinary care. But amidst the picnic food and beer and adults playing with fireworks, some kids are going to get hurt on the Fourth, and some landowners who let it go on knowing that kids might be attracted — even without permission — may be liable.

Have a safe Fourth of July.

Keith v. Peterson, 922 So.2d 4 (Ct.App. Miss. 2005). Young Brandon Keith was struck in the eye by a bottle rocket while playing with friends in the Petersons’ back yard.

The Petersons had held a New Years Eve party the night before, and some of the Petersons’ friends were picking up unused fireworks — which a few of previous night’s partygoers had brought with them the night before — which were strewn around the yard. Brandon, who had attended the party because he was visiting his grandmother across the street, got permission to play in the Petersons’ yard by his grandmother as well as by Mrs. Peterson. While the children were playing hide and seek (and Brandon was hidden in the bushes), one of the people cleaning up the yard lit a bottle rocket and threw it into the air. The rocket ignited, flew across the yard and put Brandon’s eye out.

Mr. Peterson was on his way home from an errand at the time, and didn’t know Brandon was in the yard. The woman who had lit the rocket had no idea Brandon was hidden in the bushes. Brandon’s mother sued Mae Langston, who had lit the rocket, and the Petersons. Mrs. Keith obtained a default judgment against Mae for $350,000, but the trial court granted summary judgment for the Petersons and dismissed the case against them.

Held: The trial court’s dismissal was upheld.

The Court of Appeals first considered whether Brandon was an “invitee” — one who enters the property of another in response to an express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual benefit — or a “licensee” — who enters another’s property for his own benefit or pleasure — or a mere trespasser. A landowner owes the highest duty to an invitee, the duty to maintain his property in a reasonably safe condition, and when not reasonably safe to warn only where there is hidden danger or peril that is not plain and open view. For a licensee or trespasser, on the other hand, a landowner owes only the duty to have refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him or her. Normally, the status of the plaintiff is a jury question, the Court said, but where the facts aren’t in dispute, the court can make the determination as a matter of law. In this case, young Brandon was on the Peterson property as a “licensee,” because he had the Petersons’ permission to be there and he was there for his own pleasure — to play with other children — rather than for the Petersons’ benefit. Because Brandon was a licensee, the Petersons only owed him a duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him.

To breach that duty, the Court said, requires more than mere inadvertence or lack of attention. Instead, the landowner’s conduct must show conscious disregard of a known serious danger. Here, the Court ruled, the undisputed evidence showed the Petersons didn’t engage in wanton or willful conduct. The property owner was riding his bicycle towards his property when he saw children playing in his yard and two adults cleaning up fireworks, and it was at this time that Mr. Peterson saw one of the adults ignite the bottle rocket. He didn’t know that Brandon was one of the children playing on his property until he heard his scream, and Brandon testified that Mae Langston didn’t know that he was hiding behind hedges. And because the guests cleaning the yard weren’t paid employees, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply to make the Petersons liable.

Brandon’s mother argued that the doctrine of attractive nuisance applied to this action. The Court noted that the theory of attractive nuisance was that a landowner was subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon if the property owner failed to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the dangerous instrumentality which attracted the children. That didn’t apply here, the Court said, because the record showed that Mr. Peterson exercised ordinary care, he was not liable. There was no testimony that he had allowed children to ignite the remaining fireworks without supervision. In fact, he had two adults removing fireworks from his yard, and he was not on his property at time of incident and was unaware of licensee Brandon’s presence on his property.

Case of the Day – Monday, July 6, 2015

GIVE ‘EM AN INCH, THEY’LL TAKE A MILE

Seems like it was only 80 years ago or so when Grandpaw emerged from his outhouse one day to find a couple of duded up- flatlanders standing on his little piece of Tennessee hillside. They had some kind of deed full of fancy writin’, and they told him if he signed it, they’d string some wires on poles across the place, and he’d have electric lights just like the big city folks.

That sounded like a pretty good deal to Grandmaw, who was good and tired of hand pumping wellwater, cooking on a stove and buying ice whenever the iceman decided to cometh. She made Grandpaw put his ‘x’ on the dotted line.

The flatlanders were as good as their word. They ran some wooden poles and a couple of wires over the homestead, and pretty soon, Grandmaw had her Frigidaire and electric stove, Grandpaw had an electric light in the privy, and life was grand. The flatlanders from the Tennessee Valley Authority sold Gramp power at dirt cheap rates, and only appeared once every couple years or so and trimmed back a few trees under the wires.

Some time in the 1960s, crews came in and replaced the poles with gigantic steel trussed transmission towers on concrete pads. They cut a bigger swath of timber, removing trees under the towers and a few feet to either side. Grandpa and Grandma were pretty unhappy about it, but they were quite old and didn’t know what to do. You checked things with a lawyer, who told you that TVA had an easement from your grandparents, and was within its rights.

Time marched on, your grandparents went to their reward, and your inherited the old place. You tore down the rambling farmhouse and replaced it with a beautiful log home, a rustic but modern weekend getaway. You like sitting on the porch and looking out over the hills and woods. Every so often, a TVA tree trimming crew would stop by, and trim back a few trees near the power lines. You assured them that they didn’t have to worry about the mature trees beyond about 25 feet, because you’d look after them yourself.

Then, about 500 miles north northeast of your idyllic retreat, an overtaxed transmission line sagged in the August Ohio heat, and arced to a nearby tree. The cascading errors and failures that followed plunged the northeastern United States into darkness that lasted in some places for several days.

In the wake of the blackout, the in 2007, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), a government-certified industry organization that sets reliability standards for the transmission of electricity, established tougher rules for vegetation management around electric transmission lines. Electric utilities faced hefty fines if they did not vigorously maintain their rights-of-way under transmission lines. In 2012, you got a letter advising you, among other things, that TVA would no longer allow taller, incompatible trees within its rights-of-way, even if landowners say they will control tree height, and that it would be removing, sometimes extensively, incompatible species from its rights-of-way. Any tree that could grow more than 15 feet high at maturity would go.

When you find out that the new vegetation management policy will result in TVA cutting down more than 200 trees, you take action.

That’s what Donna Sherwood and a host of neighbors did, suing TVA in U.S. District Court. They argued that TVA had improperly classified the so-called 15-foot rule as routine maintenance which was exempt from the National Environmental Policy Act. In fact, Ms. Sherwood contended, the new 15-foot rule would essentially denude 260,000 acres, a square of land over 20 miles to a side. Besides, Ms. Sherwood argued, TVA didn’t have the right to remove trees in its right of-way that did not interfere with or endanger the transmission lines.

The District Court threw out the case, holding that TVA had complied with the NEPA and that the easements clearly encompassed removal of timber. The plaintiffs asked the court to submit the easement interpretation issue to the Tennessee Supreme Court, a procedure known as certifying a question. The District Court ruled that it didn’t need to certify the question, because state law was well settled. The easements pretty clearly gave TVA the right to clear trees from its rights-of-way.

The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, but the decision didn’t give the neighbors much comfort. The appellate court held that record did not show that TVA had complied with NEPA, so the case was sent back to the District Court to compile the record. But on the crucial issue, the Court held that crucial Federal interests, as well as Tennessee law, supported a reading of the old easement Grandpaw created to encompass the 15-foot rule, and clear-cutting a swath as wide as the limits of the easement (in some cases, 200 feet).

The likelihood that NEPA would stop TVA is about as likely as your electric bill falling by 50%. That being the case, Ms. Sherwood is undoubtedly scratching her head with gleeful puzzlement that TVA announced last week that it would abandon the 15-foot rule without further litigation.

The neighbors won … but the matter wasn’t settled in court. That means that come the next blackout, the chainsaws could be unleashed again.

Sherwood v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Case No. 13-6004 (6th Cir., Oct. 28, 2014). The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) provides electric power to consumers in seven states across the Southeast. In order to reliably deliver that power, TVA maintains the vegetation under and around its power line structures. Historically, TVA has removed all trees directly under its power lines, but did not cut down all of the trees in what TVA called buffer or border zones, the edges of the easements TVA possesses.

Over the years, TVA acquired easements that are typically between 75 and 200 feet wide. Built within those easements are approximately 15,900 miles of power transmission lines. Those easements permit the TVA “the perpetual right to enter” and “to erect, maintain, repair, rebuild, operate, and patrol” electric power transmission lines and all necessary appurtenances. As well, the TVA is granted the “right to clear said right-of-way” and keep the right-of-way clear, including brush and trees. TVA has established a vegetation-management program for its easements. TVA maintains the easements by keeping the area beneath the transmission lines clear, while leaving a narrow buffer zone on either side of the easement. The sectors are on five-year cycles for tree removal and three-year cycles for mowing or spraying the undergrowth.

Although the TVA has been maintaining the vegetation in its easements for more than seventy years, it has not removed all of the taller, mature trees located within its rights-of-way. Its right-of-way specialists have been afforded discretion in deciding which, if any, trees to remove. Budget constraints have further restricted the discretion afforded the specialists. As a result, many tall trees remain standing within TVA’s easements. TVA has also made exceptions when landowners have promised to control the height of the trees.

After the August 2003 Northeast U.S. blackout, the wisdom of allowing these taller trees to grow within electric transmission line easements was called into question. In 2007, NERC established rules for vegetation management around electric transmission lines.

TVA altered its vegetation-management practices in order to comply with the new NERC rules and to avoid paying fines and penalties. TVA may allow low-growing species (less than 15 feet at mature height) to be planted in the within the right-of-way, but not directly under transmission lines, but express TVA approval would be required in each case. It would no longer allows taller, incompatible (species that exceed 15 feet mature height) trees within its rights-of-way when requested, even if landowners promise to control tree height. TVA would remove all incompatible species from its rights-of-way.

A TVA spokesman said TVA would have a “zero tolerance policy,” explaining that “we’re going to remove trees that can grow 15 feet or more. We’re also going to clear the full width of the easement.”

Donna Sherwood and her neighbors sued, arguing that TVA’s new policy would result in the removal of millions of taller, older, mature trees from TVA’s rights-of-way. They argued that TVA had failed to conduct the required NEPA studies before implementing this new rule. The plaintiffs have submitted evidence showing that TVA identified more than 200 trees for removal from plaintiffs’ properties. The plaintiffs submitted evidence of the environmental consequences of removing tall, mature trees from the easements.

The district court granted TVA’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that TVA had exceeded the scope of the easements, denying the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a question to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After reviewing the record, the district court held that TVA had not established a new policy, and was acting consistent with the maintenance policy that had been in place for the past fifteen years. Finally, the district court held that TVA’s 2012 vegetation-maintenance policy was not arbitrary or capricious.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Held: The plaintiffs’ request that the District Court certify a question of state property law to the Tennessee Supreme Court was rejected. However, the record showed that TVA had not adequately considered the environmental consequences of its new 15-foot policy, so the case had to be sent back to the District Court.

As for the NEPA claim, the Court of Appeals held that the administrative record submitted by TVA did not consider the environmental consequences of the 15-foot rule. The Court held that the plaintiffs were alleging that TVA’s alteration of its vegetation-maintenance practice – the removal of all trees over 15 feet, as well as those trees that will grow to a height over fifteen feet – constituted a major federal action under NEPA. The TVA must compile an administrative record for the decision it made that is being challenged by the plaintiffs, in order for the court to evaluate the decision’s propriety under NEPA.

As for the scope of the easements, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that “[b]ecause federal interests are sufficiently high in this matter, the easements are governed by federal law, not state law.” When the United States is a party to a lawsuit, and the underlying activities arise from a federal program, the federal interests implicated may warrant the protection of federal law.

The Court also agreed that the unambiguous language in the easements gave TVA the perpetual right to remove trees. Although state law was not determinative when applied to a Federal easement, the Court said, under Tennessee law the scope of an easement created by a grant is determined by the language of the grant. Here, the easements involved here unambiguously give the United States three rights: (1) the right to enter and to construct electric transmission line structures, (2) the right to clear the easements of brush, trees, and timber, and (3) the right to remove danger trees from the surrounding land. In describing the rights granted, the easements use the plural “purposes,” not the singular “purpose.”

The Court said that nothing in the language of the easements, explicitly or implicitly, limited TVA’s right to clear trees from the right of-way.

Thus, although the NEPA issue remained to be litigated on remand, the easements were broad enough to clear-cut the full width of the easements, regardless of prior practices or the landowners’ opinions as to what was necessary to protect the transmission lines.

Case of the Day – Tuesday, July 7, 2015

A TREE GROWS IN BROOKLYN – AND THAT’S DIFFERENT

Time was, trees were just trees, and what they did, how they lived, grew and died, was out of the control of the property owner. No one blamed little Francine Nolan if the tree growing in Brooklyn fell on a Sabrett’s cart.

About the time little Francine was living in her Williamsburg tenement, an influential group of judges, scholars and lawyers in Philadelphia formed an organization known as the American Law Institute. They believed, among other things, that they could write comprehensive treatises about all areas of the law – which they called “Restatements” – that would serve as authoritative statements of the principles of common law. No more confusion, no more divergence of holdings, no more contentious arguments! You can just about hear the group, lemonades hoisted (this was during Prohibition, after all), singing “We Are the World.”

Alas, Prohibition failed, and so did the ALI’s goal of replacing all of those tedious casebooks and treatises with the Restatement of the Law. Everyone loved the Restatements, but far from replacing state common law, case reporters and codes of statutes, the volumes became just another secondary source. To be sure, some of the ALI members never really thought an entire law library could be replaced with one shelf of Restatements, notably Benjamin Cardozo. He believed that the Restatement “will be something less than a code and something more than a treatise. It will be invested with unique authority, not to command, but to persuade.”

The Restatement of the Law continues today, with some volumes in their third printing. And courts love them, even if they don’t always follow them.

Today’s case is a good example. When the Browns’ tree fell on Ms. Barker’s property, it made a mess. She sued her neighbors, arguing that they should have recognized that the tree is at risk of falling, and done something about it. The Browns pointed out that no less persuasive source than the Restatement (Second) of Torts said that they weren’t responsible for the natural condition of trees on their property. The trial court agreed, and threw the case out.

The appellate court disagreed. It rejected the Restatement approach as being outdated and not sufficiently attuned to the differences between urban and rural life. In other words, the Court said, if a tree grows in Brooklyn, little Francine had better keep her eye on it.

Barker v. Brown, 236 Pa.Super. 75, 340 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super. 1975). Virginia Barker’s property adjoins that of the Browns. Both are located in a residential district of State College. A large tree stood on the Browns’ property, a tree which Barker said the Browns knew or should have known was in a decayed, rotting and dangerous condition. Barker alleged that the Browns negligently failed to take steps to avert the danger and, as a result, the tree fell onto her property.

The tree’s fall destroyed two of Barker’s trees, valued at about $600 each. Barker had to have the fallen tree removed from her property at a cost of $147.50, and the process required her to miss two days of work, causing lost wages of $34.00. Finally, the incident caused a loss of value of Barker’s property in the amount of $600.00.

The trial court threw out the case on the grounds that section 363 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) precluded holding the Browns to blame. That section provided:

(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), neither a possessor of land, nor a vendor, lessor or other transferor, is liable for physical harm caused to others outside of the land by a natural condition of the land.

(2) A possessor of land in an urban area is subject to liability to persons using a public highway for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm arising from the condition of trees on the land near the highway.

Held: The appellate court reinstated the lawsuit.

The court held that the Restatement’s distinction between natural and artificial conditions – which had never been the focus of prior Pennsylvania court decisions – was outdated. “It may very well be true,” the Court said, “that the distinction between artificial and natural conditions was valid in a time when landowners were possessed of, and hence would have been charged with the care of large quantities of land. It would still be valid today in rural areas where large landholdings are common. [However], we do not believe that the distinction should be applied to land in or near a developed or residential area. Urban living, by altering the purpose for which the land is used, must also bring with it certain responsibilities. A tree growing in an urban or residential area does not have the same natural relation to surrounding land as a tree located in a rural setting.”

While acknowledging that its approach imposed more cost on landowners, the Court nevertheless believed that “the relatively minor expenditures in time and money that it will take to inspect and secure trees in a developed or residential area is not large when compared with the increased danger and potential for damages represented by the fall of such a tree.”

The Court thus held that a possessor of land in or adjacent to a developed or residential area was subject to liability for harm caused to others outside of the land by a defect in the condition of a tree thereon, if the exercise of reasonable care by the possessor would have disclosed the defect and the risk involved, and repair would have made the tree reasonably safe.

In this case, the Court held, Barker alleged in her complaint that the Browns “knew, or should have known, that the said tree was in a decayed, rotting, and dangerous condition.” This is denied by the Browns, but for purposes of this appeal, the Court had to accept the facts alleged in Barker’s complaint as true. On remand, it noted, the question would be one for the fact finder.

Case of the Day – Wednesday, July 8, 2015

SMOKEY’S REVENGE

This is the kind of thing Smokey Bear always warned us about (and no, his name is not “Smokey the Bear.” One hot August day in northern California, a Union Pacific track repair crew let some grass next to the tracks catch fire. They tried to put the blaze out … rather ineffectively, it turns out.

This being a hot summer day, one on which there’s no water in California, we thought it might be a good time to revisit the tale of the Great Storrie Fire of 15 years ago.

By the time it was all over, 81 square miles of national forest burned in the Storrie Fire of August 2000. The Forest Service, which has compiled a poor record of reforestation – chiefly because of lack of money – sued Union Pacific for the cost to rehabilitate the burned-out area. Smokey Bear would have his day in court.

Before the case was to go on trial, the lawyers tussled over the proper measure of damages. The railroad argued that the correct measure was diminution of property value caused by the fire. What’s more, the losses had to be mitigated by the value of the timber that could be salvaged from the burned land. The catch was that most of the land was restricted by law, and could not be harvested until the law expired several years after the fire. Union Pacific argued that if it could have been sold, it would have fetched so much that the damages only reached about $5.7 million.

The Government cried foul, contending that the traditional measure of damages wasn’t appropriate for natural resources. Instead, it claimed damages to the timber, damages to the soil, reforestation costs and loss of environmental habitat to birds and mammals on the order of $167 million.

Big difference! So the crucial battle was joined, well before the trial commenced, when the court was asked to rule on what damages would be allowed. When the decision was handed down, it turned out to be a bad day for the railroad. The trial court showed little sympathy for Union Pacific, holding that California law let the Government pile on the damages – timber, soil, reforestation and loss of habitat. What’s more, in a double whammy if ever there was one, the District Court ruled that, even though the timber on the restricted land couldn’t be sold in 2000 (and couldn’t be for many years thereafter, because the law was extended), the value of the timber was appropriately considered in setting damages. OK, Union Pacific conceded, but then the salvage value of the timber left on the restricted land should be considered in mitigation. No, the Court disagreed, it couldn’t be considered … because it could’t be sold. The law, you know.

Having been thoroughly sandbagged by the Court, the railroad knew better than to go to trial. It settled the case for $102 million.

For all of the Court’s feel-good rhetoric about the sacred trust of the national forest, the Forest Service hadn’t done very much to remedy the mess the fire left behind in the eight years after the fire. Private landowners who suffered loss have done much more, but then they’re not hamstrung by regulation and interest groups. Once the Union Pacific millions started pouring in, the Forest Service didn’t have any excuse for further sloth.

How about Union Pacific? A settlement of over $100 million has to hurt, right? Take heart — the venerable old railroad had insurance.

As for the national forest, it’s slowly returning to green. But even an untrained eye looking at August 2013 satellite pictures can tell that the timber is gone. To the north and west of Storrie, rising from the Feather River, the unforested land stands in obvious contrast to the rest of the area.

The interesting tree law lesson drawn from today’s case is the Federal District Court’s free-wheeling approach to damages. With a creative lawyer, a political hot potato and a sympathetic court, the sky can be the limit.

United States v. Union Pacific Rwy. Co., 565 F.Supp.2d 1136 (E.D.Cal., 2008). A Union Pacific (“UP”) track repair crew negligently ignited the fire while repairing a rail, and — not recalling their Boy Scout days — didn’t put it out properly. The resulting conflagration, known as the “Storrie Fire,” destroyed 52,000 acres of National Forest in August 2000. The Government sued UP.

The issue raised before Federal district court ncerned the proper measures of natural resource damages, whether diminution of the market value of the forest land was the over-arching measure of the Government’s damage in the case, and if not, whether the Government may recover as separate injuries timber damages of over $121 million, reforestation costs of $33 million, and loss of habitat and environment during the period of regrowth of $13 million. Also, some of the National Forest had been specified by Congress as being temporarily exempt from timber harvest. Had the trees on these lands not been wholly destroyed by the fire, the Government could have harvested the trees over time, after the expiration of the law. Similarly, no logging or reforestation was allowed in the Bucks Lake Wilderness at the time of the fire, and the general forest areas were lands where commercial logging may occur subject to other legal restrictions, such as environmental assessment requirements.

The Government conducted salvage sales of the charred timber that was not located on restricted lands, recovering $335,616. UP contended a post-fire salvage sale of the burned timber on the restricted lands — had federal law permitted it — would have generated over $73.6 million. UP claimed that at most, the Government incurred only $5.7 in net lost timber value ($79.3 million minus $73.6 million).

Held: The U.S. District Court found that the loss in market value of the land was not the proper measure of damages. Instead, the Government could argue to the jury that it was entitled to recover damages for damages to the trees, to the soil and pre-merchantable timber, and its loss of use of habitat and environmental services during the period of forest regrowth. UP would not be allowed to argue at trial that it was entitled to an offset based on the theoretical salvage value of the timber. Finally, the Government’s habitat equivalency damages were legally permissible.

California law applied to the Government’s damage claims. Although UP argued that under California law, the measure of damage for negligent injury was the difference between the value of the property before and after the injury. The Court agreed this was generally correct, but California law also held that [t]here is no fixed rule for the measure of tort damages under Civil Code §3333 … [and t]he measure that most appropriately compensates the injured party for the loss sustained should be adopted.” The general measure of tort damages under California law is broadly defined as “… the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.”

Thus, the Court held, the Government – as the injured party here – was entitled to full compensation for all of its damages, considering the unique character of the land at issue and that natural resources have values not fully captured by the market system. Resource damages, including timber damages, rehabilitation and restoration costs, and environmental and habitat damages all were recoverable as separate injuries, the Court ruled. In this case, the fire damaged the Government’s property and reduced its value, not only through destruction of trees used for timber, but through damage to the soil. In addition, the USFS was required by law to replant to a certain minimum density, and they incurred expenses in their salvage operation. These, the Court said, were separate injuries.

UP also argued that the Government couldn’t recover damages for the value of the trees located on the restricted lands because commercial logging of those lands was not permitted by law. But, the Court held, when the Storrie Fire occurred in August 2000, the restriction was set to expire in 2004. Had the fire not destroyed the trees within the restricted areas, the trees would have been commercially available for harvesting within a few years, and the Government could have recovered their timber market value. Instead, as a result of the damage caused by the fire and the subsequent decay of the burned trees, the trees were dead or dying and no longer had any viable timber value. That the law had subsequently, post-fire, been extended, the Court ruled, was of no consequence because at the relevant time in 2000, the law had a definite expiration date.

UP argued that in areas where commercial logging is not allowed the reasonable cost of reforestation is the proper measure of damages, but the Court rejected the argument. It said that the Government’s timber damages of $121.9 million were supported by detailed expert analysis of actual timber values. The Court waxed eloquent that UP had wholly ignored the wilderness areas in question “[w]ere national treasures created by Congress ‘to secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness’ … ” In such circumstances, the Court held, the Government could recover damages for the timber burned in the wilderness areas. Destroyed timber values were a relevant means to capture at least part of the lost value of the burned lands because there is no available real property market value by which to determine the pre- and post-fire value of thousands of acres of national forest lands that can’t be sold.

UP asserted that if such damages were permitted by the court, it should be allowed to argue to the jury that the damages calculation did not account for the full administrative costs that the Government would have incurred in marketing unburned timber at the prices it claims, including environmental assessment costs and road building costs. The Court disagreed, holding that the harm in this case was caused by UP’s admitted negligence which essentially created a “forced sale” of the trees. Thus, the Court said, deduction for administrative costs was not appropriate.

Finally, UP argued it was entitled to an offset of the timber damages based upon the amount UP contended the Government could have obtained in a theoretical post-fire salvage sale of the timber on the restricted lands, $73.6 million. The Government argued against this, noting that the law prohibited the post-fire salvage sale. UP agreed, but pointed out that the law also prohibited a pre-fire sale, and thus, if the Govern-ment were permitted damages based in part on the theoretical pre-fire, sale value of the timber on these lands, UP should also receive a corresponding offset to those damages based on a theoretical post-fire salvage sale. The Court disagreed, holding that salvage value is a question of mitigation after actual damages have been ascertained and then only for amounts that were realized or could have been realized. Thus, assessment of the Government’s actual damages are a separate inquiry from the assessment of the Government’s duty to mitigate its damages after the commission of the tort. Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences (or mitigation of damages), the person injured by another’s wrongful conduct may not recover continuing damages “that the injured person could have avoided by reasonable effort or expenditure.” Thus, the Court said, UP was entitled to an offset of damages only for the salvage value realized by the Government for its salvage sale with respect to timber not located on the restricted lands.

Case of the Day – Thursday, July 9, 2015

WE ONLY GET WHAT WE GIVE

Those corporation-hating New Radicals warned us in the late 1990s that “we only get what we give.” The defendants in today’s case found that out a bit too late.

In many ways, a civil action is little more than a gladiatorial contest, with the court sitting to referee according to procedural rules, to apply the law when needed, and to correct inequities only in egregious circumstances. That’s sort of what happened when the McCammons – garden center owners who were buying tree boughs wholesale from “Trees 4U” – cut the boughs they needed not only from the trees Reicosky had designated but also from some landscape trees they had been told not to damage (sounds kind of like Adam and Eve and the tree of knowledge, doesn’t it?).

The owners of “Trees 4U” — the Reicoskys — told McCammon that those trees were definitely not for him, and sued. They claimed McCammon had destroyed $35,000 in trees, and they wanted treble damages under Ohio law. McCammon claimed that Mr. Reicosky had given him permission to cut boughs from the landscape trees. Mr. Reicosky denied it. It was up to the jury to decide whose story to believe, and it believed Mr. Reicosky.

There may not have been any compelling basis for believing the one story over the other, but when the jury makes its decision, it has pretty much settled things. It’s sort of how pro football was before instant replay: what the official said happened was what had happened. (Cursed instant replay … but that’s a rant for another day, )

The other problem the McCammons faced came with jury instructions. A trial court gives a jury detailed instructions on what the law is, so that jurors can decide how the facts they find (such as determining that McCammon cut boughs from Reicosky’s landscape trees after Reicosky said not to) leads to the legal outcome (McCammon thereby committed a trespass and was reckless). Both sides may suggest jury instructions to the Court. Here, McCammon didn’t think things through, and agreed with an instruction that the jury figure up damages by adding the market value of the tree times the number of trees. Later on, McCammon realized that the real measure of damages should be lost profits, that is, the market value of the trees minus the cost of producing and selling them. After all, even kids running a lemonade stand know that you only get to keep the money you’re paid minus what it cost you to buy the lemonade and handmade sign. McCammon complained that he should get a new trial, because the jury hadn’t considered the costs of production when it calculated damages.

The Court of Appeals said McCammon was out of luck. The jury had made its decision on his liability, and whether it’s what the Court agreed with or not, there was evidence enough for a rational jury to reach its finding. And as for the damages, well, Mr. McCammon, “we get what we give.” The instruction might have been flawed, even unfair to the McCammons, but the McCammons were happy enough with it when it was given. A party can’t make a mistake, and then cry foul that the mistake happened.

Reicosky v. McCammon, Case No. 2006 CA 00342 (Ct.App. Ohio, Feb. 19, 2008), 2008 WL 442567 (unpublished). The McCammons ran a garden center, from which they sold, among other things, tree boughs to cover gravesites. They had trouble getting enough boughs, and began buying them from the Reicoskys, who operated “Trees 4U.” The Reicoskys delivered them one year, but in subsequent years, let the McCammons come to the “Trees 4U” tree farm and cut the boughs they needed. The first year the McCammons did so, the Reicoskys instructed them not to take any boughs from trees east of a particular drainage ditch, because those were landscape trees to be resold.

The McCammons limited their cutting to the west side of the ditch one year, but the next year came back, and this time cut boughs from the landscape trees on the east side of the ditch as well. The McCammons said Mr. Reicosky had given them permission to do so on trees taller than 16 feet east of the ditch. Mr. Reicosky denied doing so, and claimed he lost 211 trees, worth over $35,000. The Reicoskys sued.

At trial, the jury heard both sides, and then found for Reicosky, holding that he had suffered $35,000 in damage. The trial court trebled this under Ohio’s treble damages statute. The McCammons’ motion for a directed verdict – in which they argued that no evidence supported the finding of recklessness was needed for treble damages – was denied by the trial court. Likewise, the McCammons’ motion for a new trial – based on the fact that the jury considered the market value of the destroyed trees without deducting any of the costs associated with selling the trees — was turned down. The McCammons appealed.

Held: The treble damages were upheld. The Court of Appeals observed that it was limited to determining whether there was any evidence that could have convinced a rational juror the McCammons had been reckless. The evidence, because the Reicoskys were the winner, had to be construed in favor of the Reicoskys.

The Court concluded that the jury simply chose to believe Mr. Reicosky’s version of what happened — that he had never given permission to cut east of the ditch and had previously made clear that the trees there were off limits — and to reject Mr. McCammon’s version. The jury is the fact finder, and its determinations as to who to believe are entitled to great deference by reviewing courts. The jury having accepted that the McCammons trespassed on the east side of the ditch without permission, the Court of Appeals was not entitled to decide that it may like Mr. McCammon’s recitation of events better.

As for the faulty calculation of damages, the Court said McCammons’ complaint was too little, too late. The McCammons had an opportunity to make sure the jury instructions accurately described how to deduct costs from the market price to determine lost profits. Instead, they submitted a jury instruction that was the same as the one the Court used, which omitted any direction as to how to calculate damages by deducting costs from market price. The Court found that “any error in the jury’s determining of damages was invited by [the McCammons]. Under the invited error doctrine, ‘a party will not be permitted to take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced’.”

Case of the Day – Friday, July 10, 2015

MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE RANCH …

… that confounded sodbuster neighbor just done cut the power line with his plow. In the fire that swept across the plain, the trees planted in a windbreak went up like Roman candles, and the ranch hands couldn’t stop the conflagration. Sure, the farmer was negligent, but to what extent?

One of the first things new law students learn is the lesson of Hawkins v. McGee, the “case of the hairy hand,” in which we find that the measure of damages is the difference between the value before the breach or the negligence, and the difference after the breach. Nebraska law in this case held that if the trees were used for residential or recreational purposes, the damages are the replacement cost of the trees up to the value of the real estate. But if they were just used for agricultural purposes, the Hawkins v. McGee formulation is fine.

Here, replacement of the trees would cost over $270,000, but the reduction in value of the farmland was only $30,000. David Spicer, owner of the ranch, tried to bootstrap himself into qualifying for the “recreational” formulation by arguing that not only did he use the windbreak for the usual agricultural purposes, but he relied on it for recreational purposes as well, including for his kids’ 4-H projects. The 4-H projects argument was especially touching, except that David Spicer’s youngest kid was 25 years old.

The trial court granted summary judgment on the damages question, holding that the replacement cost exceeded the value of the land, and that $30,000 was adequate to compensate for the loss of the trees. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that whether the trees were recreational in nature or agricultural in nature was a question of fact, and the trial court was wrong to resolve that question without a trial.

The issue of how to value the loss of trees – especially where the value of the tree to the homeowner is due to noneconomic reasons such as beauty, sentimentality or recreational value, arises often, and for good reason. The aphorism in real estate is that value of a home depends on location, location, location. Much could be said of trees as well. The mighty oak that shades the plantation house is worth far more than its identical twin standing a quarter mile into the woods behind the fields. Determining exactly how much more may require juries to consider not so much stumpage prices as the quality of 4-H projects.

Spicer Ranch v. Schilke, 15 Neb.App. 605, 734 N.W.2d 314 (Neb.App., 2007). Schilke farmed leased land next to the Spicer Ranch. While he was plowing one day, he cut a power line leading to some irrigation pumps. A fire resulted, which — before it burned out – destroyed a windbreak on Spicer Ranch consisting of red cedar and juniper trees, and located about five hundred yards from the ranch house. Spicers used the windbreak, which was on a 110-acre tract of land, in the normal fashion of slowing the wind, providing shelter for cattle, for calving, for horses and for general farm use. David Spicer – mindful of how damages were figured in cases such as these – also maintained that he used the trees for recreational purposes including his kids’ cataloging the trees for 4-H projects (except it turned out that his youngest child was 25 years old). Spicer sued for negligence, which was pretty much conceded.

In an affidavit to the trial court, Spicers’ expert valued the windbreak at $270,000 for replacement of the trees. But the trial court granted summary judgment to Schilke, finding that to value the trees on the 110-acre tract at $270,000 far exceeded the value of the real estate involved. The trees included only made up a small percentage of the tract, the Court found, and that small percentage of land likewise would not be permanently damaged because of the loss of the trees. The trial court awarded Spicer Ranch $30,000 as the highest amount of damages suffered by Spicer Ranch.

The sodbuster was relieved. The rancher was not, and appealed.

Held: Summary judgment was reversed on the damages issue. Spicer Ranch argued the district court erred in using a “before and after” measurement of damages. Instead, it said, to determine compensatory damages for destroying trees and for related damage to the land – where the owner of land intends to use the property for residential or recreational purposes – the owner is not limited to the difference in value of the property before and after the damage or to the stumpage or other commercial value of the timber, but instead may recover the cost of reasonable restoration of the property to its preexisting condition or to a condition as close as reasonably feasible.

The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court’s implicit rationale for its calculation of damages is that the land was used for the farming business, not for any recreational purposes, apparently because of the age of the youngest child was then 25 years old. The trial court’s finding failed to account for the material question of fact as to whether the windbreak was used for residential and recreational purposes, as stated in David’s affidavit, or whether the windbreak was simply a “normal and average farm windbreak,” as could be implied from David’s deposition testimony and as stated in the affidavit of a real estate appraiser. The Court of Appeals noted that measure of a plaintiff’s damages would depend upon the evidence presented at trial and might require alternative instructions, depending upon the jury’s determination of contested factual issues. Because a material issue of fact existed, the Court of Appeals held, summary judgment with respect to damages was improper.

Even under the “before and after” theory of damages used by the trial court, the evidence revealed a range of damages — not just a fixed, undisputed figure of $30,000. The trial judge made a factual finding when he awarded Spicer Ranch $30,000, which he said “is the highest amount of damages suffered by the Ranch according to the before and after damage appraisal.” He should have simply determined whether a material issue of fact existed with respect to damages, and – if one did – set the case for trial. The matter had to be returned to the trial court.

Case of the Day – Monday, July 13, 2015

A SLOPPY AND LAZY TRIAL JUDGE

You have to appreciate the careful prose of an appellate court. Today’s case was brought in 1999, but was still sputtering along eight years later. The Rhode Island Supreme Court thought it knew why.

After a few pointed comparisons of the case to Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, the Supreme Court wondered what the Dickens was going on. The trial court took its time writing a decision — about five years — leading the Supreme Court to mention in a note, “We are mindful of the inordinate delay of the decision of the trial justice, which this Court does not favor.”

Beautiful understatement! The Supremes were saying to the trial judge, ‘Hey, dude, you’re lazy!” Of course, in the decision, the high court also implicitly said, “Hey, dude, you’re incompetent, too.” The reason for that was the trial judge’s failure to make the findings the Supreme Court needed to adequately review the decision.

A court speaks through its opinions, and when the trial court doesn’t make findings of fact, no one wins. The winner doesn’t know why he won, the loser doesn’t know why he lost, and the rest of us can’t derive any useful guidance from the case. In this case, an unusual argument in the battle over the location of an easement arose. The easement holder claimed the prior owner had obstructed the easement — a driveway — and demanded that the easement and everything on it be shifted a few feet to the south. This is called an easement by substitution. Some testimony suggested that an easement by substitution had been created. But the trial court couldn’t be bothered to make any findings on the issue, leaving everyone to puzzle whether something hadn’t been proven, some witness hadn’t been believed, or just what?

So after eight years, the case landed back in the trial court’s lap. Maybe the owners will settle or all die, or Rhode Island will be devoured by an tsunami, or the court will be consumed by an angry dragon … anything that will spare this poor trial judge from having to do his duty. We can only hope.

Nardone v. Ritacco, 936 A.2d 200 (Sup.Ct. R.I., Dec. 3, 2007). Nardone’s property bordered Lawton Foster Road. Ritacco owned an adjacent parcel of land behind Nardone’s property, with no frontage on Lawton Foster Road. In 1965, Nardone’s predecessor-in-interest, Ralph C. James, Sr., granted Ritacco a 50-foot right-of-way along the northern boundary line of what is now Nardone’s property. The right-of-way for ingress from and egress to Lawton Foster Road, has been the subject of many years of litigation.

On Memorial Day 1999, Ritacco cut trees and vegetation within the right-of-way. Nardone sued for a temporary and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit Ritacco from cutting the trees and from trespassing on Nardone’s land. The trial court entered a preliminary injunction and later found Ritacco in contempt of the order by cutting trees and vegetation outside the right-of-way. A key issue was the location of the right-of-way. In addition to arguing that the right-of-way was not originally located along the northern boundary of Nardone’s property but rather inside the boundaries of the land, Ritacco also asserted two alternative claims for relief: the existence of an easement by prescription as well as an easement by substitution over plaintiffs’ driveway. The trial court decided for Nardone, clarifying that the right-of-way was located along the northern boundary of Nardone’s property. Nardone appealed.

Held: A remand was necessary to determine whether Rotacco had acquired an easement by prescription or by substitution over Nardone’s driveway. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly found that the right-of-way over Nardone’s land was located on northern boundary of the land. The deed itself placed right-of-way “along the northerly boundary line” of the premises, and Nardone’s expert witness testified that, upon examining property, the boundaries were clear and right-of-way was located along the northern boundary of property. Ritacco’s expert had said that the deeds were not clear, but he hadn’t inspected the property itself, and the trial court’s discounting of his testimony was therefore reasonable.

However, Ritacco had also claimed that he had acquired an easement on land inside the Nardone boundaries by prescriptive easement. The trial court had ruled against him without a trial, but the Supreme Court ordered a remand for trial on the issues. The Supreme Court held that the trial court hadn’t addressed the issue of Ritacco’s permissive use of driveway, let alone determine whether sufficient factual support existed to conclude that permission to use driveway was given by Nardone or his predecessors-in-interest. A party who claims an easement by prescription bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence actual, open, notorious, hostile, and continuous use under a claim of right for at least ten years. In this case, the Court ruled, the trial judge had failed to make the specific findings of fact upon which he based his decision. When that happens, the trial court risks reversal or remand unless the record yields a full understanding and resolution of the controlling and essential factual and legal issues.

Here, there were unaddressed issues that were raised in pleadings and testified to at trial, including Ritacco’s testimony that perhaps Nardone’s predecessor-in-interest had granted him an easement by substitution. When the owner of a servient estate closes with a wall or other structure the original easement and points out another way which is accepted by the owner of the dominant estate, the new way may become the easement by substitution. The Supreme Court said that testimony indicated that James may have granted Ritacco an easement by substitution. However, the trial court failed to determine whether sufficient factual support existed to conclude that an easement by substitution was granted.

Case of the Day – Tuesday, July 14, 2015

IF A TREE FALLS IN THE FOREST …

Taking a philosophical bend, a New York trial court asked “[i]f trees are cut in a forest that were going to be removed anyway does the owner have compensable damages?”

The Mottas couldn’t stand the overgrown and scrubby condition of unimproved land next door, property owned by Island Realty. When another neighbor took matters into his own hands and cut back some of the offending saplings on the vacant land, the Mottas — bothered by falling leaves and insects, not to mention fears of West Nile virus — hired their own landscaper to cut back other trees and vegetation on the Island Realty property.

The landscaper attacked the job with enthusiasm, and a neighbor — worried about the cutting because the Mottas weren’t home — called the cops. The police came and — this being New York City — everyone got a ticket because no permits to cut trees or park dumpsters had been obtained. One of the police reported the matter to Island Realty, too.

Island had a case of the “shorts.” It wanted to develop the lot for housing, but it had less money than an ATM in Athens. So it sued the Mottas for treble damages under New York law, and brought in an expert who tried to sell the Court the amazing woof story that the one-third acre of cut saplings would cost $190,000 to replace.

The Mottas’ expert pointed out that the Island Realty development plan called for removal of the trees that the Mottas had cut. In other words, far from damaging Island Realty, the Mottas had saved the developer a few bucks by doing what the developer would have had to have paid to have done.

The Court was a bit vexed. It didn’t much cotton to the Mottas’ form of self help in clear cutting the neighboring land, but it couldn’t really find any damage, either. It ruled that under New York law, the lesser of diminution of value of the land or restoration costs was used to set damages. The Mottas had pretty well shown that the land wasn’t worth a dime less with the scrub cut. In fact, an aerial picture taken during the litigation (three years after the cutting) showed that the scrub was nearly all back.

The Court held that because Island Realty intended to cut the trees itself, damages were nominal, and it ordered the Mottas to pay $100, trebled to $300. In fact, the Court gave credence to the Mottas’ suggestion that the whole reason Island Realty sued to begin with was to raise a pot of money to start the development that it was too cash-starved to pull off by itself.

333, Island Realty Assoc., LLC v. Motta, 21 Misc.3d 554, 863 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup.Ct., Aug. 22, 2008). Island Realty was a land developer that owned a large tract of unimproved wooded land in the south shore on Staten Island. Joseph and Joan Motta owned a house next door. The Mottas had often complained that the unattended trees on the Island Realty land had created a nuisance, because some of the trees hung over their property and fallen leaves had clogged their pool drains.

Motta’s neighbor – whose property also abutted the Island Realty land – exercised a little self-help by cutting a swath of Island Realty trees to create a 100 foot buffer zone between his backyard and the tree line.  He did so without any permission or objection from the real estate firm.  Seeking to create a similar buffer zone to safeguard his own property, Joseph Motta had a landscaper cut the trees that overhung his land and create a buffer zone away from the unattended trees for fear of insects and West Nile Virus, which was prevalent in Staten Island around the time of the cutting of the trees.

While the Mottas were not home, the landscaper and his crew went to work but became overzealous, cutting down various trees without Island Realty’s consent and with any supervision from the Mottas. A nosy neighbor called the police to inform them that trees were being cut while the Mottas were not home. Because the complaint involved tree cutting, police officers from the New York City Department of Environmental Protection responded to the premises and observed a wood chipper feeding into an open container. Upon confronting the landscaper, the police officers learned that Joseph Motta authorized him to clear out some trees. The police officers originally estimated that 100 to 200 trees were cut in an area about half the size of a football field, but later admitted they were not certain how many trees were cut down. The police issued Motta five summonses for cutting down trees without permission and for placing a container on the street without a permit. All of those charges were dismissed by the criminal court, except for the container charge, wherein the defendants paid a $250 fine.

Island Realty was not immediately aware of the cut trees, but learned of it from the police. Island Realty had planned to develop the wooded tract into a large development of houses, and in order to do so, it would have had to clear large sections of trees to comply with an approved plan. Ironically the Mottas argued that they rendered a benefit to Island Realty in removing trees at no expense that ultimately would have to have been removed in order to complete the building project.

Nevertheless, Island Realty sued Motta under New York Real Property Actions and Proceeding Law §861, which authorizes treble damages for wrongful cutting of trees.

Held: Motta was liable for damages, but the damages awarded were nominal, $100 trebled to $300. The Island Realty expert estimated that 483 saplings would have to be planted to replace what was cut, at a price of $190,000. The trial court rejected the estimate as “incredible” and “preposterous.” Motta’s expert, on the other hand, testified that Island realty was under no legal requirement to replace the trees, which it was going to cut down itself anyway. The Court accepted this opinion.

The Court followed the New York law principle that the measure of damages for permanent injury to real property is the lesser of the decline in market value and the cost of restoration. A plaintiff may demonstrate the costs of restoration, but then it becomes the defendant’s burden to prove that a lesser amount than that claimed by the plaintiff will compensate for the loss.

Here, the Court said, Island Realty only presented speculative testimony of the value of the restoration and disregarded balancing that testimony with the other evidence in this case, namely, that there was no decrease in the value of the land, especially when it was to be cleared for development anyway.

The Court warned that it did not condone the Mottas’ actions in cutting down Island Realty’s trees without permission. However, applying the rule of taking the lesser of the values between restoration —which was most speculative — and no diminution of the value of the land, the Court held it was clear that there was no diminution in the value of the land. It was noteworthy, the Court said, that Mottas tried to buy the land from Island Realty after the cutting, and Island Realty wouldn’t adjust the price downward because the trees were gone. This suggested, the Court said, that even Island Realty didn’t think the land was worth less with the trees gone. Instead, it suggested that Island Realty’s lawsuit was only about getting startup capital for a building project from the Mottas instead of being about the value of the lost trees that would never be replanted.

Case of the Day – Wednesday, July 15, 2015

BUYER’S REMORSE

What do you get when you cross a lousy businessman with a careless homeowner? In today’s case, you get a whopper of a lawsuit.

The lousy businessman was Jeff Davis, who may well be a very good arborist but clearly was lacking is paperwork and billing skills. The shocked homeowner was Ron Sexton, who — to put it charitably — was woefully (and conveniently) forgetful, not to mention rather unforgiving.

Ron had hired Jeff to trim trees in 2002, and he paid the invoice, which had been figured at $1,200 (although he couldn’t remember ever seeing the bill he paid). He hired Jeff again the following year, but Jeff not only didn’t prepare a written proposal or estimate, he couldn’t even be sure he had told Ron the price would be the same as the year before.

For his part, Ron kept expanding the scope of the work, appearing frequently as the crews worked to suggest additional trimming. By the time Ron was done changing the job to encompass all 60 trees on his land, Jeff’s crews had 14-1⁄2 days of work in, presenting Ron with a bill for $17,400.

You’d think that Jeff would have said something to Ron about how the bill was mounting up. For that matter, you’d think Ron might wonder at some time during the two weeks of tree work how much it was all costing him. But neither Dumb nor Dumber questioned anything until the bill arrived in the mailbox. And then, Ron refused to pay.

Like every state, Kansas has a consumer practices act, intended to protect consumers from unscrupulous businesses that prohibit unconscionable acts and deceptive practices. And even if Dorothy isn’t in Kansas anymore, that doesn’t mean that the state’s restrictions are over the rainbow: just about all states have unfair or deceptive acts and practices statutes, consumer protection statutes, consumer fraud statutes or the like. The laws are well intended, but as our homeowner hero proves today, the likelihood that they can be used for mischief is high.

Here, we suspect that Ron didn’t feel like a defrauded consumer until some lawyer suggested that some KCPA claims would be a dandy way to beat paying Jeff. So Ron claimed Jeff had violated the KCPA by deceptive practices (not telling him how much it would cost and trimming well beyond the scope of the work in order to jack up the price) and unconscionable acts (performing unnecessary work and not giving Ron his money’s worth). The jury didn’t buy it — especially the whopper that he didn’t know it was $1,200 a day because he hadn’t gotten last year’s bill, which he had managed to pay without seeing — but it did apparently find that the value fell somewhat short of $17,400, because it awarded Jeff Davis only $6,500.

And here, we encounter a popular fiction: juries are wise and Solomonic. They’re not, often hurried, bored, a collection of weak-willed people bullied by one or two strong ones, even just plain stupid. But juries as fact-finders are the foundation of our legal system, and appellate courts protect that foundation with a most deferential standard of review. Typlcally, an appeals court won’t overturn a jury’s findings of fact unless no rational juror — even taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the winner — could have made the decision the jury handed down.

Here, just about everything in the record was contradicted. But assuming the jury believed evidence in favor of Davis Tree — and the appeals court made that assumption — it could have come to the conclusion it reached. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals seems to have been less than thrilled with the jury’s verdict even while showing it deference, asking cryptically, “Would the evidence also support contrary inferences? Yes, but that is simply not the question which we are called upon to decide.”

Everyone was a loser here, especially because all of this could have been avoided with a written estimate from the arborist and a careful written record of change orders maintained throughout the job. The homeowner was negligent to the point of recklessness as well, but … well, he’s the customer. Expect them to be foolish or to try to beat the contractor out of his or her price. The tree professional has to prepare for the naïve and the cunning customer alike.

Davis Tree Care v. Sexton, 197 P.3d 904 (Ct.App. Kan., 2008). In 2003, Ron Sexton hired Jeff Davis, doing business as Davis Tree Care, to trim the trees at his house. It was a big job, over 60 trees trimmed with a final bill of $17,400. When Sexton refused to pay, Davis sued him for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Sexton counterclaimed under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA), alleging deceptive practices and unconscionable acts. Sexton had used Davis Tree the year before, for which he was billed $1,200 per day. He denied having seen the 2002 invoice and denied the 2002 job was priced on a per day basis, but he admitted he had paid the same amount as was shown on the invoice. He maintained that Davis had never told him the 2003 job would cost the same as the 2002 work, and that was “willful misrepresentation of a material fact” under the KCPA.

Sexton and Davis Tree agreed the work was intended to include removing two trees and removing an oak tree branch, but Sexton said he didn’t ask for anything else. Davis testified Sexton also wanted some general trimming and that he came out from time to time and pointed out additional work he wanted done. Sexton argued there was no need for general trimming because that was what Davis Tree had done the year before. The trial court found against Davis Tree on the contract claim, but it awarded Davis Tree $6,500 on the unjust enrichment claim. As for Sexton’s creative KCPA claims, the court found that Davis Tree had committed neither deceptive practices nor unconscionable acts.

Sexton didn’t appeal the $6,500 he was found to owe Davis Tree on the unjust enrichment claim, but he did challenge the findings that Davis Tree had not violated the Kansas Consumer Practices Act.

Held: Davis Tree had not violated the law. Because the trial court jury had found for Davis Tree, the appellate court had to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the tree trimmer. If the evidence so viewed supports the verdict, the appellate court will not intervene to disturb the verdict. The question on appeal, the Court said, was whether there was evidence to support the jury’s findings against Sexton’s claims.

The issue was whether Jeff Davis believed Ron Sexton knew the price and requested added tree trimming services. There was ample evidence that he knew what he had paid the year before, and that Davis believed he knew the price would be the same in 2003. Likewise, there was plenty of evidence that Sexton had asked for extra services. Based on that, a rational jury could have found from the record that Davis Tree did not willfully conceal or misrepresent the price or scope of the work.

Under the KCPA, a supplier shall not engage in deceptive acts or practices, including the willful use in a misrepresentation of “exaggeration, falsehood, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact,” the willful failure to state a material fact, or the willful concealment of a material fact. Such practices are violations regardless of whether the consumer has, in fact, been misled. Here, the evidence supported that Jeff Davis of Davis Tree believed he and Sexton had discussed price and that Davis believed Sexton knew the price for the 2003 job would be the same as the prior year — $1,200 per day. Likewise, the evidence supported the inference that Sexton requested additional trimming services. That, the Court said, was sufficient to find Davis Tree did not willfully conceal or misrepresent the price or scope of the work.

Sexton also claims the trial court erred in finding Davis Tree did not commit unconscionable acts in violation of the KCPA. He argued that because KCPA cases were so “fact sensitive,” the appellate court had to conduct an “unlimited review” of findings that certain conduct was not unconscionable. But the Court disagreed, holding that the standard is “abuse of discretion,” that is when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. This is especially true where the credibility of witnesses is central to resolution of the case. Credibility determinations will not be reweighed on appeal.

The KCPA prohibits a supplier from engaging in an unconscionable act in connection with a consumer transaction. In determining whether an act is unconscionable, a court considers a nonexclusive list of circumstances “which the supplier knew or had reason to know,” including whether when the consumer transaction was entered into, the price grossly exceeded the price at which similar property or services were readily obtainable in similar transactions by similar consumers, and whether the consumer was able to receive a material benefit from the subject of the transaction.

Sexton argued that the Davis Tree invoice lacked documentation, and compared it to invoices for other Davis Tree customers which differed both in amounts charged and in how specifically the tasks were described. Davis Tree cited the extensive equipment and complex procedures required to trim the large number of trees on the Sexton property over the claimed 14-1/2 days of work. The trial court found that “just looking at $1200 a day for three people and the equipment, the Court … does find that it has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence that the price was grossly exceeding the value of what was being provided.”

The Court of Appeals found essentially that Sexton had not sustained his burden of proof. The trial court found there were three people working on the project, using a number of machines and at least two of the people climbing trees with their gear. Even Sexton admitted to seeing the equipment and work being done. However, the trial court noted, Davis Tree’s failure to prepare specific proposals was “a bad way to run a business,” and “more of a poor business that was run by Mr. Davis and not an unconscionable act or an intentional misleading business. Just bad business practices.”

At trial, in support of the claim that he did not receive a material benefit under the KCPA, Sexton argued the work Davis Tree claimed to have done was the same as done the previous year and, therefore, unnecessary, or that Davis Tree charged for work not done, and that Sexton did not receive the benefit of the full $17,400 charged. But as the Court noted, the jury did not order Sexton to pay the full $17,400 charged. The jury’s verdict against Sexton was for $6,500, and that was not challenged on appeal.

The trial court found there was little evidence to show what the value of the work actually should be, but it considered the evidence of the number of people and amount of equipment involved to conclude $1,200 a day was not excessive and, therefore, not unconscionable. The Court of Appeals couldn’t say that no reasonable person would agree with that ruling. Thus, the trial court’s ruling that Sexton received a material benefit would not be disturbed.

Case of the Day – Thursday, July 16, 2015

CLEANING UP AN OMISSION

Judges make mistakes. If that weren’t so, there’d hardly be a need for courts of appeal or even the Supreme Court.

An electric utility sued back in the 1960s to force a landowner to give it an easement for building and maintaining power lines. The court granted the easement — which consisted of four separate rights — but somehow left out the part where it got an easement of 25 feet on either side of a right-of-way to keep trees trimmed.

Fast forward 45 years … the utility wanted to assign its right to the City of Jackson, Missouri, so the City could build its own power line. Someone noticed the omission nearly five decades before, and the City sued to establish that it really had the right to trim the easement as well as install a power line. The landowner, who was probably still smarting over having had to give up the easement after being sued 2-score-and-5 years before, was cantankerous enough to protest. Revenge, after all, is a dish best served cold.

The utility and City argued that just because the 1969 court forgot to mention the 25-foot easement, that didn’t mean it wasn’t there. After all, the utility had asked for it at the time, and the court never said it couldn’t have it. When the damages were assessed so the landowner could get fair compensation for the condemnation, the commissioner charged with assessing the cost included the 25-foot easement as part of what was being taken. The omission was just an oversight, the utility argued, a mere scrivener’s error.

There’s an old adage in the law that a court speaks through its record.  And in this case, while the 1969 order probably did omit the 25-foot easement just because of an oversight, that didn’t matter. The court’s order establishing the easement years earlier was clear and unambiguous in how it described the easement, and it didn’t mention any 25 feet reserved for tree trimming.

Where the language of an easement is clear, a reviewing court won’t second-guess what may have been left out. Like the Dramatics’ old song went, “Whatcha see is whatcha get.”

City of Jackson v. Bettilee Emmendorfer Revocable Trust, 260 S.W.3d 918 (Mo.App. E.D. 2008). The Bettilee Emmendorfer Revocable Trust owned land in Jackson, Missouri, which had been subject of a condemnation action 40 years before. Back then, Union Electric petitioned for rights over four portions of the land: a 100-foot easement, for the purpose of installing electric transmission lines, 25-foot sections on either side of the 100-foot easement for maintaining trees, overhanging branches and obstructions, two smaller for use in connection with the transmission lines, and an easement for ingress and egress. The Order granted Union Electric the 100-foot easement, easements to the two separate parcels, and an easement for ingress and egress. However, the court failed to mention Union Electric’s request for an easement of the 25-foot sections on either side of the 100-foot easement. A Report of Commissioners filed in the case indicated the commissioners viewed the 25-foot sections on either side of the 100-foot easement as well as the 100-foot easement itself, and set damages at $22,224.

In October 2006, Union Electric entered into an agreement with the City of Jackson to allow Jackson to build a new electric line on the eastern edge of the 100-foot easement. Jackson and Union Electric entered into a partial assignment of the easement in accordance with that agreement. But noticing the old trial court order had a hole in it, the City sought a declaration of rights as to whether the 1969 condemnation action awarded Union Electric the 25-foot sections on either side of the 100-foot easement, whether Union Electric has the right to assign to Respondent the right to construct an electric transmission line on the 100-foot easement, and whether the construction of an additional electric transmission line amounts to an additional taking of property from the Trust.

The Trust asserted the 1969 Order made no mention of an easement or other rights condemned or established on either side of the 100-foot easement. The Trust also argued that construction of an additional electric transmission line would increase the burden on the property “beyond the scope of the intended and authorized use of the easement,” the grant of the easement would be “inconsistent with the original use of the easement,” and the additional utility poles and electric transmission lines would interfere with reasonable use and enjoyment of the property.

The trial court held that Union Electric’s easement included the right, permission and authority to trim, cut and remove trees, overhanging branches and obstructions on 25 feet on each side of the 100 feet right of way which may endanger the safety of or interfere with the transmission lines, and it had the power to assign the right to the City.

The Trust appealed.

Held:  The 1969 order establishing the easements made no mention of and contained no reference to the 25-foot sections on either side of the 100-foot easement, and thus, those portions are not part of the easement.

When interpreting easements, courts ascertain the intention of the grantor from the instrument itself. Only when the language of the deed is “unclear and ambiguous” should a court resort to the rules of construction and consider extrinsic evidence. A contract is not ambiguous simply because parties disagree about its meaning. Rather, an ambiguity arises only “when the terms are susceptible of more than one meaning so that reasonable persons may fairly and honestly differ in their construction of the terms.

Here, the Court said, nothing was unclear or ambiguous in the documents creating the easement in this case, thus leaving a court to judge the easement only by the plain language of those documents without the need to refer to extrinsic evidence. The report of the commissioners, while it apparently valued the 25-foot sections in determining damages, does not supersede the court’s unambiguous order.

As for the right to assign, the Court held, it was equally clear and unambiguous that the order granted the easement holder the ability to construct a “line or lines,” permitted the holder to “add to and relocate” the electric transmission lines, and referenced “successors and assigns,” thus indicating that assignments are permitted.

 

Case of the Day – Friday, July 17, 2015

CHIA JERK

Should we be talking about Chia Pets? It’s not even close to Christmas.

The CHIA we’re discussing here isn’t a ceramic figurine smeared with seeds. Instead, it’s the Connecticut Home Improvement Act. And the “jerk” is a slick lawyer who tried to use it to cheat a local tree trimmer. We’ve told you about this case before, but this sad little cautionary tale bears repeating.  And it warms us up for some new cases we’ll be talking about next week.

The takeaway here for the aspiring arborist should be entitled “make sure all your oral contracts are in writing.” That rule goes double when you’re messing with a homeowner who happens to be a slick lawyer. Don made a deal with Ronnie “The Mouthpiece” LoRicco to cut the lawyer’s grass. The contract was verbal. After all, it’s a lawn, for heaven’s sake. Who needs a lot of printed mumbo-jumbo for a lousy lawn?

We think you know the answer to that one. He started with cutting the grass, but one thing leads to another. The mowing became some grass seeding became some stone moving became some grading and some tree trimming and retaining wall construction. When Don, tuckered out after all of that hard work, went to collect for his labors, slick Ronnie yelled “Gotcha!” Well, perhaps not literally, but he might as well have, because he refused to pay the $2,277 bill, claiming he didn’t owe the arborist a farthing.

Don sued. The lawyer-defendant argued that under the Connecticut Home Improvement Act, Don should have given Ronnie a written agreement. Because Don didn’t, Ronnie said, he didn’t owe anything for all the work. Shades of Henry B. Swap tricking the hapless but industrious Mike Mulligan! But like the classic story about the plucky steam shovel Mary Anne, today’s case has a happy ending.

When Ronnie moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Don violated the CHIA, the trial court showed the solicitor that it could get just as hyper-technical as he could. The work Don did, according to the court, seemed more like “maintenance services” than home improvements. That argument might be a hard sell where lawn planting and wall building are concerned, but what we have here is a court doing a little distributive justice. Plus, the court said, Don was asserting that Ronnie had raised the CHIA defense in bad faith, invoking the Act not because he was a sheep-like homeowner fleeced by an unscrupulous contractor, but instead because Ronnie had never intended to pay Don to begin with.

Don believed he was the one getting sheared, and the court — apparently thinking the same thing — intended to give Don a chance to prove it. But what a cautionary tale! Simple projects all too often become complex projects, and the fifty states have a patchwork of consumer protection laws that serve as a snare for the unwary arborist. Support your local lawyer! Spend a few bucks to be sure that the slick Ronnies of the world don’t try to shear you.

Don’s Landscaping and Tree Service v. LoRicco, Not Reported in A.2d, 2007 WL 2938602 (Conn.Super. Sept. 21, 2007). Don’s Landscaping entered into a verbal agreement with LoRicco for lawn cutting services, which over time mushroomed into installation of a lawn, grading, removal of stones, seeding, moving of trees, planting and building walls. When LoRicco decided not to pay, Don’s sued for the amount due, $2,277.00. LoRicco denied owing Don’s any money, and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the landscaper’s suit was barred under the Connecticut Home Improvement Act because Don’s didn’t give LoRicco a written contract. Don’s complained that LoRicco was an experienced attorney familiar with Connecticut law looking to beat Don’s out of payment, using the CHIA in bad faith.

Held: Summary judgment was denied to the lawyer-defendant. The trial court noted that for LoRicco to satisfy his burden he had to make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. That evidence had to be viewed in a light most favorable to the opponent. In this case, although the Home Improvement Act refers to landscaping, there was a real question of fact whether the services provided by Don’s were governed by the Act. They appeared to be maintenance services, and not “home improvements.” What’s more, the Court credited Don’s allegations, finding they raised questions of fact of whether LoRicco’s reliance on the Act was a bad-faith dodge (of course it was). For those reasons, the summary judgment was denied.

So Don got his day in court, but it was a day that shouldn’t have ever had to arrive. There is a thicket of local, state and (sometimes) Federal law out there – in addition to a substantial body of common law – just waiting to prove a snare to unwary but well-meaning people like Don. And you. A stitch in time saves nine. Here, a little piece of paper would have saved Don a lot of aggravation and legal costs.

Far be it from us to toot our own horn, but if you’re wondering just what to put in your contract, considering getting our book:

Case of the Day – Monday, July 20, 2015

FISTS, NOSES AND TREES

Everyone’s heard the old saw that “The right to swing my fist ends where your nose begins.” Imagine your nose is a 65-foot tall maple tree, and my fist is a backhoe. Good luck with that – most imaginations aren’t quite that agile.

Here’s the problem. We all know about “self help,” the venerable old Massachusetts Rule that limits a landowner to trimming away encroaching branches and roots from a neighbor’s tree up to the property line. Michaelson v. Nutting – and virtually every encroachment case decided in the eight decades since that decision – has given a property owner the right to trim back a neighbor’s tree to the boundary without any limitation.

At the same time, we all know about boundary trees, those trees whose trunks enter the earth smack on the property line, so that tree is attached to the ground in both properties. Boundary trees are special, and the general rule is that neither property owner may trim the tree without the consent of the other.

But what happens when a neighbor’s tree is not on the boundary, but so encroaches on a landowner’s property – both above ground and below ground – that the practical effect of the landowner’s Massachusetts Rule self-help will be to kill the tree?

Remember King Solomon? When two women appeared in front of him arguing over who was the mother of a baby, he proposed to settle it by cutting the baby in half so that each woman would get 50 percent of the child. That threat was enough to smoke out the imposter. In today’s case, dividing the tree in half would have had the same effect as cutting up the infant (albeit it with less blood).

The Alvarezes own a nice place in Vermont, complete with a view of Lake Champlain. They have a 65-year old maple tree next to the property line of their neighbors, the Katzes. It was close, but the base of the tree was completely on Alvarez property, so this was no boundary tree the parties were dealing with.

The tree had been standing for almost seven decades. In fact, when the Alvarezes bought the property 20 years ago, the maple had already sent roots and branches across the boundary between the two parcels.

The Katzes, who also enjoy a view of Lake Champlain, have planned for a number of years to add on to their house, essentially doubling its size with a two-story addition. The only problem – or at least, the only problem we care about – was the maple tree. To add on, the Katzes would have to cut away about half of the maple tree’s branches and roots, in all likelihood killing the tree.

The Alvarezes and Katzes tried to resolve the problem amicably, but – just as happened with the women in front of King Solomon – there really wasn’t any middle ground. Either the Katzes would get their way, building onto their house and killing the tree, or the Alvarezes would have it their way. Like Dr. Seuss’s north-going and south-going Zax, neither neighbor would budge.

But then Katz somehow learned all about the Massachusetts Rule. It dawned on him that he could cut back the offending maple tree to the property line, both roots and branches. Sure, the tree might die, but the Massachusetts Rule said nothing about what happened to the tree after a neighbor used “self-cutting” trimming on it.

The Alvarezes ran to court, and obtaining an injunction against Katz. The trial court found that trimming the tree as Katz proposed doing would probably kill it. The injunction prohibited cutting away only about 25 percent of the tree, about half of what the Katzes needed for their ambitious plans.

The Katzes appealed, and the Vermont Supreme Court threw out the injunction. It held that the Massachusetts Rule was a blunt object, and had always been one. A landowner owns everything above and below ground level, and that owner can cut anything he or she wants to cut, without regard for the effect of the cutting. The Court said that was the law in Vermont and just about everywhere else.

The Supreme Court seemed a little uncomfortable with its decision, but it ruled in essence that the law is the law, and that’s the way Vermont had always done it.. It noted, in a hint that was as subtle as an anvil, that cases where Massachusetts-style self-help had been limited – such as in Booksa v. Patel – the theory that had been advanced was that of nuisance. In other words, the Alvarezes could have argued that Katz’s proposed trimming would so endanger the tree that it would interfere with their enjoyment of their property. Recall in Booksa, the court ordered the defendant to trim the encroaching tree reasonably. The Vermont Supreme Court telegraphed that it would probably have done the same, if the Alvarezes’ lawyer had only thought to make the argument. Oops.

Alvarez v. Katz, 2015 VT 86 (Supreme Court of Vermont, June 19, 2015).  The Katzes own property at in South Burlington in the Shelburne Bay area. The Alvarezes own the adjoining lot just to the north of the Katzes. The Alvarezes have a 65-ft. tall maple tree, the trunk of which is located entirely on their property. About half of the branches and roots from the tree cross the property boundary and encroach onto the Katz lot. Some roots extend under the Katzes’ existing deck.

For several years the Katzes have sought to expand their home by adding a two-story addition on the rear. The plans for the construction of the addition would require cutting the roots and branches that are encroaching onto their property. This could encompass up to half of the tree’s roots and branches.

The Alvarezes and the Katzes have been unable to amicably resolve the problem of the maple tree. In 2013, when the Katzes considered taking unilateral action to trim the tree’s roots and branches, the Alvarezes filed for an injunction. The superior court found it more likely than not that removal of 50% of the tree’s roots and branches would result in the premature death of the tree, perhaps within five years and probably within ten from the time of cutting. The court employed what it called the “urban-tree rule,” under which trimming the roots or branches of an encroaching tree may be proscribed if the trimming will destroy the tree. The injunction barred the trimming of more than 25% of the roots and branches of the tree.

The Katzes appealed.

Held: The injunction was vacated. The Supreme Court reaffirmed “Vermont’s long-standing right of a property owner to trim branches and roots from an encroaching tree without regard to the impact that such trimming may have on the health of the tree.”

Vermont has long recognized ownership of property to include the ownership of that which is below the ground and that which is attached overhead. The right has been clear for almost 100 years, since Cobb v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,  (a 1916 decision which stated the Massachusetts Rule before there ever was a Massachusetts Rule). Cobb held that “it is a sound principle that where a tree stands wholly on the ground of one and so is his tree, any part of it which overhangs the land of an adjoining owner may be cut off by the latter at the division line.” The Supreme Court criticized the trial court for conjuring up an “urban-tree rule” that would be an exception to Cobb. The trial court had considered this case to be one of first impression in Vermont because of the anticipated adverse – and likely fatal – effect the root-and-branch cutting would have had on the encroaching tree. The Supreme Court held that any attempt to “distinguish” Cobb, that is, to find that the Cobb case was somehow different just because the Cobb tree was located in a rural setting, was wrong.

Further, the Supreme Court said, the “urban-tree rule” does not enjoy the support attributed to it by the trial court. Outside of two cases, the California decision in Booksa and one obscure New York decision, the Massachusetts Rule (which maybe we should have called the “Vermont Rule”) enjoys extremely widespread support. What’s more, the Court reasoned, the Vermont legislature has had 99 years to modify the Cobb holding by statute, and it has not bothered to do so. The Supreme Court concluded that the “right to cut encroaching trees where they enter the land of another, without regard to the impact on the encroaching tree by such cutting, is well-established under Vermont law.”

The Supreme Court noted that at common law, the right to cut encroaching boughs and roots historically counterbalanced a landowner’s right to grow shade trees on his land, regardless of the impact those trees may have in casting shade or encroaching upon the neighboring property. Common law provided no claim for damages caused by encroaching roots or branches. Instead, the remedy was one of self-help, allowing the cutting of roots and branches to the extent of encroachment.

Where other jurisdictions have departed from the common-law rule and allowed actions for damages as a result of encroaching roots or branches, they have generally relied upon nuisance principles. Even where such actions have been permitted, those jurisdictions continue to recognize the right to self-help. In this case, the Alverezes did not raise a nuisance claim, so “the issue of whether a nuisance claim might exist for the encroachment of roots and branches from the Alvarezes’ tree is not presently before the Court.”

The Supreme Court defined the conundrum as follows: “[T]his case presents the competing interests of neighboring property owners. On the one hand, [the Katzes] have an interest in using their land, which they have purchased and upon which they pay taxes, as they see fit, within permissible regulations, free from limitations imposed by encroaching roots and branches from the neighbors’ tree, which they did not invite and for which they receive no benefit. The Alvarezes seek to restrict the use of the Katz property by preventing the removal of branches and roots on land that is not theirs and for which they have given nothing of benefit to [the Katzes] for suffering the encroachment. On the other hand, the Alvarezes wish to continue to enjoy their tree, which has been there for many years, without placing its viability in peril due to the construction that [the Katzes] wish to undertake.”

The Court observed that if the Alvarezes had the right to have their tree encroach onto the neighboring property, the obvious next question would be to what extent the encroached-upon property owner must suffer such an encroachment. The Supreme Court admitted that on some occasions the “exercise of self-help may result in the immediate or eventual loss of an encroaching tree, given the long-recognized rule in Vermont and its widespread support elsewhere, we decline to depart from the common-law rule in favor of the approach adopted by the superior court.”

Case of the Day – Tuesday, July 21, 2015

PEOPLE BEHAVING VERY BADLY

We suspect that the Alvarezes and the Katzes – neighbors separated by a tree from yesterday’s post – didn’t get along that well. Filing suit against the guys next door won’t get you invited over for cocktails.  But a dispute between two reasonable parties is one thing.  Today’s neighbors are something else altogether.

Meet the Cooleys, neighbors who were so bad as to drive the Court to write a plaintive plea that everyone try to get along.  How bad, you ask? Well, Mrs. Cooley tried to run down her neighbor with her car.  She built a chicken-wire spite fence. Her son threatened to beat up his elderly neighbor (who had just had a heart transplant). Yes, that bad …

This case is one of those rare fact-driven trial court decisions worth reading just to get the flavor of the Court’s incredulity that people could carry on like this. At one point, the judge observes that “[o]ne could almost use that well worn lawyer’s expression ‘I rest my case’ after merely viewing Mrs. Cooley’s Exhibit 12, which in gruesome detail sets out the ‘this is my property’ syndrome.” The court finally issues a 15-point injunction ordering the Cooleys to stop doing 12 acts of malice, and the Quarantas to refrain from three others. It found application for a seldom-used Connecticut statute prohibiting structures built out of malice, banning a chicken-wire monstrosity erected by the Cooleys as a “spite fence.” Finally, it found the often-alleged but seldom-proven “intentional infliction of emotional distress” tort to have been shown here, and ordered the Cooleys pay the Quarantas legal fees.

At the end of its opinion, the Court ordered each party to read his final words out loud. Those were a plea by the Court for these people to rewind the clock to the beginning and try to get along. The Court’s frustration and sense that no matter what the law said, nothing would stop the bickering, comes through. Not great moments in the development of the law … just a neighbor law tale worth reading.

Quaranta v. Cooley, Not Reported in A.2d, 2007 WL 4577942 (Conn.Super. 2007). People behaving very badly. You know how the opinion’s going to go when the Court begins by quoting an old Supreme Court opinion that “… it is the bickerings, spite, and hatred arising from neighborhood quarrels; it is difficult for any legislation to remedy such evil.”

The Quarantas were senior citizens who had lived in the same home for 26 years. Mr. Quaranta was on life support system and eventually had a heart transplant. The Cooleys were younger than the Quarantas, but had a 25-year-old son and health considerations of their own. When the original landowner subdivided his property into the lots which became the homes of the Cooleys and Quarantas, there was an existing paved driveway to the Quarantas’ home from the street, bordered with a split rail fence and a grassy area on each side. The landowner created by deed two 25’ easement roads (for a total width of 50 feet) over the same area on which his driveway existed. Each lot owned 25’ of the road, and each owner had the right to pass over the 25 feet owned by the other. The practical effect of these easements is to allow all three parcels of land to share access to the public street with one common driveway. Although the neighbors couldn’t see each others’ homes, they ended up in a continuing vitriolic spat in which each side accused the other of using the “F” word, raising the middle finger on numerous occasions, and other immature and harassing behavior, such as the noisy racing of vehicles, the blowing of car horns and trash placement fights.

The Court held that the Cooleys, who were New York City dwellers unused to the suburban life, utterly lacked credibility on the stand. It found that the battle began with Mrs. Cooley delivering a letter to the Quarantas within 30 days of her having moved in, in which she told them their lampposts and driveway sat on the Cooley property. Then, the Cooley son began throwing keg parties at the Cooley home, with noisy partygoers parking all along the right-of-way. The parties were noisy and annoying, and afterwards, the Quarantas found themselves cleaning up empty bottles and cigarette butts. The parties were held about four times a month. The Quarantas complained without effect. The grand finale was the Cooley Halloween Party in 2005. When Mrs. Quaranta went out in her nightgown to ask for peace and quiet, the partygoers cursed her – one exposing himself to her – and urinated toward her. After this, Mrs. Cooley and her daughter, took to riding at high speed over the grassy area, even leaving deep tire tracks. Although the Cooley’s trash pickup was on Friday, they would put their trash out all week long, at a spot where it was viewable only from the Quarantas property. Animals got to the trash during the week and the plaintiffs did the clean up. Mrs. Cooley would to drive fast down the mutual passage raising dust and her middle finger while blowing her horn the entire distance. She overdosed her own lawn with weedkiller, killing all of the grass ostensibly so she wouldn’t have to mow. Her lawn, of course, fronted on the Quarantas’ lush and meticulous.

There were countless verbal confrontations as well. The Cooley son yelled at Mr. Quaranta, a man past 65 with a heart transplant, “Hit me! I’ll wipe the ground up with you.” Previously, another judge had ordered the parties to refrain from intimidating, threatening, harassing, stalking, assaulting, or attacking each other, and to refrain from entering the property of the other, until the dispute was tried and resolved on the merits. After that, the Cooleys built an ugly chicken wire fence on the side of the passage that fronts the Quarantas’ house only. The trial court was called upon to mediate the dispute.

Held: The Court found for the plaintiffs, the Quarantas. It held that Mrs. Cooley’s testimony was so bad that it noted that “[o]ne could almost use that well worn lawyer’s expression ‘I rest my case’ after merely viewing Mrs. Cooley’s Exhibit 12, which in gruesome detail sets out the “this is my property” syndrome. The court found it unsurprising that she took an axe to, and threatened to destroy, anything – even things of beauty – found on her property. These items included a lamppost, (that provided her light with the Quarantas paying for the electricity), fences (that enhanced the entrance to both their properties), a beautiful birch tree (with no professional evidence that it had to be cut down), a ceramic nameplate, (which her son admitted smashing) and even shrubbery. “Such warmth!” the Court said. “And it shows in the fifty plus exhibits.”

The Court held that the chicken wire fence was maliciously erected, based on its character, its location, and the obvious state of mind and motive of the defendant. It ordered the fence removal pursuant to §52-480 of the Connecticut Statutes. It found that the Cooleys had exceeded the use of the right of way in a vindictive and malicious manner so as to harm the Quarantas, rather than just for ingress and egress. It held that number of the Cooleys’ activities on this simple right-of-way were, “in layman’s terms, ludicrous, and in legal terms harmful, unnecessary, illegal and unreasonable.” It issued a detailed injunction spelling out 12 acts in which the Cooleys were not to engage, and 3 acts in which the Quarantas were not to engage.

Based upon the totality of the evidence, the Court held that the Cooleys directly and indirectly negligently and intentionally caused severe emotional distress to the Quarantas, and knew or should have known that their acts would result in severe emotional distress to the plaintiffs. In the case of Mr. Quaranta, the distress was found to be life threatening. The Cooleys evidenced a reckless indifference to the Quarantas’ rights and showed an intentional and wanton violation of these rights. The injury was inflicted maliciously, with evil motive and violence. The Court awarded the Quarantas their legal fees as damages.

The Court took the unusual step of ordering a final statement to be personally read by the parties. It begged both parties to “go back to the day the Cooleys moved in and put everything back the way it was. Let us dig a hole and bury all of the ill feelings and hatreds that are all consuming.” The Court, writing this on Thanksgiving Eve, ended by noting that “[t]he person whom many people honor in this Holiday Season forgave everyone. Isn’t it time that the Quarantas and the Cooleys caught the spirit of the Season?”

Postscript: They did not. Rather, they were back in court repeatedly between 2007 and 2013, arguing over contempt motions filed against each other. Oh, the humanity …

Case of the Day – Wednesday, July 22, 2015

GIVE ‘EM AN INCH …

We continue our tour through the House of Bad Neighbor Horrors today, with a look at neighbors Paula A. Luckring and Christopher Blair.

There’s an old legal adage which argues that “a bad settlement is better than a good lawsuit.” Paula sues her neighbor, arguing that branches from his trees overhung her property, and that they were doing all the kinds of things trees do – you know, dropping twigs and leaves, leaking sap, growing roots, just normal tree stuff. Paula insisted that she was entitled to something north of $13,000 because the trees were “trespassing” on her property, making claims that sounded a lot like her lawyer had read Fancher v. Fagella.

Neighbor Chris Blair counterclaimed, pointing out that if Paula wanted to really get technical, her deck – which she claimed was being damaged by his trees – was built partly on his property, and it should be removed.

The case looked like the trial would be the Saturday night main event, but alas … before trial, the parties settled. There’s nothing wrong with that. Civil actions are just a formalized means of settling disputes, a little more complex and fact-driven than “rock, paper, scissors,” but often, it seems, just as random. When the parties find a means short of a full-blown trial to resolve things, time and money are saved, and people are able to get on with their lives.

That must be what Chris Blair thought, because he settled the case with Paula Luckring before trial. He agreed to give Paula title to an 11-foot strip of his own land and to build, at his own expense, a fence marking the new boundary line between their properties.

We have to hand it to Chris. He apparently was a Bible scholar, and remembered Matthew 5:39 – 40: But I say to you, do not resist an evil person; but whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other to him also. If anyone wants to sue you and take your shirt, let him have your coat also…” For that matter, Neville Chamberlain thought that giving Hitler Czechoslovakia would keep the brown shirts out of Paris.

We’re not saying Ms. Luckring was evil, nor would we ever equate her territorial ambitions with those of the Third Reich. For a concession to be effective, however, the party being appeased has to be acting in good faith. This is rarely the case.  Rather, the problem is that the party being appeased has probably acted in bad faith in order for affairs to get to the point that appeasement is necessary. Hitler had the “Anschluss.” Without it, Chamberlain wouldn’t have needed to make a deal. Putin started by taking South Ossetia from Georgia.  Then, he grabbed Crimea, and now he wants a piece of Ukraine (if not Moldova, Estonia and the other Baltic states as well).  History has shown us that appeasement doesn’t work, because appeasement only convinces the appeased party that bad conduct pays.

Just ask Chris Blair.  Chris thought he had bought peace by giving away a piece of this land. But when Chris hired a fence company to build the agreed-upon fence along the new boundary, Paula Luckring refused to let the contractor set foot on her property during the construction process. It’s hard to build a fence from one side only. To further appease Ms. Luckring, the contractor built the fence 13 inches into Chris’s side of the boundary. After that, when Chris’s caretaker (Chris himself had severe Parkinson’s, a condition that undoubtedly only goaded Ms. Luckring into further predations) would try to use a weed whacker on the grass growing in the 13-inch space between the new boundary and the fence, Ms. Luckring demanded that he go the cutting without setting foot on her property. However, she magnanimously conceded, she would cut the grass on the 13-inch strip … if Chris gave her an easement for the 13 inches of space.

The trial court was drawn back into what it called the “predictable drama” that arose by Ms. Luckring’s demands. It told Paula that she had to pay to have the fence moved and reinstalled right along the boundary. No 13-inch “no man’s land.” No easements. No more trespassing actions.

Naturally, Ms. Luckring appealed. The appellate panel was having none of it. It held that “a mere cursory review of the Plaintiff’s pleadings and her own testimony … adduces an ongoing pattern of bullying of a Defendant who granted her the moon and the stars in acquiescing to her unceasing demands, and yet was confronted with demands for more …” It’s not unheard-of for a plaintiff to cripple her case by her own testimony, but to prove yourself to be a bully?

Under the circumstances, making Paula pay to relocate the fence seemed to the court to be a lot like justice. Approximate justice, but still justice.

Luckring v. Blair, 2014 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 3 (Com.Pl.Ct. Pennsylvania, Dec. 3, 2014).  Paula Luckring sued neighbor Christopher Blair, alleging that his pine and sycamore trees trespassed onto her property, causing public safety issues that had been presented to the local township authorities. She additionally complained of damage caused by “tree sap, needles, branches, cones, roots” constituting a “nuisance” because the trees overhung, fell upon, and grew under her property which caused damage such as a broken window, damage to a deck and stamped concrete, as well as clogging a sewer line and causing landscape damage. She demanded $13,369 for cutting down or trimming the offending trees and restoring her property to its previous condition.

Blair countered that he had given Luckring permission to trim the sap-dripping white pine tree all the way back to its trunk, but her trimming caused the sap to drip excessively because there were no tree branches remaining to catch and absorb its flow. He also said that she had previously accepted his written permission and cut down the encroaching white pine tree at her own expense. He argued she should not now be able to renegotiate that contract. He also counterclaimed, alleging that Luckring was trespassing on his property with her deck and retaining wall.

The parties settled the case before trial by signing a settlement agreement that called for Blair to grant title to Luckring, free of charge, to an 11-foot strip of his own land and to build, at his own expense, a fence marking the new boundary line between their respective parcels. Nevertheless, the parties were back in court a year later seeking to resolve the predictable drama ensuing from the Plaintiff’s abject and literal refusal to allow the fence company to set foot on her newly acquired property in order to erect the structure. The contractor then built the fence thirteen inches inside the Blair’s side of the new property line in order to appease the Plaintiff in that regard. Adding further insult to injury to Blair, who suffered from severe Parkinson’s Disease, Luckring demanded that when Blair cut the tall grass and weeds on the 13-inch strip of his property on Luckring’s side of the fence, such work must be accomplished without setting foot on her land. She offered to cut the grass and weeds herself, but only if Blair granted her an easement to that additional piece of his property.

The appellate court enforced the settlement agreement by ordering Luckring to move the fence to the boundary line of the respective properties at her own expense.

Luckring appealed.

Held:    The enforcement of the settlement agreement was upheld.

The appellate panel noted with disdain that after Blair applied for a building permit for the fence in May 2013, Luckring made multiple calls to Haverford Township officials to note her opposition to the fence despite having agreed in the settlement not to oppose in any manner the erection of the fence and to waive any and all objections thereto. She also erected signs on her property pointing in the direction of Blair’s residence saying “No Trespassing,” and put up a sign on her property order-ing the fence company not to install the fence all the way to the sidewalk, contrary to Blair’s in-structions. She also initiated a verbal confrontation with Mary Blair, in which she accused the Blairs of being “too cheap to get their own survey”, even though the settlement agreement required Luckring to bear the expense; and she hammered stakes into the ground on Blair’s property and – after the fence was built – she entered the Blair’s property to “wash” the brand new fence.

The Court noted that when Luckring was asked at the hearing to expound upon her belief that the parties must strictly adhere to the terms of their settlement agreement regarding the need to care for the portion of the Blair’s land outside the fence line and abutting her property, she replied that, if the caretaker stepped on her property during this process, he would be trespassing and that she would sue.

The Court concluded that a “mere cursory review of the Plaintiff’s pleadings and her own testimony at the Hearing on the Defendant’s Petition to Enforce Settlement adduces an ongoing pattern of bullying of a Defendant who granted her the moon and the stars in acquiescing to her unceasing demands, and yet was confronted with demands for more. The parties’ Settlement Agreement and Release provided for a fence to be built by the Defendant on his side of the new boundary line of the neighboring properties, albeit without trespassing on the Plaintiff’s land. A reasonable interpre-tation of this requirement would result in the edge of the fence being placed on the edge of the Plaintiff’s new property line and not crossing this point of demarcation. Moreover, the momentary intrusion involved in its construction would be of no concern whatsoever with regard to the fence contractor’s presence on the Plaintiff’s side of the boundary line in order to complete the effort. However, the Plaintiff took the extreme position that enforcement of these provisions must be strict, and refused to permit the fence installer to step on her property to undertake its construction in the place designated by the Defendant in express accordance with the parties’ stipulated Agreement. As a result, the fence contractor took it upon itself to erect the structure thirteen inches inside the Defendant’s side of the boundary line, instead of on the line itself, in order to placate the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff then added to this mix of unreasonableness and bad faith by complaining that the Defendant’s landscaper was stepping on her property when clearing weeds and high grass growing on the thirteen inch strip on her side of the fence that remained in the ownership and possession of the Defendant.”

Calling Luckring’s conduct “obdurate and [in] bad faith,” the Court concluded that Luckring had not acted in good faith, and the trial court’s order that she pay to move the fence “ was warranted and necessary to achieve justice in this case.”

Case of the Day – Thursday, July 23, 2015

CHUTZPAH, CONNECTICUT STYLE

You like your wild mountain property, with its clean, sparkling streams and majestic trees. You like to think that it will always look as pristine and undeveloped as it does right now. To make certain, when you finally sell it, you place some restrictions on the deed, so that there won’t be any double-wide trailers, pre-fab A-frame chalets or tar paper shanties.

Seems reasonable, doesn’t it? But eventually the people you sold the land to sell it to someone else, and the someone else has a really good lawyer. “This is Connecticut!” the solicitor tells his client. “We can beat this restriction!”

And lo and behold, that’s just what he does. It seems in Connecticut, the terms on which you were originally willing to sell your land don’t much matter. In today’s case, the heirs of the original nature-lovin’ owner suffered a lot of angst when they finally sold off most of the lake property. But the buyer won them over, even agreeing to a development restriction on part of the land, in order to preserve its natural character. A few years later, that buyer sold the land to the Williams, who had been convinced by their lawyer that the restriction wasn’t enforceable. The new owners promptly sued for a declaratory judgment that the restriction was void.

The Connecticut court agreed that it was. It fell outside of the three traditional categories of restrictions that ran with the land. Even so, the Court said, it could be enforced under equitable principles. But it wouldn’t do that, the Court said, because it would be so unfair to the buyers of the land. After all, the Court said, it wasn’t clear who the beneficiary of the restriction was or who could enforce it. Therefore, the Court held it would be unfair to the buyers because — and we’re not making this up — they “bought the property because they thought the restriction was unenforceable. If the restriction is found enforceable, the property could only be developed for recreational purposes and would be far less valuable. Devaluing property without a clear beneficiary is not reasonable.”

The decision certainly turns common sense on its head. Where a seller is unwilling to sell unless a restriction is placed on the land, it’s hard to argue that the continuing restriction harms marketability. It’s more marketable than if the seller doesn’t sell at all. And for that matter, should it be the law’s business to promote marketability over a seller’s free will?

It seems safe to imagine that as conservation — and especially forest preservation because of “climate change” concerns — is of increased public policy importance, the notion of “marketability” and the free right to develop may become less of a holy grail. As it probably should.

Williams v. Almquist, 2007 WL 3380299 (Conn. Super., Oct. 30, 2007) (unreported). Robert Bonynge bought a 150-acre tract of land at Lake Waramaug in 1898, which he later conveyed away in several parcels. Although some of the original tract was sold in the 1930s, and some of the heirs owned certain parcels outright, a 105-acre tract was eventually sold to Lee and Cynthia Vance by the Bonynge heirs in 2001. The negotiations for that sale were a difficult and emotional process, with the primary concern of the heirs to conserve the natural condition of the property. The Vances agreed to give some of the land and a conservation easement to the Weantinoge Heritage Land Trust. Also, they agreed a restriction on 8.9 acres of the property: “There shall be no construction or placing of any residential or commercial buildings upon this property provided that non-residential structures of less than 400 square feet may be constructed for recreational or other non-residential purposes and further provided that the property may be used for passive activities such as the installation of septic and water installations, the construction of tennis courts, swimming pools and the construction of facilities for other recreational uses.”

David and Kelly Williams bought part of the 8.9-acre tract in 2005 from the Vances, still still subject to the restriction agreed upon in February 2002. Shortly thereafter, the Williams entered into an agreement with the Vances in which the Vances waived their right to enforce the restriction. The Williams then sued for declaratory judgment against the Bonynge heirs, asking the court to declare the restriction in their deed void and unenforceable.

Held:  The restriction on the Williams’ land is unenforceable. The Court noted that restrictive covenants generally fall into one of three categories: (1) mutual covenants in deeds exchanged by adjoining landowners; (2) uniform covenants contained in deeds executed by the owner of property who is dividing his property into building lots under a general development scheme; and (3) covenants exacted by a grantor from his grantee presumptively or actually for his benefit and protection of his adjoining land which he retains. Here, the restrictive covenant did not fall under the first category because it originally arose from the sale of the Bonynge heirs’ land to the Vances, not from an exchange of covenants between adjoining landowners. Likewise, the second category did not apply. Rather, that category applies under a general developmental scheme, where the owner of property divides it into building lots to be sold by deeds containing substantially uniform restrictions, any grantee may enforce the restrictions against any other grantee. But in this case, the Court ruled, the evidence suggested that a common plan or scheme did not exist.

The restrictive covenant did not fall under the third category either. Where the owner of two adjacent parcels conveys one with a restrictive covenant and retains the other, whether the grantor’s successor in title can enforce, or release, the covenant depends on whether the covenant was made for the benefit of the land retained by the grantor in the deed containing the covenant, and the answer to that question is to be sought in the intention of the parties to the covenant expressed therein, read in light of the circumstances attending the transaction and the object of the grant. The question of intent is determined pursuant to the broader principle that a right to enforce a restriction of this kind will not be inferred to be personal when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant to the land, and that it will generally be construed to have been intended for the benefit of the land, since in most cases it could obviously have no other purpose, the benefit to the grantor being usually a benefit to him as owner of the land, and that, if the adjoining land retained by the grantor is benefitted by the restriction, it will be presumed that it was so intended. Here, three of the Bonynge heirs retained property near the 105-acre tract, but did not own property directly adjoining or overlooking the restricted tract. As such, the Court said, there was no presumption that the restriction was meant to benefit their land. The deed didn’t say as much: in fact, the deed didn’t indicate that the restriction was meant to benefit anyone at all. With no mention of beneficiaries in the deed and no testimony regarding the intent of the retaining landowners, the Court held, the restriction could not fall under the third category.

The trial court said it could properly consider equitable principles in rendering its judgment, consistent with Connecticut’s position favoring liberal construction of the declaratory judgment statute in order to effectuate its sound social purpose.

Although courts before have approved restrictive covenants where they benefited a discernable third party, the Court here found that the restriction was not reasonable because it had no clear beneficiary and limited the marketability of the property. The possible beneficiaries were the Bonynge heirs, only those heirs who retained property in the Lake Waramaug area, the other residents in the Lake Waramaug area, the Vances, or simply nature itself. Without a discernible beneficiary, the Court ruled, it was difficult to determine who could enforce the restriction and for how long.

The restriction also unreasonably limited the marketability of the property. Although restrictions are often disfavored by the law and limited in their implication, restrictive covenants arose in equity as a means to protect the value of property. Here, no identifiable property was being protected by the restriction. The plaintiffs bought the property because they thought the restriction was unenforceable. If the restriction is found enforceable, the property could only be developed for recreational purposes and would be far less valuable. Devaluing property without a clear beneficiary, the Court said, was not reasonable.

Case of the Day – Friday, July 24, 2015

WE GOT YOU COVERED

California homeowner Shelly Albert lived next to grumpy Henri Baccouche. How do we know he was grumpy? You’d be grumpy, too, if your neighbor built a fence over the parties’ common driveway easement, enclosing a grove of nine mature olive trees that stood on your land. Imagine how the Berliners felt when they awakened on the morning of August 13, 1961 to find that their neighbors on the east side of town had built a fence enclosing the Brandenburg Gate, Karl Marx Strasse, and some of the nicer parts of town. That’s how Mr. Baccouche felt.

To make matters worse, Henri fumed, the nine olive trees had been badly damaged by Shelly’s contractors. The workers’ “actions in hacking, cutting and pruning the trees reduced them to a pitiable state.” The contractors had damaged other trees as well, thereby diminishing “the aesthetic and monetary value of those trees . . .” Henri demanded treble damages under Civil Code §§ 733 and 3346, but later expanded his claims to include the alternative claim that Shelly and her people were negligent.

Shelly didn’t bat an eye. She had an insurance policy from Mid-Century Insurance that covered negligence like this. When Henri served his civil action on Shelly, she forwarded a copy to the insurance company. She explained to her insurer that she didn’t believe that any of her fencing encompassed Mr. Baccouche’s property. Plus, she said, the trees that her workers trimmed were “boundary trees,” straddling the property line between the properties. Plus, she explained, she has been notified by the Los Angeles Fire Department to clear the area where the trees were located, as it was within 200 feet of her residence. She had trimmed these same trees year after year, and Mr. Baccouche never told her not to, or that the trees belonged to him. Shelly told her agent that she believed in good faith that the trees were hers, and that she was required to trim them.

Ah, Shelly … your Pollyannish optimism is amusing! But not to the cold-hearted field claims manager, who denied your claim. The insurance company concluded that the claim was barred by the exemption for intentional acts set out in the policy. Insurance policies typically cover losses from negligent acts (you accidentally run over the neighbor’s cat) but not intentional acts (you kick the neighbor’s cat into the next county).

However, maybe Henri left her an out.  In his amended complaint, he claimed that if Shelly didn’t trespass and hack up his trees on purpose, she did so negligently. Shelly reported the amended claims to her insurance carrier. She argued that because she believed that the trees were owned by both parties, they “constitute[] property covered under my policy. Accordingly, [defendant] has an obligation under my policy of insurance to tender a defense on my behalf.”

The insurer did not budge. The company contended that because Shelly admitted she purposefully erected the fence, and had intentionally cut Mr. Baccouche’s trees, the conduct giving rise to Henri’s claims was intentional, and thus not an accident or occurrence within the meaning of the insurance policy. The insurer said its coverage determination had considered the possibility that the trees were solely owned by Shelly, solely by Henri, or were jointly owned. The carrier determined that who owned the trees was irrelevant to the coverage determination because the damage occurred from nonaccidental conduct.

In a  response to the insurer’s July  letter, Shelly took issue with some minor factual assertions in the letter, but did not otherwise claim that the damage to the trees had arisen from any sort of accident within the meaning of the policy.

In a reply, the insurer pointed out that Shelly had not provided any facts addressing defendant’s position that the incident was not an “accident” or “occurrence” within the meaning of the policy.

Shelly sued the insurance company. The trial court concluded that she failed to show “a potential for coverage,” which is what she had to prove in order to get Mid-Century to pay for her legal defense. The judge decided that the Shelly’s conduct alleged in Henri’s lawsuit was nonaccidental and intentional. To the extent the amended complaint alleged “negligent” conduct, Shelly had admitted to the carrier what she had done, and Shelly’s argument that she somehow “negligently supervised” the workers was not supported by Henri’s claims.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court. An insurer owes its insured a broad duty to defend against claims creating a potential for indemnity. This duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, and may exist even if there is doubt about coverage. However, the insurer has no duty to defend where the potential for liability is tenuous and farfetched. The ultimate question is whether the facts alleged in the lawsuit against the insured fairly apprise the insurer that the suit is upon a covered claim.

Shelly’s policy covered property damage resulting from an occurrence, and the policy defines an occurrence as an accident. An intentional act is not an ‘accident’ within the plain meaning of the word. The term “accident” refers to the nature of an insured’s conduct, and not to the unintended consequences of the conduct. An accident does not happen when a insured performs a deliberate act, unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs that produces the damage.

Shelly intended the acts resulting in the damage to Henri’s trees. Her conduct did not become an accident just because she didn’t know the trees belonged to Henri. Her intent was irrelevant; the act was not. Shelly told her workers to trim the trees that got trimmed. Her mistake was in thinking the trees were hers. Her insurance didn’t cover that.

There’s a lesson here for the Henris of the world, too. You lawyer can sometimes get the bit in his or her teeth, writing enraged and cutting complaints against defendants. In this case, it would have been a lot better for Henri’s lawyer to have accused Shelly of gross negligence, or even recklessness. That way, the insurer gets involved. Insurance companies tend to be economic, rational creatures, who are willing to settle when settlement is reasonable, and always have the ability to write a check that’s good.

Albert v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 236 Cal.App.4th 1281, __ Cal.Rptr.3d __ (California Court of Appeals, Second District, Eighth Division, April 28, 2015).  Plaintiff Shelly Albert bought a homeowners insurance policy from Mid-Century in January 2008. The policy was in force in January 2011, when Albert was sued by her neighbor, Henri Baccouche, for damage she caused to his property when she erected an encroaching fence, and pruned nine of Mr. Baccouche’s mature olive trees. Albert asked Mid-Century to defend the suit, and when the insurance company refused, she sued it.

The insuring clause of plaintiff’s policy stated: “We will pay those damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of … property damage resulting from an occurrence. At our expense and with attorneys of our choice, we will defend an insured against any suit seeking damages covered under [this section] . . . We do not have any duty to defend or settle any suit involving actual, alleged, threatened or declared . . . property damage not covered under this liability insurance.” The policy defines an “occurrence” as “an accident, including exposure to conditions, which occurs during the policy period, and which results in . . . property damage . . . during the policy period. Repeated or continuous exposure to the same general conditions is considered to be one occurrence.” The policy also set forth a number of exclusions, including one for “intentional acts,” which the policy defined as “property damage . . . which is caused by, arises out of or is the result of an intentional act by or at the direction of the insured.” By way of example this includes but is not limited to any intentional act or intentional failure to act by an insured, whether a criminal act or otherwise, where resulting injury or damage would be objectively expected to a high degree of likelihood, even if not subjectively intended or expected.”

Mr. Baccouche’s complaint alleged that he and Albert, his neighbor, owned adjacent parcels of land which were subject to a reciprocal roadway easement providing both parcels access to the main public road. He said Albert erected a permanent fence over a portion of the roadway easement, which also intruded onto his parcel. The fence enclosed a 644 square foot portion of Mr. Baccouche’s land, which included a grove of nine mature olive trees. He claimed Albert and her contractors “willfully and maliciously damaged [the] nine mature olive trees . . . by severely hacking cutting and pruning those trees so as to greatly reduce their canopies, foliage, limbs, etc., without permission.” The complaint sought treble damages under Civil Code §§ 733 and 3346.

Mr. Baccouche later amended his complaint, alleging a cause of action for negligent damage to his trees.

The insurance company investigated the claims. Albert asserted that the fence she erected was within her property line, and said she not believe any of her fencing encompassed Baccouche’s property. As to the trees at issue in Mr. Baccouche’s complaint, Albert asserted that the trees were “boundary trees” and that the trunks of the trees essentially straddled the property line between Mr. Baccouche’s and her properties. She told the insurance company that since she purchased her lot, she has been notified by the Los Angeles Fire Department to clear the area where the trees were located, as it was within 200 feet of her residence. She trimmed these same trees year after year, without complaint from. Baccouche.

The  carrier denied coverage, concluding that the conduct complained of by Baccouche was intentional conduct by Albert. Albert argued that because she had the trees trimmed in the good faith belief she owned them, “ . . . no intentional tort will lie.” Albert then sent Mid-Century a “demand for tender of defense,” which the carrier denied.  Albert took issue with the insurer’s position, but did not otherwise claim that the damage to the trees had arisen from any sort of accident within the meaning of the policy.

Albert then sued Mid-Century. The trial court granted the carrier’s motion to deny coverage. The court ruled that Albert had failed to demonstrate a potential for coverage, as the conduct at issue in Baccouche’s lawsuit was nonaccidental, intentional conduct. The trial court also concluded that to the extent Mr. Baccouche’s complaint alleged “negligent” conduct by plaintiff, there was no evidence whatsoever that the trees were injured in some accident, “e.g. by inadvertently striking a tree with a motor vehicle.” The trial court also concluded that Mr. Baccouche’s pleadings did not support plaintiff’s “negligent supervision” theory.

Albert appealed.

Held: Mid-Century was not obligated to defend Albert. The Court observed that an insurer owes its insured a broad duty to defend against claims creating a potential for indemnity. While the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, and may exist even if there is doubt about coverage, the proper focus is on the facts alleged in the complaint, rather than the alleged theories for recovery. The ultimate question is whether the facts alleged ‘fairly apprise’ the insurer that the suit is upon a covered claim.”

Here, the policy covers property damage resulting from an occurrence, and the policy defines an occurrence as an accident. Under California law, the word ‘accident’ in the coverage clause of a liability policy refers to the conduct of the insured for which liability is sought to be imposed on the insured. The Ciourt held that an intentional act is not an ‘accident’ within the plain meaning of the word.” It said, rather that in the context of liability insurance, an accident is “an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from either a known or an unknown cause.”

“Accident” refers to the nature of the insured’s conduct, and not to its unintended consequences. It is not an “accident” when the insured performs a deliberate act unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs that produces the damage. When an insured intends the acts resulting in the injury or damage, it is not an accident “merely because the insured did not intend to cause injury. The insured’s subjective intent is irrelevant.”

Nevertheless, the Court said, coverage is not always precluded when the insured’s intentional acts result in injury or damage. An accident may exist “when any aspect in the causal series of events leading to the injury or damage was unintended by the insured and a matter of fortuity.” When a driver intentionally speeds and, as a result, negligently hits another car, the speeding would be an intentional act. However, the act directly responsible for the injury – hitting the other car – was not intended by the driver and was fortuitous. In that case, the occurrence resulting in injury would be deemed an accident. On the other hand, where the driver was speeding and deliberately hit the other car, the act directly responsible for the injury – hitting the other car – would be intentional and any resulting injury would be directly caused by the driver’s intentional act.” 

Albert argued that although she deliberately hired a contractor to trim the trees, the excessive cutting was not an intended consequence, and should be deemed an accident. However, it is completely irrelevant that Albert did not intend to damage the trees, because she intended for them to be pruned. Moreover, it is undisputed that the contractor intended to cut the trees, and absolutely no facts exist – in the complaint or otherwise – indicating that some unforeseen accident (such as a slip of the chainsaw) caused the damage to the trees. In fact, it was always Albert’s position that the trees had not been damaged or pruned excessively (and therefore were not subject to an accident), and that they had been cut in accordance to the City’s brush clearance ordinance. An insured may not trigger the duty to defend by speculating about extraneous ‘facts’ regarding potential liability or ways in which the third party claimant might amend its complaint at some future date.”

Also, the Court said, no facts supported Albert’s theory that her negligent supervision of the contractors brings the complaint within the terms of the policy. Negligent supervision requires an employer supervising an employee; who is incompetent or unfit; the employer had reason to believe undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment; and the harm occurs. There are simply no facts, in the complaint or otherwise, supporting the elements of this claim.

Under any view of the facts, the Court ruled, the trimming of the trees was no accident. Albert failed to carry her burden to show any of Mr. Baccouche’s claims may fall within the scope of the policy.

Case of the Day – Monday, July 27, 2015

EASEMENT CREEP

It’s a common enough problem when a deal gets cut by people who later leave the company, retire, pass on, whatever. Over the years newer, younger Turks come along, who redefine the deal to suit the newer aims and needs of the company.

So it was with some gas line easements in the Mohican forest area of eastern Ohio. We’ve discussed previously why a careful description of the bounds of an easement is such a good idea. Here’s another example. When the easements for these three gas pipelines were written, they didn’t contain any description of the width of the right-of-way being provided to the easement holder. Over the first 40 years or so, the gas company kept the right-of-way cleared to 10 or 15 feet. But in 2003, the company suddenly decided it required 20 to 25 feet, and it began cutting accordingly. Even that wasn’t enough, and so in 2006, the gas company sued a church camp and some other recreational landowners for a declaratory ruling that the easement was really 50 feet wide.

The Federal district court denied summary judgment to the gas company. The gas company’s argument, reduced to its essence, was that it must obey new, stiffer federal laws and regulations in the wake of 9/11, and those require a 50-foot wide easement. The court wasn’t buying it. Finding no language to help it in the easements themselves, the court looked at other factors. It seemed pretty clear that nothing in the way the gas company had operated for 40 years or so supported a finding that the parties understood all along that they were dealing with a 50-foot wide easement. The gas company’s arguments that its operations required 50 feet failed — the court said the best it could justify based on the evidence was 29 feet wide. And the court was troubled that the gas company had met with the church in 1965, when the church was buying the campground, and told church representatives that it was looking at a 10-15 foot right-of-way. Thirty-eight years later, it told the church it needed a 20-25 foot wide easement.  

Sometimes, you have to dance with the girl who brung ya … 

None of this meant that after a full trial, the court might not feel differently. But for moment, it was David 1, Goliath 0. And – reading the handwriting on the wall – Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. ended the litigation several months later.

Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. First Congregational Church, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 4350769 (N.D. Ohio, Dec. 11, 2007). Columbia Gas owned three gas pipelines that traverse the Church’s camping retreat property. Two of the easements had been granted by the Muskingum Conservancy District, the Church’s predecessor-in-interest, providing the right to ingress and egress, the right to lay, maintain, operate, repair, replace and remove the pipe, provided the pipe would be buried so as not to interfere with the cultivation of the land. A second easement had been granted for the sole purpose of drilling for oil and gas and to use the premises for pipelines, water lines, pumps, tanks, structures and stations necessary or convenient in connection with drilling, provided that the pipelines be buried and the easement holder pay for all damages to growing crops and trees. When the Church bought the campground in 1965, gas company representatives showed the clergymen the clearings for the pipelines, which were between 10 and 15 feet wide. In 2003, the gas company expanded its cleared right-of-way to 20 to 25 feet. Three years later, the gas company told a church member it owned a 50-foot right of way, and asserted that the Department of Homeland Security required this for gas pipelines. The gas company cleared all the trees within 50 feet of one of the pipelines without informing the church of its intention. The gas company dumped brush piles in excess of 55 feet from the centerline of of the pipeline, needlessly changing the topography of the area. Shortly thereafter, the gas company sued the church for injunctive relief that its easement entitled it to clear a 50-foot right-of-way on a second pipeline. The church wasn’t alone: several other landowners were sued as well, and the court consolidated all of the cases. The Church filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory judgments and injunctive relief that Columbia Gas was not entitled to a 50-foot right-of-way in its easements for its pipelines, and sought damages from the previous tree clearing along the one pipeline. Columbia Gas moved for summary judgment.

Held: The gas company’s motion was denied. Under Ohio law, the granting of an easement includes a grant of all things necessary for the use and enjoyment of the easement. Where the complete terms of the easement are not expressed in the instrument granting it, the extent and limitation of the easement are ascertained from the language of the grant, from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and by what is reasonably necessary and convenient to serve the purpose for which the easement was granted. The holder of an easement may not increase the burden upon the servient estate by engaging in a new or additional use of the easement. However, without specific language to the contrary, an easement holder is entitled to vary the mode of enjoyment and use of the easement by availing himself of modern inventions if by doing so he can more freely exercise the purpose for which the grant was made.

Here, the easement agreements were ambiguous at best, and provided no basis for determining what the parties had intended. As to what is reasonable, it is true that the gas company has a duty to maintain its storage pipelines in accordance with federal law. It has a policy of not allowing any growth more than five feet tall within the right-of-way. However, its evidence of use of the easement and of hazard to pipelines from tree roots supports a clearing of only about 29 feet at most. Furthermore, Ohio courts have also looked to use and acquiescence and have refused to extend easements to fifty feet where the gas company has allowed mature trees growing within fifty feet of the pipeline. Here, even if the regulations suggested a fifty-foot wide clearing were necessary, the Court said, the parties never contemplated such a right-of-way at the time of the granting of the easement. The gas company argued that 50 feet is necessary for it to conduct aerial patrol. The Court said presumed that the parties contemplated normal developmental changes in the use of the easement, nothing in the evidence ever suggested that anyone contemplated a 50-foot right-of-way.

The parties’ experts’ discussions of the relevant safety issues is only one issue among many that the Court was willing to consider in determining the dimensions and scope of the easement. The Court also considered the language of the grants and the circumstances surrounding the transactions. Neither of those entitled the gas company to a judgment as a matter of law.

Finally, the Church argued that the Plaintiff should be estopped from arguing a larger easement than 25 feet is reasonably necessary and convenient, because it not only used a small right-of-way in the past, but its representative affirmatively showed the Church’s representative the clearings of the trees so that the Church would know what to expect — showing him clearings of 10 feet, occasionally increasing to 15 feet in width. Further, in 2003, the gas company told a member of the Church it needed 25 feet, not 50. The Court said these conversations and interactions, coupled with the gas company’s failure to remove mature trees until now, might demonstrate enough evidence of use and acquiescence to estop the gas company from arguing for 50 feet.

Case of the Day – Tuesday, July 28, 2015

WHO ARE YOU GOING TO BELIEVE – ME OR YOUR OWN EYES?

Judges actually go to judges school to learn cool, judge-related things. Not the law … they already know about the law, or they know how to look it up. Instead, judges learn really practical things — such as how to tell when a witness is lying.

And how can you tell when a witness is lying? No, not when his or her lips move. That’s too easy. But judges learn how to watch for signs — and they don’t tell us in the great unwashed what those signs are — that a witness may be dissembling. Dissembling: a great euphemism for lying.

In today’s case, two New York neighbors had a common fence. On the Zeltsers’ side of the fence was a one-foot wide strip of land between the fence and the driveway. It had been there for a long time. The Zeltsers took care of the strip, planted trees and shrubs, enclosed it from the street and even paved part of it. But in 2003, the Sacerdotes had a survey done and found, lo and behold, the strip belonged to them. They tore down the fence and cut down the trees. The Zeltsers sued.

The trial court found, on the crucial issue, that the Zeltsers had used the one-foot wide strip openly, continuously and exclusively from 1987 to 2003. The Sacerdotes argued that there had been evidence — testimony from the Sacerdotes — that showed otherwise. But the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court — which had been in “a unique position to assess the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses” — resolved that issue in favor of the Zeltsers.

Generally, appellate courts will not disturb credibility findings of a trial court. The trial judge, after all, with his keen eye for prevaricators (a euphemism for dissemblers, see above), can smell testimony that gives off the reek of tergiversation — and the appellate court wasn’t about to question what the trial court had decided.

There is undoubtedly a good backstory here, one we’ll never know. The Zeltsers were awarded the one-foot strip by adverse possession, so it’s a cinch the judge believed them.   In fact, all of the physical evidence – the old fence, the trees planted by the Seltzers, the asphalt and the edging – made this a pretty open and shut case.  

The only evidence to the contrary was the Sacerdotes’ testimony.  It was rather self-serving testimony at that.  The self-serving nature doesn’t make it wrong, but it sure makes it suspect.  

The Zeltsers won rights to the foot-wide strip.  In the process, they lost any chance that they’d be invited to a Sacerdote picnic any time soon.  

Zeltser v. Sacerdote, 860 N.Y.S.2d 624, 52 A.D.3d 824 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2008).  The Zeltsers and the Sacerdotes owned adjoining residential properties. When the Sacerdotes purchased their property in 1987, an existing fence — covered in rose bushes and vines — ran parallel with their property line from the street to a garage in the rear for about 100 feet. A small strip of dirt, about a foot wide was sandwiched between the fence and the Zeltsers’ driveway. The Zeltsers believed that the strip — which was on their side of the fence — belonged to them. They planted trees on the strip, trimmed the bushes and vines on the fence, and installed a row of bricks as an edging. They installed a fence that enclosed the front portion of the strip, making it inaccessible from the street, and they laid asphalt on the strip between their garage and the Sacerdotes’ garage, both of which were on the back portion of the respective properties.

It turned out that title to the one-foot strip was held by the Sacerdotes.  They never mentioned that to the Zeltsers, and may have been uncertain about it themselves,  until they had a property survey done in 2003.  After the survey, the Sacerdotes removed the fence and the trees.  

The Zeltsers sued to quiet title to the disputed strip, based on their claim of adverse possession.

Held: The Zeltsers had become owners of the strip of land by adverse possession. The Court observed that a party claiming title by adverse possession – rather than a written instrument – must show that the parcel was either regularly cultivated, or improved or protected by a substantial enclosure.  Additionally, the party must satisfy the common-law requirements demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the possession of the parcel was hostile, under claim of right, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for the statutory period of 10 years.

The trial court properly found that the Zeltsers had established that they met both the statutory and common-law requirements of adverse possession. The trial court’s findings relied substantially on its perception of the credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate court was not willing to disturb those findings. The Court said that the evidence established that the Zeltsers openly used and maintained the disputed strip from 1987 until 2003.

The Sacerdotes argued that there was conflicting evidence as to whether the Zeltsers’ possession of the disputed property was exclusive. However, the trial court — which, the Court observed, “was in a unique position to assess the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses” — resolved that issue in favor of the Zeltsers, and the appellate court wasn’t about to disturb the finding.  

Case of the Day – Wednesday, July 29, 2015

CONTEMPTUOUS NEIGHBORS

Contempt of court is the mechanism by which a court enforces compliance with its orders. Punishment can range from a reprimand to jail time. Regardless of whether the contempt is civil or criminal, it’s something that litigants and lawyers would agree is best avoided.

Some people, like George Reece and Gerry Smith, just can’t help themselves. The neighbors squabbled for years over boundaries and an old hemlock tree. Finally, in 2005, they buried the hatchet, agreeing to a settlement where Reece gave Smith some property, and Smith gave Reece some property. The settlement specifically provided that Reece got property next to a pond that included his beloved hemlock tree.

So much for congeniality. It wasn’t long before they were back at it. Smith accused Reece of trespassing, harassing him, assaulting him, and diverting rainwater to flood Smith’s land. Reece countered that Smith had cut down his beautiful hemlock and destroyed a custom wrought-iron gate. The court threw up its hands, found them both in contempt and sent them off to jail for 20 days – presumably not as cellmates – to contemplate their misdeeds.

Both of them appealed. The Court of Appeals sided with Smith for procedural reasons, holding that the act of asking that the other party be held in contempt was a motion, not a new civil action. That being the case, Reece wasn’t entitled to counterclaim for contempt himself. If he felt strongly enough about the destroyed gate and hemlock tree, Reece could file his own motion for contempt, or start a separate lawsuit for trespass to trees.

It’s a cinch that Reece probably felt strongly about it after 20 days in jail, and it seems to us rather hyper-technical of the court not to consider Reese’s misstyled counterclaim to be a motion for show cause to hold Smith in contempt. To do so would have been more efficient, as well as a triumph of substance over form.

Reece v. Smith, 292 Ga.App. 875, 665 S.E.2d 918 (Ga.App. 2008). This case was the last in a series of appeals resulting from several years of litigation between Gerry Smith and George Reece, who live next door to each other (but obviously not in harmony).

Smith and Reece repeatedly petitioned the court to intervene in a property-line dispute. In 2005, they entered into a settlement agreement in which they agreed to get an accurate survey of the disputed property and, based upon the survey, to convey portions of their property to each other in settlement of the long-running dispute. Smith specifically agreed that certain property next to a pond would belong to Reece and that this property included a tall hemlock tree. The court entered a final order approving the settlement agreement, ordering the parties to comply with it “in every respect.”

Two years later, Smith asked the court to hold Reece in contempt of the agreement. Smith said Reece had trespassed on his property several times, had threatened and hit him, and had caused rainwater to flow onto his property. Reece denied it and asked the court to hold Smith in contempt, saying that Smith cut down the hemlock tree, destroyed a wrought iron gate Reece had erected across his driveway, interfered with the surveyors, removed pins marking the property lines, blocked the access roads to his property, and stalked and harassed him and his guests. Reece asked for damages for the destruction of the hemlock tree and the gate.

The trial court found that each of them had committed some of the acts alleged and ordered them to serve 20 days in jail and pay a fine. The court also ordered Smith to pay Reece $5,000 in damages for cutting the hemlock tree, but it denied Reece’s claim for damage to the gate, ruling that he hadn’t presented sufficient evidence on the value of the gate.

Both parties appealed.

Held:   The Court upheld the jail sentence against , but reversed Reece’s counterclaim. In order to find criminal contempt, there must be a showing of willful disregard or disobedience of the order or command of the court. The sentences and fines should be affirmed if there is sufficient evidence to find that a party committed at least one of the contumacious acts listed in the court’s order.

Smith’s testimony that an adjoining owner had constructed his driveway in such a manner that it caused rainwater to dump onto Smith’s property, had trespassed and threatened him, and drove into a sand pile in Smith’s front yard was sufficient to support the court’s finding that Reece was in contempt of the court’s previous order relating to the settlement.

The contempt remedy is part of the judiciary’s inherent power to enforce its orders. As such, an action for contempt is ancillary to the primary action and is characterized as a motion and not a pleading. Because it is not a complaint, an application for contempt may not, standing alone, serve to commence a civil action for damages.

Therefore, Reece could not file a counterclaim for contempt or obtain an order requiring Smith to pay $5,000 in damages for cutting the hemlock tree. However, he could file a separate suit in superior court for damages resulting from destruction of the hemlock tree and wrought iron gate.

Case of the Day – Thursday, July 30, 2015

SHUT MY MOUTH!

When the Harrises moved in back about 1956, they thought their land extended back well beyond where it actually did. They tended to their land – including the part they thought was theirs but wasn’t – planting flowers, mowing the lawn, and finally nurturing a beautiful break of pine trees along what they thought was the property line.

The Harrises eventually sold the land to their granddaughter, Melissa Watts-Sanders. She likewise believed that the land went back to the trees, and she maintained it as though she owned (which she thought she did). Making her own improvements, she installed a dog pen on the disputed property.

Or perhaps we should we say “soon-to-be disputed property.” Because it seems she had a new neighbor, Mindy Chambliss. Ms. Chambliss did things right. Among those right things was her hiring of a surveyor. The surveyor unsurprisingly found that the land with the dog pen on it really belonged to Mindy.

Ms. Chambliss was not a lawyer (or much of a speller, which is a rapidly-dying art in this day and age). However, she knew some impressive-sounding legal terms – “cease and desist” being among them – so she wrote Ms. Watts-Sanders a missive demanding that she “cease and desist” with the dog pen, and claiming the property she believed to be rightfully hers. In the letter, Ms. Chambliss officiously explained that her survey “does superscede [sic] the fact that the property was maintained for 49 years.”

Maybe it was the spelling. Whatever the reason, Ms. Watts-Sanders was not suitably cowed by the letter, so Ms. Chambliss sued. When she did, Ms. Watts-Sanders defended by arguing that a new boundary line had been established over the years by acquiescence. Nonsense, said Ms. Chambliss. Pine trees did not a boundary make, and none of Ms. Watts-Sanders’ predecessors had ever expressed an intention to occupy the land. And, Ms. Chambliss said, proudly showing her “cease and desist” letter to the Court, she had told Ms. Watts-Sanders about the surveyor’s findings.

‘Say what?’ the court asked, looking at the letter. ‘You mean Ms. Watts-Sanders and her people had maintained the property for 49 years?’ Well, the Court said – notwithstanding Ms. Chambliss’s opinion – that really did mean something. In fact, given that Watts-Sanders and her predecessors people maintained and used the land for half a decade without any complaint from Chambliss’s predecessors, the case was pretty compelling that someone had acquiesced to the pine tree boundary.

The lesson here? Clients, let your lawyers be your mouthpiece. Ms. Chambliss’s smug “explanation” of what trumped what turned out to be an admission against her own interests, and ended up being a pretty costly law lecture.

Chambliss v. Watts-Sanders, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2008-AR-0131.003, 2008 WL 241288 (Ark.App., Jan. 30, 2008). Ms. Chambliss and Ms. Watts-Sanders share a common backyard boundary. The dispute began after Ms. Chambliss ordered a survey which showed that Ms. Watts-Sanders had built a dog pen on Ms. Chambliss’s land. Ms. Watts-Sanders claimed property up to a row of pine trees planted on the disputed tract, but those trees were 23 feet east of the surveyed boundary line. Ms. Chambliss demanded that Ms. Watts-Sanders remove the dog pen, claiming to Ms. Watts-Sanders in writing that her survey superseded the fact that Watts-Sanders maintained the property for 49 years.

The property formerly belonged to Watts-Sanders’ grandparents, Vivian and Loren Harris. The Harrises bought the property in 1956 and built a house there. They later planted the pine trees and developed the flower bed toward the rear of the property. Mr. Harris cut the grass between the flower bed and the pine trees and that he treated the pine trees as the boundary between the two properties. No one except the Harrises used the disputed area since 1956. Ms. Watts-Sanders received the deed to the property from her grandmother in 2004. She noted that the pine trees were planted as close to in a line as possible and that the trees marked the boundary line between the properties.

Ms. Chambliss purchased her property in 2003, and thought her land went to the concrete edging of the flowerbed. She was unaware that Ms. Watts-Sanders claimed possession of the disputed property until she placed the dog pen. Ms. Chambliss claimed that she had maintained the disputed property since purchasing it in 2003 and that she never saw Watts-Sanders on the property. The trial court found that Watts-Sanders had established the row of trees as the boundary by acquiescence and quieted title to the disputed property in her name. It also awarded her $250 in damages for the cost of rebuilding the dog pen. Ms. Chambliss appealed.

Held: The decision in favor of Ms. Watts-Sanders was upheld. Ms. Chambliss argued that the tree line was not a physical and permanent boundary, there was no evidence that Watts-Sanders’ predecessors occupied the disputed property, and there was no proof that any of Watts-Sanders’s predecessors-in-interest took any actions to indicate that the disputed land belonged to them.

The Court noted that the mere existence of a fence or some other line, without evidence of mutual recognition, cannot sustain a finding of boundary by acquiescence. However, silent acquiescence is sufficient, and the boundary line usually can inferred from the parties’ conduct over so many years. A party trying to prove that a boundary line has been established by acquiescence need only show that both parties at least tacitly accepted the non-surveyed line as the true boundary line.

Here, the Court said, the law merely required the boundary line to be some monument tacitly accepted as visible evidence of a dividing line, and the row of pine trees sufficed. The evidence was sufficient to show that Ms. Watts-Sanders and the Harrises occupied the disputed area, including evidence that Mr. Harris planted the pine trees and Ms. Chambliss’s own ill-advised admission that Ms. Watts-Sanders and the Harrises had maintained the disputed tract for forty-nine years.

Finally, evidence showed that only Ms. Watts-Sanders and her predecessors used the disputed tract. A boundary by acquiescence exists in cases where one party has used land belonging to another and the true landowner did nothing to assert his interest. Here, Ms. Watts-Sanders’ family’s use of the property remained undisturbed for almost 50 years. No one objected when her mother had one of the trees removed. Acquiescence can result from the silent conduct of the parties, and the fact that none of appellant’s predecessors used the property east of the tree line could be seen as tacit acceptance of the tree line as the boundary between the two properties.

Case of the Day – Friday, July 31, 2015

THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF HOWELL, MICHIGAN

Like many American cities, the City of Howell, Michigan requires its property owners to keep their lawns mowed below a certain height. Violators of the ordinance are charged a fine as well as a fee for the costs associated with hiring a private contractor to mow or otherwise maintain the property. Such an ordinance, of course, occupies the same moral plane as laws that lock up three generations of families in a labor camp for life because somebody’s uncle tried to leave the country.

Or so David Shoemaker, a Howell homeowner, would have you believe. He complains that such an ordinance “makes the City look like North Korea rather than an American city.” Kim Jong Eun would be amused … or, if he was not, he’d have David shot to pieces with an anti-aircraft gun.

It seems that Shoemaker and his daughter planted a maple tree in their tree lawn, that strip of grass between the sidewalk and the street. The maple flourished for a few years, until the City came along to widen the curb. City workers hacked down the tree, and – when Shoemaker complained – they imperiously told him there was nothing he could do about it, because the City owned the tree lawn. Later, the same workers planted nine saplings in the tree lawn, and guy-wired them to a fare-thee-well.

Shoemaker was incensed, and he figured to get even. If the tree lawn was the City’s property, he reasoned, then city worker could just jolly well cut the grass on the tree lawn. He wasn’t going to do it. So Shoemaker stopped mowing the strip between the sidewalk and the street.

In North Korea, it’s illegal to name a baby “Kim Jong-Eun” (like anyone would want to). According to Shoemaker, Howell has an equally irrational and stupid ordinance, one that prohibits the owner or occupant of any lot in the City from “maintain[ing] on any such lot … any growth of weeds, grass or other rank vegetation to a greater height than eight inches.” The ordinance explicitly applies to any land “along the sidewalk, street or alley adjacent to the same between the property line and the curb.” Shoemaker’s act of civil disobedience promptly ran into a city inspector, who cited him under the ordinance when the grass in the tree lawn got to be high enough to harvest.

No doubt the city inspector wanted to throw Shoemaker and his daughter into the gulag. But he was limited to fining Shoemaker, and charging him for the cost of mowing the lawn. After several infractions and city-sponsored mowings, Shoemaker was billed for $600.00 by the City.

Shoemaker filed suit against the City in federal court, asserting that Howell had violated both his procedural and substantive due process rights. Amazingly (to us), the district court granted summary judgment for Shoemaker on both claims. But down at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, cooler heads prevailed.

Shoemaker argued that the City ordinance requiring him to mow the tree lawn violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. The Court held that while the citation for violating the ordinance didn’t expressly state appeal rights, the imposition on a property owner was so slight, a property owner was given a chance to avoid the fine by cutting the grass after the citation was served, and the standards of the ordinance – grass in excess of 8 inches high – were pretty straightforward. Anything you can settle with a yardstick isn’t very complex. The Court was not about to turn the fairly simple citation into a procedural due process violation.

Shoemaker claimed the statute violated his substantive due process rights as well. For those of you who had constitutional law right after lunch, and consequently fell asleep in a warm classroom with a full stomach, “substantive due process” is the doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed.” Which deprivations? Well, it “depends on the nature of the right being deprived.” Specifically, “[g]overnment actions that do not affect fundamental rights … will be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”

There … that’s clear. If you had stayed awake in Con Law, and taken good notes, you might be nonetheless be forgiven for thinking that “fundamental rights” are what Justice Potter Stewart was thinking of when quipped about pornography in Jacobellis v. Ohio: “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it …”

What interested us about this decision was Shoemaker’s insistence that the tree lawn was owned by the City of Howell, and not by him. He said a city worker had told him that, and thus the matter was settled. The Sixth Circuit, not a court to take a litigant’s word for it, examined Michigan law on the topic.

The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of Shoemaker because the City owned the tree lawn in front of Shoemaker’s house, and “the right not to be forced by a municipal government to maintain municipal property” is a fundamental one. The ordinance infringed on that basic right.

Nonsense, the Court of Appeals said. Whitle Michigan cities possess “nominal” title to land designated for public use, the private property owners retain the usual rights of the proprietor. This relationship, the Court said, “reflects the reality that homeowners like Shoemaker have a special interest in the curb strips adjacent to their houses because these strips of land are, for all practical purposes, simply extensions of the homeowners’ lawns. The curb strips also provide a traffic and safety buffer between the street and the rest of the property. In other words, despite the City’s right of way over the curb strip for public use, Shoemaker retained both his property interest in and de facto use of the land in question.’

As for Shoemaker’s hyperbolic comparison of Howell’s lawn-cutting ordinance to Korea, the Court dryly observed that the notion “should come as a surprise to the citizens of both nations. On the one hand, North Korea is a totalitarian regime that notoriously tortures criminal defendants, executes non-violent offenders, and sends those accused of political offenses to forced labor camps. On the other hand, laws like Howell’s lawn-trimming ordinance “are ubiquitous from coast to coast.”

Shoemaker v. City of Howell, Case No. 13-2535 (6th Cir., July 28, 2015). Shoemaker and his minor daughter lived on East Sibley Street in Howell, Michigan, for 9 years. Early on, they planted a maple tree in the tree lawn, that strip of grass between the sidewalk and street.

During this time, the City undertook a citywide project to refurbish and landscape its streets. East Sibley Street next to the Shoemaker residence was among the areas where work was done. The City removed the Shoemakers’ maple tree replaced it with nine saplings. Shoemaker claims that when he protested the tree’s removal, City workers told him “that’s not your property, you have no say on what goes in or out of there.” Upset by the City’s unilateral remodeling of the curb strip, Shoemaker chose to protest the City’s actions via civil disobedience: he stopped mowing the curb strip.

The City received a complaint about Shoemaker’s uncut tree lawn. Based on the complaint, City Code Inspector Donahue visited the residence and left a door-hanger notice informing Shoemaker that his lawn was in violation of City Code § 622.02, which requires property owners and occupants to maintain the vegetation on their land. The Ordinance prohibits the owner or occupant of any lot in the City from “maintain[ing] on any such lot.., any growth of weeds, grass or other rank vegetation to a greater height than eight inches,” and applies to any land “along the sidewalk, street or alley adjacent to the same between the property line and the curb.” A violation of the Ordinance subjects the responsible party to fines.

On August 4, 2011, Donahue noticed vegetation that was taller than eight inches on the curb strip in front of Shoemaker’s house. As before, Donahue left a door-hanger notice informing Shoemaker of the violation and mailed another Notice of Ordinance Violation. He returned to the property on the next day to find that, although the lawn had been freshly mowed, the grass on the curb strip remained in excess of the Ordinance’s limitation.

Shoemaker told Donahue that he would not mow the curb strip because he had been told by City employees that the area was the City’s property and not his own. Donahue insisted that the property did in fact belong to Shoemaker. Shoemaker asked to be ticketed for the violation in order to challenge the Ordinance in court. Shoemaker was charged a total of $600 for his violations of the Ordinance, including $300 in grass-cutting services and $300 in fines.

Shoemaker filed suit against the City, asserting violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Shoemaker, finding that the City owned the curb strip in front of Shoemaker’s house, that “the right not to be forced by a municipal government to maintain municipal property” is a fundamental one, and the Ordinance “unconstitutionally infringes” on that right.

The City of Howell appealed.

Held:  The City did not violate Shoemaker’s procedural due process rights because it provided him with ample notice of the violation and an adequate opportunity to be heard. The City did not violate his substantive due process right, because Shoemaker continued to own the tree lawn, subject only to certain rights the City had to use the area for permissible purposes.

The Court weighed several factors in deciding exactly how much procedural process was due Shoemaker, including whether a private interest is affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of rights, the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards, and the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Clearly, a private interest was affected by the Ordinance, although it was a slight one. The constitution does not require strict adherence to the City’s Ordinances. What it does demand – that the notice as given be reasonably calculated to alert Shoemaker of the charges against him and any avenues available for challenging those charges – was accomplished by the notices distributed by the City, which explained what he had to do to avoid a fine.

There was little risk of erroneous deprivation under the Ordinance If the vegetation on the land in question is allowed to grow beyond eight inches tall, then the owner or occupier of that land has violated the Ordinance. Due to this objective, readily ascertainable standard, there is little chance of a wrongful application of the law. The ample means of challenging an alleged violation under the laws of the City and the state of Michigan further counsel against the need for additional procedures. Finally, the burden of added process here would be significant, and that the potential burden “militates against yet more process.”

The Court said that Howell did not violate Shoemaker’s substantive due process rights because Shoemaker had a shared ownership interest in and the de facto use of the curb strip. Under Michigan law, Shoemaker technically owned the property at all relevant times and the City simply possessed a right of way for public use. The erroneous reasoning of the district court relied entirely on the inaccurate determination that the City is the sole owner of the curb strip. Given Shoemaker’s shared ownership interest in the curb strip as well as his de facto use thereof, no substantive due process violation occurred.

Substantive due process holds that governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed. The limitations the Constitution imposes on such governmental deprivations depends on the nature of the right being deprived. Government actions that do not affect fundamental rights will be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

The district court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process, because guideposts for responsible decision-making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended. Despite this, the district court expanded the concept by identifying a new fundamental right: the right not to be forced by a municipal government to maintain municipal property.

The Court of Appeals observed that this “right” was predicated on the finding that the City owned the tree lawn, and that was wrong. Through a conveyance by a platting statute, the government does not receive title in the nature of a private ownership; it acquires no beneficial ownership of the land and has no voice concerning the use; and it does not possess the usual rights of a proprietor, but rather takes title only to the extent that it could preclude questions which might arise respecting the public uses, other than those of mere passage. “Simply put,” the Court of Appeals said, “the law vests the governmental entity with nominal title. We pause at this word ‘nominal’ to emphasize the obvious, i.e., that the property interest conveyed by these early platting statutes is a fee in name only.”

The reality, the Court ruled, is that homeowners have a special interest in the curb strips adjacent to their houses because these strips of land are, for all practical purposes, simply extensions of the homeowners’ lawns. The curb strips also provide a traffic and safety buffer between the street and the rest of the property. In other words, despite the City’s right of way over the curb strip for public use, Shoemaker retained both his property interest in and de facto use of the land in question.

Shoemaker suggested that the Ordinance was somehow “un-American.” The Court didn’t sit still for the argument. It said, “Shoemaker’s argument, like the district court’s opinion, relies on the erroneous assumption that the City is the sole owner of the curb strip. Shoemaker specifically compares the requirement that he maintain the curb strip associated with his property to draconian mandatory public-labor measures adopted by regimes in troubled nations such as the Republic of the Congo, Uzbekistan, and Burma/Myanmar. These analogies are almost too outlandish to address. But even more hyperbolically, Shoemaker argues that the Ordinance ‘makes the City look like North Korea rather than an American city’. This final comparison should come as a surprise to the citizens of both nations.”

Indeed it does.