Case of the Day – Friday, November 1, 2024

Posted on November 1, 2024 by TLRoot tagged.

THE GUY FROM OUT OF TOWN

Mark Twain is reputed to have once said that an expert is just some guy from out of town. Unlike many of the quotes attributed to him, this one is probably authentic.

There are a lot of guys like that in the legal system, as cases rely more and more on esoteric problems that a jury just can’t understand on its own. It is axiomatic in legal circles that witnesses can’t give their opinions, but instead must confine themselves to the facts. Legend incorrectly has it that Sgt. Friday said as much: just the facts, ma’am. And the rules of evidence, both state and federal, largely confine witnesses to “just the facts.”

But those same rules of evidence let certain witnesses, known as “experts,” give their opinions. Naturally, as soon as a good idea like expert witnesses was rolled out, lawyers started to abuse it. Remember the “Twinkies defense?” It relied on an expert to explain to the jury the junk science behind the notion that crème filling was a foreseeable cause of death, murder and mayhem.

Notwithstanding the occasional black eye lawyers and their experts can give the legal system, expert witnesses are crucial as cases get more and more complex. That’s as true in tree law as in most other tort (and many contract) cases. Whether a witness can be qualified as an expert is for the court to determine, and depends on the witness’s education, experience and qualifications. Once qualified as an expert, the witness can give opinions based on a written report provided to the other party. Those opinions must be based on sufficient data, and be the product of reliable principles and methods applied reliably to the facts of the case.

The rules of evidence have effectively moved decisions that control the outcome of a case to a time well prior to the seating of the jury. Today’s case is a good example. Hiram Hyde’s family sued the maker of a stump grinder after the late Mr. Hyde fell in and … well, we’ll leave it to your imagination. The Hyde’s expert witness wanted to testify that putting a clutch mechanism — kind of a cut-off handle like one finds on a rotary mower — on the grinder was easy, economical and logical. The maker’s expert wanted to argue just the opposite.

Both parties went at the other’s experts, questioning their qualifications and opinions. The federal district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, a kind of an assistant judge intended to handle pre-trial and other tedious matters, who ground through the competing claims without being stumped. He concluded that the experts were qualified, but the stump grinder’s guy couldn’t testify to some of his conclusions because they were based on unreliable data.

Hyde v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 2007 WL 2329688 (W.D.Tex. Aug. 7, 2007). Hiram B. Hyde died when, while attempting to grind a tree stump using a stump cutter, he became entangled in the cutting and grinding wheel of the stump cutter. His wife and adult kids sued under the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statute, arguing that the stump cutter — a Vermeer model SC252 designed, manufactured and distributed by Vermeer Manufacturing Company — was defective.

They sued Vermeer for money damages under the doctrine of strict product liability for alleged defects in the stump cutter; negligence in the design, manufacture, sale, and marketing of the stump cutter, negligence in failing to give adequate or proper warnings or instructions for the stump cutter, negligence based on failure to recall the stump cutter, breach of warranty that the stump cutter was fit for the purposes for which it was intended, and for punitive damages based on gross negligence.

Because no one witnessed the accident, the trial of this case was going to depend on the jury’s consideration of expert opinions about the design of the stump cutter. Each side moved to exclude the other party’s expert witnesses. The trial court referred the matter to a magistrate judge for a recommended decision.

Held: Some of the proposed testimony from one of Vermeer’s experts should be excluded, but none of the expert witnesses should be thrown out.

The Magistrate Judge noted that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provided for the admissibility of expert testimony if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Rule 703 provides that an expert’s opinion is generally admissible so long as the facts and data underlying that opinion are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field.

The Hydes offered Russ Rasnic as an expert to testify about feasible alternative designs that Vermeer could have incorporated into the SC252 stump cutter to reduce the risk of an operator contacting a rotating cutter wheel. Vermeer moved to exclude Rasnic’s testimony on the grounds that Rasnic was not qualified to render his proposed opinions, and his proposed opinions were unreliable. Vermeer complained that prior to this litigation, Rasnic’s experience with stump cutters was limited to using a handlebar stump cutter to cut less than 10 stumps and observing a worker operate a hydraulic stump cutter. Vermeer also complained that since the litigation Rasnic’s experience with the SC252 consists of only 2.8 hours of operating a stump cutter. Finally, Vermeer argued that Rasnic has never worked for a manufacturer of stump cutters.

The Magistrate Judge observed, however, that a witness can qualify under Rule 702 as an expert even though he lacks practical experience, provided that he has received suitable training or education or has otherwise gained the requisite knowledge or skill. The absence of hands-on experience with the particular equipment is relevant to the determination of whether to accept a witness as an expert, but it is not determinative. Here, Mr. Rasnic was a qualified mechanical engineer with expertise in industrial equipment, machine design, hydraulics, guarding, and safety engineering. He has designed machinery using clutch brakes, the safety device on which he would testify. He has numerous professional memberships and has evaluated a number of machines in his forensic engineering practice for both plaintiffs and defendants. He had used a handlebar stump cutter to cut stumps on his property and observed a hydraulic stump cutter in operation before using one that he modified for purposes of testing the safety feature he was recommending in this case. While Mr. Rasnic may have limited experience with hydraulically-controlled stump cutters, the Magistrate Judge said, that was most likely a characteristic shared by most mechanical engineers. His credentials, training, and experience were sufficient to qualify him as an expert on guarding systems for the Vermeer SC252 stump cutter.

Vermeer designated Michael Gililland as an expert to rebut the Hydes’s argument about the need for a cut-out switch and to testify about the adequacy of the warnings on the SC252. In his expert’s report, Gililland argued that the addition of the cut-out switch will cause operators to defeat the switch and that the SC252 is not unreasonably dangerous and the warnings on the machine are adequate. Since preparing his report, Gilliland interviewed five people who had participated in a Vermeer test of an SC252 stump cutter modified with Rasnic’s proposal. Gililland stated that his interviews confirmed the opinions expressed in his expert report. The Hydes have moved to exclude Gililland’s testimony about the 5-user test because he failed to supplement his report and that the plaintiffs did not learn about the 5-user test until after the discovery period had closed, leaving them unfairly surprised by the new information.

The Magistrate Judge agreed that the 5-user test report should be excluded. Rule 703 holds that experts may rely on three sources of information to form their opinions: (1) first-hand observation by the witness, (2) presentation at trial, and (3) presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception. Here, Gililland did not participate in, or observe the 5-user test. Instead, his knowledge of the 5-user test was presented by Vermeer outside of court and was obtained by interviewing the five operators. That testimony was hearsay, the Magistrate Judge said, because Vermeer sought to use statements by the five operators to support Gililland’s opinion of the Rasnic proposal to add a cut-out switch to the SC252.

Under 703, an expert can discuss as the basis for an opinion either facts or data which are otherwise inadmissible hearsay if the basis is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. In this case, Vermeer did not show that Gililland’s testimony about his interviews with the five operators was of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. First, Gililland had no control over the test. He did not modify the SC252 stump cutters used in the 5-user test, he did not observe the modification of the stump cutters, he did not know who modified the stump cutters, and he did not know who took his photos of the modified machines. He did not record the interviews with the five operators, but instead, he recorded the interviewees’ answers to his questions on a checklist form. In at least two cases, the checklist suggested the desired answer. Finally, his testimony was based on information about a test developed and conducted by his client in anticipation of litigation.

In his report, Gililland advanced several opinions about why Mr. Hyde’s actions constituted negligence and why Vermeer was not negligent. The Magistrate Judge said his opinions were legal conclusions that Gililland was not qualified to advance. The jury would determine the parties’ negligence in this case, and Gililland would not be permitted to testify about his conclusions about the parties’ respective negligence.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Thursday, October 31, 2024

Posted on October 31, 2024 by TLRoot tagged.

YOU SNOOZE, YOU LOSE

This past weekend was sunny, brisk and glorious, one that called for enjoying the fall splendor. Outside of a Halloween fright for the first three quarters of Ohio State-Nebraska football (before my beloved Buckeyes awakened from their gridiron snooze to eke out a four-point win in a game where the Buckeyes were three-touchdown favorites – and, by the way, I should say “well fought, Nebraska”), I spent the weekend raking up the fall splendor. A lot of it. By 7 o’clock Sunday night, I was nodding off to sleep.

I used to have the same problem many decades ago in Property Law, a required course for first-year law students. All of those terms I had happily lived 22 years without knowing: fee simple absolute, livery of seizen, life estates, enfeeoffment, trespass quare clausum fregit… Contract law made great sense, civil procedure had a certain elegance, but property…

More often than they should have, my eyes glazed over, my head slumped, and I slumbered while Professor Prosser droned. Even without first raking leaves. Ah, how education is wasted on the young.

Speaking of slumber, the defendant in today’s blast from the past did just that. Like your author, he paid too little attention to Byzantine concepts like life estates. When the owner of a life estate gave him permission to harvest timber on her land, Hempy slept on his rights. The owner of the life estate died, whereupon Hempy awoke from his slumber and figured maybe he had better get those trees cut.

Too little, too late. A life estate lasts only as long as the person holding the life estate does. While the holder lives, the life estate can create real mischief, but once the life expires, so does the estate. And so do any rights the estate holder may have granted.

But the reason the timber cutting was a trespass is not terribly relevant to today’s case. Instead, it is only the setup for the real issue, which is how to value the damages.

Koonz v. Hempy, 120 N.W. 976 (Supreme Court, Iowa, 1909). Koonz sued Hempy for cutting timber on property in which he had recently obtained an interest following the death of his mother. Apparently, Koonz’s mother, who had held a life estate in the property granted by her deceased husband, had contracted with Hempy to remove timber on the property. However, Hempy did not harvest the timber until after the mother had died. The trial court ruled that mom’s demise meant that Hempy had lost his right to cut the timber, because the life estate was extinguished with her passing, and Koonz was now in possession. The court awarded damages to Koonz, and both parties appealed.

Held: Hempy was liable to pay the value of the harvested timber to Koonz. However, Hempy argued that if he was liable at all, it was only for the reduction in the value of the property after he removed the timber. The Court disagreed, ruling that “where the thing destroyed or removed from real property, although it is part of the realty, has a value which can be accurately measured … without reference to the soil on which it stands, the recovery may be of the value of thing thus destroyed or removed, and not for the difference in the value of the land.”

Applying this rule, the Court held that the trial court had properly measured damages in terms of the value of the timber alone. Throwing a bone to Hempy, the Court ruled that the trial court properly denied treble damages, because Hempy’s actions failed to demonstrate the requisite willfulness to warrant such an award.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Wednesday, October 30, 2024

Posted on October 30, 2024 by TLRoot tagged.

YOUR RESPONSE STINKS

This case is the septic equivalent to the old doctor’s advice of “take two aspirin and call me in the morning.”

Mrs. Hubbell was a resident of Xenia, a small city in southeastern Ohio (Motto: One of America’s only cities to start with ‘x’). One unfortunate day, Mrs. Hubbell discovered that ‘x’ didn’t just stand for “Xenia.” It stood for ‘x’crement, too.

When Mrs. Hubbell’s basement, bathroom and kitchen all started filling up with some pretty nasty effluent from the sewer line, she called the emergency helpline the City of Xenia maintained for homeowners with such smelly problems. But it was the weekend, and the sewer department worker on duty wasn’t too keen on going out in the rain to check out her problem. He figured that it was just the rain backing things up, and if it were really bad, Mrs. Hubbell would call again.

Well, it was really bad, and Mrs. Hubbell did call again an hour later, to catalog all of the types of malodorous waste bubbling into rooms all over her house. That time, the worker did come. When he and his assistants pulled a manhole cover off the sewer main around the corner, a fountain of filth erupted and the liquid waste in the Hubbell home started draining away. It turned out that tree roots had jammed up the sewer main, and the City’s maintenance program hadn’t gotten around to clearing them away.

Mrs. Hubbell was unhappy at the Sewer Department’s lackadaisical response to her problem, so she sued. The City claimed it was immune under Ohio’s governmental immunity statute because its inspection program was an exercise in discretion. True, the Court agreed, but there was nothing requiring any special expertise in the lazy worker’s refusal to respond when Mrs. Hubbell reported a problem. The problem, the Court said, is that almost everything required some discretion, and to accept the City’s argument meant that everything a governmental entity did would be immune.

Erupting effluvient …

Here, the City had a kind of a contract with its residents. The City offered an emergency number, and the implied deal was that if a local taxpayer called, the City would respond. The worker’s decision to let the stink build — and to be sure, it was a real problem worthy of his attention on a Sunday afternoon — could easily be negligence. The Court said Mrs. Hubbell was entitled to her chance to prove that to a jury.

Hubbell v. Xenia, 175 Ohio App.3d 99, 885 N.E.2d 290 (Ct.App. Ohio 2008). Water and sewage began flowing into Mrs. Hubbell’s home through drains in a shower, a toilet, and a bathroom sink. Believing that the stinking problem was likely caused by a malfunction in the sewer system maintained by the City of Xenia. She called the City’s emergency services, and the call automatically transferred to the Xenia Police Department. The police paged an on-call sewer and waste maintenance worker, but he refused to do anything, suspecting that the problem was likely the result of heavy rainfall that day.

The sewage and dirty water continued to flow into Mrs. Hubbell’s home, and she desperately placed a second call for help several hours later. This time, the on-call worker decided to respond and investigate the problem, and a service crew was brought in.

Hubbell’s home is located at the intersection of Monroe and Home Avenues. The house is connected to the sewer main on Home Avenue, which in turn connects to the main on Monroe Avenue. The service crew examined the Home Avenue main line and found it was flowing freely, but when they removed the Monroe Avenue manhole cover, the backup into Hubbell’s house promptly subsided. The crew removed tree roots that had invaded the main. Sewer Department officials conceded that the roots may have contributed to the blockage.

Hubbell sued, alleging that Xenia was negligent in maintaining and operating its sewer line because it failed to inspect the Monroe Street main, allowing the line to become obstructed and clogged by tree roots and collected refuse, causing the back-up into her home. She also said the sewer condition constituted a nuisance for which Xenia was liable. Xenia claimed it was immune from liability under the Political Subdivision and Tort Liability Act.

The trial court refused to throw the case out, and Xenia appealed.

Held: The City was not entitled to have the case dismissed without trial. Generally, the Court said, where a municipal corporation assumes the management and control of a sewer, it is required to exercise reasonable diligence and care to keep the system in repair and free from conditions that will cause damage to private property. The municipality’s failure to do so may make it liable for damages caused by its negligence.

However, a municipal corporation’s liability is nevertheless subject to the defense of governmental immunity provided by §2744.01 of the Ohio Revised Code, if any of the five exceptions or one of the defenses to immunity set out in the statute apply.

Here, the Court ruled, Xenia’s ongoing inspection and cleaning of its sewer lines were entitled to governmental immunity because the execution of the program involved judgment and discretion as to how extensive and in what manner the program would be executed. However, routine decisions requiring little judgment or discretion and which, instead, portray inadvertence, inattention, or neglect, are not covered by the statute’s grant of immunity.

The City maintenance worker’s decision not to respond to Mrs. Hubbell’s call regarding the sewer backup incident, due to his belief that her problem resulted from excess rainfall, wasn’t an act of judgment or discretion for which the city was entitled to governmental immunity. Instead, the City’s contractual agreement with its residents to provide emergency services to those to whom it provided sewer services gave rise to a duty to perform such emergency services with ordinary care.

When one undertakes a duty to perform an act, and another reasonably relies on that undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary care. A genuine issue of material fact existed, the Court said, as to whether the City was negligent in its performance of its duty to provide emergency services to Mrs. Hubbell, and that matter could only be settled at trial.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Tuesday, October 29, 2024

Posted on October 29, 2024 by TLRoot tagged.

THE CAMEL’S NOSE

Prescriptive easements – easements across someone’s land acquired, usually by public utilities, because of a lapse of time – are fairly common. That’s usually because no one thinks twice about utility poles and overhead lines – or buried gas lines, for that matter – until an issue arises and the landowner discovers to his or her chagrin that the utility never obtained an easement for the overhead or underground facilities, but too much time has passed to do anything about it.

In today’s case, a prickly landowner with the unlikely name of Lindburgh Jackson didn’t much like the overhead power lines and the utility pole on the land he bought in 1978. But somehow, for all of his complaining, he never bothered to check to see that Alabama Power had an easement to be there. It didn’t.

Unfortunately, for Unlucky Lindy, it took him nearly 25 years to challenge APCo, and only then because – as is increasingly common in our wired world – some new fiber optic system named Lightwave wanted to use the APCo poles and easement for its cable.

APCo easily proved that it had a prescriptive easement over Jackson’s land. After all, it had been trespassing with its poles for over 21 years. But the Alabama Supreme Court held that just because APCo had snagged an easement from Jackson for free to maintain electric lines didn’t mean Lightwave could cross the land with impunity, even on the APCo poles. The camel’s nose might be in the tent, but that didn’t mean that the whole camel could necessarily follow. APCo could use the easement for electricity transmission, but not for anything else it cared to.

The Supreme Court’s ruling suggests that Alabama at least takes a very strict view of how much a landowner has given up when he or she loses an easement by prescription — and that’s probably a good thing.

Ex parte Lightwave Technologies, L.L.C., 971 So.2d 712 (Sup.Ct. Ala. Apr. 27, 2007). Lindburgh Jackson owned property in Auburn, Alabama. Alabama Power Company has maintained power lines across his land and a utility pole on the property since he bought the place in 1978. Mr. Jackson never much cared for APCo, and has complained continually about APCo’s use and maintenance of the lines and the pole, but he did nothing about them.

Sometime in 2001, Lightwave Technologies – pursuant to a “pole-sharing” agreement with APCo – installed fiber-optic cable on the utility pole on the Jackson property. The City of Auburn had authorized Lightwave to install its cable and had established the route for such placement. Jackson sued everyone, APCo, Lightwave, and the City of Auburn, alleging among other claims that APCo had conspired with Lightwave to commit trespass on his property. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of all the defendants.

The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that because APCo had maintained the power lines in opposition to Jackson’s objections from April 1983 until September 2003, it had obtained an easement by prescription over the portion of his land it used. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld judgment for APCo with respect to the trespass claim filed against it and found for APCo and Lightwave on the conspiracy claim.

Undaunted, Jackson appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

Held: APCo could not give Lightwave the right to use its prescriptive easement over Jackson’s land.

In order to determine whether APCo had the right to permit Lightwave to use the easement, the Court considered first whether APCo has the right to apportion its prescriptive easement and whether its apportionment to Lightwave was within the scope of the prescriptive easement. The Court said that the term “apportionability” in reference to easements refers to the easement owner’s right to divide the easement to produce independent uses or operations.

In general, the Court observed, an exclusive easement in gross is apportionable to the extent the additional use is authorized by the manner or terms of the easement’s creation. An easement in gross is an easement that benefits an easement holder personally whether rather than the benefit of the easement accruing to another piece of land. An exclusive easement grants unfettered rights to the owner of the easement to use the easement for purposes specified in the grant to the exclusion of all others, including the servient owner. Here, the Court held, APCo’s prescriptive easement was an exclusive easement in gross because it permits APCo to use the easement for the construction and maintenance of power lines and precludes, by its nature, Jackson and Matthews from using the easement for that purpose.

Just because a utility pole on a prescriptive carries one wire doesn’t mean that it may carry more than one …

Prior decisions held that easements and easements acquired by condemnation may be apportioned when the language in the document or condemnation order creating the easement indicates an intention to convey or to grant the right to apportion and when the apportionment does not constitute an additional servitude. But, the Court said, the decisions cannot stand for the proposition that a prescriptive easement – like the one in this case – is apportionable as a matter of law. Although the Court agreed that APCo’s prescriptive easement could be apportioned, the question to be resolved is exactly what rights APCo possessed that it could apportion.

In Alabama, the scope of an easement established by prescription is determined by the extent of the use. An easement holder is not entitled to materially alter the scope of its easement. Here, Jackson allowed APCo to gain a prescriptive easement over the disputed property. However, while Lightwave may have affixed its line to the power pole nearly 3 years before Jackson filed this action, one can hardly conclude that a relatively short 3-year delay amounts to acquiescence by Jackson of the apportionment. The Supreme Court ruled that APCo acquired the right to string power lines across the disputed property, but it did not acquire a right to string any line or cable providing something other than, or related to, electrical power over the easement.

Because APCo’s prescriptive easement is limited in scope to the extent of the use that created it, APCo’s apportionment of the prescriptive easement does not serve to insulate it from the conspiracy claim, nor does APCo’s attempt to apportion its prescriptive easement insulate Lightwave from either the trespass claim or the conspiracy claim against Lightwave.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Monday, October 28, 2024

Posted on October 28, 2024 by TLRoot tagged.

MEAN WHAT YOU SAY

I suppose that given the most recent former inhabitant of the White House – who figures to live there again, conviction-free, come January – discussions of the warts, real or imagined, of former presidents must seem like nitpicking. But still, we recall that back when George Stephanopoulos was a mere flack for President Bill Clinton and not yet a respected television commentator for ABC, he parried a skeptical Larry King with a defense that was unintentionally candid.

President Clinton, George declared, had “kept all of the promises he intended to keep.” Any suggestion that the former President might have lacked veracity at times may today seem hopelessly quaint. But the malefactors in today’s case apparently tried it out for themselves.

In order to get a zoning variance to add on to their newly-purchased estate in the tres chic village of Centre Island, New York (once home to Billy Joel and his $32.5 million shanty), the Comacks promised not to let the shrubs and trees obstruct anyone’s view of Oyster Bay. Believing their sincere pledge, the Village OK’d the proposal.

A few years later, the bushes were high and the trees were leafy, and the Comacks said something to the effect of, “Promise? What promise? Oh, that promise… It’s… uh… kind of unclear what we really intended to promise. Let’s just forget the whole thing.” Or something like that.

Sometimes, as nice as the trees may be, the view without them is even better. (Editor’s note: this photo was not taken at the Comack’s – it is illustrative only)

The Village elders didn’t forget it, soreheads that they apparently were, and sued the Comacks. The trial court found for the Comacks, but the court of appeals reversed and required the Comacks to keep their word. The appellate judges apparently could figure out what the meaning of “is” was.

Incorporated Village of Centre Island v. Comack, 39 A.D.3d 712, 834 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2007). In 1999 the Comacks purchased property in the village of Centre Island and sought a variance to maintain and enlarge the pre-existing, nonconforming home on the lot. Specifically, they sought to build a second-story addition over the existing garage and to change the roof line. The proposed expansion and changes would have necessarily affected the neighboring properties’ existing views of the waters of Oyster Bay. And, Centre Island being a ghetto of the fabulously well-to-do, the unobstructed views of all that their wealth had enabled them to accumulate were rather important to the residents.

In consideration for the granting of the variance, the Comacks signed a “Declaration” that provided “[a]ll open views from points off the premises to Oyster Bay shall remain in their present unobstructed state … [n]o trees or major shrubs shall be planted on lots 85 and 86 with the exception of minor shrubs and bushes which if allowed to grow to full height would not impede the aforesaid open views. Any shrubs or plants which if allowed to grow to maturity would exceed three feet in height will require the approval of the village building inspector for compliance with the intent of the declaration …”

Remember Johnny Nash? Are you really that old? Johnny obviously didn’t live near the Comacks, or he would never have written the song.

The variance was granted, but a few years later, shrubs and trees planted by the Comacks began obstructing neighbors’ views of the Bay. The Village sued. The trial court agreed with the Comacks that the “Declaration” was vague and that the case should be dismissed. The Village appealed.

Held: The trial court was wrong. It was the Village’s complaint that should be granted, not the Comack’s request that it be dismissed. Contrary to the trial court’s determination, the language of the “Declaration” and, in particular, the first provision thereof, was not “imprecise and vague” so as to render it unenforceable. Instead, the “Declaration” — read as a whole to determine its purpose and intent — is clear that the Comacks made a deal. In consideration for the granting of the variance, the Comacks agreed to maintain “[a]ll open views from points off the premises to Oyster Bay … in their present unobstructed state.”

Because there is no ambiguity, the “Declaration” must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms. The Court held that to the extent that certain shrubs and trees planted by the Comacks obstructed “open views from points off the premises to Oyster Bay,” these violate the “Declaration.” The Court sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether the Village was entitled to damages and whether the Comacks should be ordered to cut down certain shrubs and trees from the subject property that obstructed “open views from points off the premises to Oyster Bay.”

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Friday, October 25, 2024

Posted on October 25, 2024 by TLRoot tagged.

ILLEGAL CONTACT

What would October be without football? Pop Warner football, middle school football, high school football, college football, pro football, backyard football… and the promise of the rivalry games of November, then Ohio State-_ichigan, Army-Navy, and the bowl games starting with the dull thrum of the Celebration Bowl and Camellia Bowl on December 14th, building up to the thundering crescendo of the Sugar, Cotton, Orange and Rose Bowls, and, of course, the new 12-team college playoffs that will add spice to the major bowl games.

So, in honor of football, more football, and even more football, we’re looking at one of the Cardinal rules of trespass – illegal contact.

Usually illegal contact, that is, trespass to trees — where someone enters someone else’s land and cuts down trees without any right to do so — is pretty cut and dried. But not all trespasses are clear-cut (to turn a pun).

In today’s case from Louisiana, a party bought a piece of land from the tree owner’s sister but conditioned the purchase on being able to get rid of some trees on the boundary line with the tree owner. The owner – no doubt a Patriot – signed a contract entitling the buyer to cut down trees on the boundary. The problem was that the contract was imprecise as to how many, or where exactly the trees were. The only thing that was clear was that the parties agreed that wild Broncos couldn’t pull him over to cut down the tree owner’s prize old live oak.

Too bad the owner didn’t watch the tree-cutting crew like a Seahawk. The buyer’s contractor was no Saint. In fact, he was kind of a Buccaneer. He cut down 12 trees and, although he was told not to, he trimmed the live oak pretty aggressively. The owner cried “Deciduous foul!” and lawsuits flew like yellow hankies. Being unable to Bear the mess, the owner raced like a Jet to the courthouse and slapped a Giant lawsuit on the buyer, Raven that he hadn’t given permission to do anything like that, and the contractor was Lion if he said otherwise. He wanted treble damages for the wrongful cutting.

The court awarded about 5,000 Bills in damage for the cut branches on the live oak, but it disagreed on the treble damages. The Court said that the ambiguous contract seemed to contemplate that the 12 trees would be cut down, and there was no basis for any recovery on those. As for the injured live oak, it was damaged but still standing. The statute awarded treble damages for cutting down trees, and the trimming — although a violation of the contract — wasn’t something for which treble damages could be awarded.

The plaintiff felt deflated over the whole episode.

Distefano v. Berrytown Produce, LLC, 973 So.2d 182 (La.App. 1 Cir., 2007). Distefano owned a 2-acre vacant tract of land along Church Street. Berrytown Produce, LLC sought to buy a piece of land next to the Distefano tract to operate a produce business. That land was owned by Rose Millican, DiStefano’s sister.

A line of trees on Distefano’s land blocked the view of the Millican tract approaching it from the highway. Berrytown conditioned its purchase on obtaining Mr. Distefano’s permission to remove trees from his property. So Distefano authorized Berrytown in a written agreement to remove all trees on the property line dividing the Distefano and Millican tracts, except for a live oak tree. Berrytown hired Kemp Richardson to perform the clearing work. Richardson cut and removed 12 trees from the Distefano and Millican tracts, and he cut a significant number of branches from the live oak tree on Mr. Distefano’s tract.

Eisfeld should have gotten this sign with special wording, "And don't cut down my trees, Martin!"

This means you, Berrytown! Trespassing – kind of like the real property version of offsides.

Distefano filed a timber trespass action against Berrytown and Richardson, saying the defendants cut and removed five trees from his property and cut branches off the live oak tree without his permission. Distefano tried to recover damages under Louisiana Revised Statute 3:4278.1, commonly referred to as the “timber trespass” statute, which imposes a penalty of three times the fair market value of trees on people who unlawfully cut, fell, destroy, remove, or divert trees from a landowner’s property. Distefano also claimed restoration damages and damages due to the decrease in the value of his land and further urged that the defendants’ cutting activities caused him to suffer non-pecuniary damages.

At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court found that the agreement between Distefano and Berrytown contemplated the cutting and removal of all trees on the Distefano property that had been actually cut down. The court found that the parties clearly understood that the live oak tree was not to be cut, and awarded Distefano $6,045.00 for the unlawful removal of branches from his live oak tree, accepting expert testimony setting the fair market value of the live oak tree at that amount. The court declined to award treble damages, finding the treble damage provision inapplicable because the tree itself had not been cut down and removed, and because there was insufficient evidence of the fair market value of the limbs removed from the tree.

Distefano appealed, challenging the court’s finding that he consented to the cutting down of five trees from his property and the denial of his treble damage claim.

Held: The trial court’s decision was upheld. The Court found that the contract called for the cutting of “all trees on the dividing property line” between the Distefano and Millican tracts, “with the exception of the live oak tree located on or near the property line.” A witness attested there were no trees on the property line itself, but there were trees close to the property line that hung over the property line, and those were the trees Berrytown wished to have removed. Distefano contended that the parties never contemplated the removal of any trees not located exactly on the common property line, but other witnesses disagreed, and the trial court’s findings of fact were found to be reasonable.

Distefano contended that the trial court should have ordered the defendants to pay treble damages. Louisiana Revised Statute 3:4278.1 imposes a penalty of three times the fair market value of the trees on those persons who unlawfully cut, fell, destroy, remove, or divert trees from a landowner’s property without the landowner’s consent. But, the Court said, no tree was cut down without permission. Instead, the oak tree was trimmed without permission, and the cut trees were taken pursuant to the agreement. Although contrary to the contract, the Court ruled, because the oak tree was not cut down, the statute did not authorize treble damages under the facts of this case.

– Tom Root

Case of the Day – Thursday, October 24, 2024

Posted on October 24, 2024 by TLRoot tagged.

YOU’RE BREATHING MY AIR

I recently undertook a home construction project (imagined and ramrodded by my wife of 45 years, of course). I found myself trimming back some gargantuan arborvitae belonging to my neighbor, whom I will call “John” because that’s his name. The arborvitae were just puny little bushes when planted by Andy and Allwyn, next-door residents two neighboring homeowners ago, but in the 25 years since they were mere shrubs planted a foot or so on John’s side of the property line, the arborvitae have grown into towering, misshapen monsters.

On my side of the property line, they have swollen well into my airspace.

My airspace? Sounds a bit pretentious, doesn’t it? But that’s what we’re really talking about when we discuss overhanging branches and limbs. We all know about adverse possession – in which a sufficiently brazen squatter can gain title to your property if he or she waits you out – and even prescriptive easements, where the same trespasser can acquire rights to use your property.

What if my neighbor had stalked out his back door last weekend and claimed his branches had been overhanging my property (and messing up the roof of my shed) for more than 21 years, giving him a prescriptive easement to my airspace? So while it’s still my air, he gets to use it. And breathe it. And there is nothing I can do about it? Whither the Massachusetts Rule?

A prescriptive easement over your neighbor’s airspace is a novel argument, indeed. Fortunately for me, if my neighbor stalks out of his backdoor, he is much more likely to confront me with a basket of zucchini or a big butternut squash than he is with a wacky airspace easement argument. He is a pretty fine neighbor.

But not everyone is blessed with a neighbor as congenial as mine. That’s lucky for me in a sense because – as the Kansas Court of Appeals observed – when neighbors cannot get along, the courts protect property rights. And when courts do that, I have something to write about. Neighbor disputes that end up in court happen frequently enough to keep me going five days a week. And there are plenty of cases I never get to.

But how about that airspace argument? In today’s case, the owner of a tree that leaned over his neighbor’s yard claimed his 75-year-old pecan tree had acquired a prescriptive easement over his neighbor’s airspace. Take that, Massachusetts Rule!

Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (Latin for “whoever’s is the soil, it is theirs all the way to Heaven and all the way to Hell”), a principle of property law, holds that property holders have rights to not only to the plot of land itself, but also the air above and (in the broader formulation) the ground below. (Note to self: insert here a nod of thanks to my sainted Latin teacher of yore, Emily Bernges, or else I couldn’t translate that). The principle is often referred to in its abbreviated form as the ad coelum doctrine. So was the airspace claim clever lawyering, or just a lot of hot air? Let’s see whether the Court abrogated the ad coelum doctrine or instead brought the defendant back down to earth.

Pierce v. Casady, 11 Kan.App.2d 23, 711 P.2d 766 (Kansas Ct.App. 1985). Jim Pierce and Paul Casady are adjoining landowners with a 75-year-old pecan tree between them. The pecan trunk and root flare are on Paul’s land – but only a foot from the property line – and the tree leans toward Jim’s place. In fact, according to Jim, about three-quarters of the tree overhangs his land, rather ominously, given the substantial split in the tree’s fork (which also overhangs Jim’s property).

The length of the split on one limb is four feet and on the other about two feet. If the tree fell due to the split, it would fall on Jim’s house, garage, and any cars in the driveway. Trimming the tree at the property line is not practical – unless one does not mind killing the tree in the process – because of the tree’s location and the angle at which it leans.

Jim sued for a declaratory judgment that he had the right to cut the overhanging branches back to their property line or, in the alternative, to declare the tree a nuisance to be abated by removal. Paul claimed he had acquired a prescriptive easement to Jim’s airspace. The trial court disagreed, ruling that Paul had no prescriptive right to the airspace the tree occupied and that the tree constituted a nuisance that rightly caused Jim to fear for his safety. Paul was ordered to abate the nuisance by removing the tree either at its base or at the point where it crosses plaintiffs’ property line.

Paul appealed.

Held: An easement by prescription cannot be acquired by overhanging tree branches. Furthermore, a landowner has a right to trim branches that overhang the landowner’s property even though the trunk of the tree is on a neighbor’s land, although the landowner may not go on a neighbor’s land and remove any part of a tree without the neighbor’s permission.

Trees constitute a nuisance if overhanging branches do substantial harm or the overhanging branches create an imminent danger. If a tree is a nuisance, a landowner may compel a neighbor to abate the nuisance or, if an injury occurs, look to the neighbor to pay any damages allowable by law.

The court of appeals rejected Paul’s argument that he had acquired an easement through Jim’s airspace, because such cannot be gotten by prescription, that is, by simply occupying the airspace without permission for a long enough period of time.

Jim argued that the tree could not be a nuisance. That did not affect Paul’s right to trim branches that were overhanging his property even though the trunk of the tree was on Paul’s land. The landowner may not, the Court said, go on the neighbor’s land and remove the tree or any part thereof absent his neighbor’s permission.

If the tree is a nuisance, the landowner may compel the neighbor to abate the nuisance or, if an injury occurs, look to the neighbor to pay any damages allowable by law. In this case, the Court observed, it appeared that if the tree is trimmed at the property line it would be killed. The trial court recognized this and gave Paul the option to trim back to the property line or simply remove the whole tree.

The Court held that whether the tree constituted a nuisance was a question of fact. Generally, a tree is a nuisance when it constantly drops branches and requires constant maintenance. Or, a tree is a nuisance when there is a statute so defining it. Finally, a tree becomes a nuisance when it does substantial harm or creates an immediate danger of causing harm, the Court held, relying on Whitesell v. Houlton, the case that defined the Hawaii Rule.

Kansas recognizes that trees constitute a nuisance if the overhanging branches do substantial harm or the overhanging branches create an imminent danger.

Here, the Court said, the tree was a danger to Jim, reasonably causing him to fear for his safety. The evidence supported the reasonableness of his apprehension: the split in the fork of the tree located above his property, the squeaking sound when the wind blows, the angle at which the tree leans toward Jim’s property, and the testimony of the experts.

Paul argued that the tree could be made safe by cables and bolts. The Court was unimpressed, holding that even that work would have to be done in Jim’s airspace. Paul had no right to go on Jim’s property to do that work for the same reasons Jim had no right to go on Paul’s property to trim or cut down the tree.

Paul was thus ordered to cut the tree off at the property line or remove it altogether.

The Court admitted that “the result reached here will be distasteful to all who treasure trees. The philosophy of the law is simply that whenever neighbors cannot agree, the law will protect each property owner’s rights insofar as that is possible. Any other result would cause landowners to seek self-help or to litigate each time a piece of vegetation starts to overhang their property for fear of losing the use or partial use of their property as the vegetation grows.”

– Tom Root