What happens when landowners can’t get along? Not like husbands and wives – that kind of “not getting along” will always be with us. Rather, what happens when heirs end up owning property together, with each having a fractional piece and no one being able to agree with anyone else about anything?
When that happens – as it did in today’s case – the law provides that land may be partitioned, that is, divided among the owners according to statute. Where reasonable division isn’t feasible, the land is sold and the proceeds divided.
There’s another legal concept important for today’s case, and that’s what’s commonly known as the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds was intended to prevent frauds by requiring that certain types of agreements be in writing. Traditionally, the statute of frauds requires a signed agreement for
• contracts in consideration of marriage (including prenuptial agreements);
• contracts that by their terms cannot be performed within one year;
• contracts relating to an interest in land (including contracts of sale, mortgages and easements);
• contracts by the executor of a will to pay an estate debt with his or her own money;
• contracts for the sale of goods totaling $500 or more; or
• contracts in which one party becomes a surety for another party’s debt or other obligation.
The contracts covered by the Statute of Frauds can be remembered by using the mnemonic device “MY LEGS”: Marriage, contracts for more than one Year, Land, Executor (or Estate), Goods ($500 or more), Surety.
In today’s case, one landowner – called a co-tenant because the owners owned the land as a tenancy in common (an expression having nothing to do with rental) – wanted to cut down trees on two of the parcels. When the other co-tenants complained, the first (we’ll call him Greedy Gus) said he was taking the two lots on which the trees were located anyway, and letting the other owners have the more expensive, better parcel. The other owners (think of them as Sloppy and Hasty) agreed with his oral proposal, and even made a $16,000 equalization payment as part of the understanding. But when they finally got around to signing an agreement, Greedy Gus wanted to change the deal. Now he sought a whopping big equalization payment, one Sloppy and Hasty wouldn’t pay.
No deal was signed, and Gus then sued for partition under the statute (which would have valued the entire property and given him a much larger stake than what the others said he had agreed to). Sloppy and Hasty counter-claimed, but the trial court granted summary judgment for Gus. S & H appealed, and the Court of Appeals sided with them.
The appellate panel held that there were enough facts in play to require the matter to go to a jury, but the Arizona Supreme Court had the last word. Both the Appeals Court and the Supreme Court warned the Sloppy and Hasty, the two co-tenants who were arguing for the existence of an agreement, that the alleged voluntary partition agreement was subject to the Statute of Frauds, and the amount of paper evidencing an agreement was pretty sparse. Partial performance of a contract will exempt it from the Statute of Frauds: if I sell you a lot, and accept your payment but refuse to give you a deed, the partial performance — your payment — excuses non-compliance with the Statute. Here, the Court of Appeals was pretty clearly unimpressed with the suggestion that the tree cutting was enough performance to excuse the lack of paper. It offered Sloppy and Hasty their day in court, but the day didn’t look too promising.
The day turned out to be anything but promising. The Arizona Supreme Court held that in order to constitute partial performance, the act had to unequivocally prove the existence of the unwritten contract. In other words, “part performance must consist of acts that ‘cannot, in the ordinary course of human conduct, be accounted for in any other manner than as having been done in pursuance of a contract’. The Supreme Court said that “in addition to providing an equitable basis for ordering specific performance, acts of part performance serve an important evidentiary function – they excuse the writing required by the statute because they provide convincing proof that the contract exists. So that this exception does not swallow the rule, the acts of part performance take an alleged contract outside the statute only if they cannot be explained in the absence of the contract.”
Here, the Supreme Court ruled, the acts that Sloppy and Hasty called evidence of part performance were really acts that were as consistent with their one-third co-tenancy interest as they were of anything else. With no partial performance, the unwritten contract went unenforced, too.
Owens v. M.E. Schepp Ltd. Partnership, 182 P.3d 664 (Supreme Court of Arizona, 2008). The parties owned undivided interests as tenants in common in contiguous residential lots. Hal Owens had a two-thirds interest and Schepp Partnership had a one-third interest. Two of the three lots were vacant, and a residence and guest house were on the third. The guest house was rented to third parties, but one of the Schepp partners lived in the residence.
Hal sued for partition of the lots and an accounting for rents and profits. Schepp Partnership answered and counterclaimed for specific performance of an alleged voluntary partition agreement or, alternatively, damages for a purported reduction in value of two of the lots caused by Hal’s removal of mature trees. Schepp Partnership argued that statutory partition was not available to Hal because he had entered into the voluntary partition agreement.
While meeting with the Schepps over a City notice to clean up the lots, Hal had said he wanted to remove a row of mature, 65-foot tamarack trees along the northern edge the lots. Thomas Schepp objected, saying the neighbors would be upset. Hal responded that he would decide what to do because he was taking two lots and leaving the most developed one to Schepp Partnership. He also told the partners that because Schepp Partnership would be getting the more valuable lot, it might cost the partners some money.
The parties agreed to divide the lots in this manner but did not reach agreement on any equalization payment. The Schepp brothers understood, however, that Hal might make a future claim for such payment. Soon after the meeting, Hal removed the trees. He told one of the Schepps that because he had paid a great deal of money for the two lots, the choice to remove the trees was his alone. Hal and Thomas Schepp then agreed a second time that Hal would take two lesser-value lots and Schepp Partnership would take the developed one. Based on this agreement to split the lots, the Schepps allowed Hal to remove the mature trees. Schepp Partnership later paid Hal $16,600, one-third of the total removal cost, as compensation to Hal in light of Schepp Partnership’s receipt of the more valuable lot.
A few months later, the Schepp Partnership sent a partition agreement to Hal for execution, but he returned it unsigned objecting to the lack of an equalization payment provision. Hal proposed that Schepp Partnership pay him $233,333 and grant him an access easement as equalization. The parties negotiated but never reached agreement regarding whether additional compensation. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Hal, ordering statutory partition and appointment of commissioners, and dismissing the counterclaim for specific performance, holding that there was never an agreement as to how the property is to be divided between the parties. The Schepps appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court , but the Schepps couldn’t find much solace in that fact. Partition is a means of dividing real property among certain types of owners. Property may be partitioned by agreement, or — if agreement cannot be reached — according to the requirements of state law. Voluntary agreements to partition real property are preferred to and controlling over involuntary partition proceedings.
A contract is formed when there is a bargain, consisting of promises exchanged, and consideration. To be enforceable, a contract must be reasonably certain and definite. Agreements leaving material terms for future resolution can be enforceable nevertheless if the parties sufficiently manifested mutual assent to be bound by those agreements. Where terms are missing, extrinsic evidence can be used to establish the meaning of the parties’ contract and supply omitted terms.
Here, the Court of Appeals said, a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the co-tenants mutually agreed to be bound by an oral partition agreement. That issue of fact precluded summary judgment. But any alleged agreement between the co-tenants to partition the lots constituted an agreement for sale of their respective interest in the other’s remaining real property for purposes of the statute of frauds. And in order to satisfy the statute of frauds, the agreement must be in writing.
Subsequently, the Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, reinstating the original trial court decision. It held that no trial was necessary because neither the Partnership’s withdrawal of its objection to the tree removal nor its payment of one-third of the landscaping contractor’s bill was “unequivocally referable” to the alleged contract. Put differently, neither act is of such character as not to be reasonably explicable on other grounds. While it is true that partial performance of an oral contract is enough to take the agreement outside of the Statute of Frauds, Partnership did nothing that proved with partial performance the contract that should have been – but was not – put in writing.
– Tom Root